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COVER STORY
The Tiger
and the Dragons
Continued...India Inc.'s Asia
Strategy Ventures - I
THE A.V. BIRLA GROUP
East Asia is not new to the Rs
15,000-crore Kumar Mangalam Birla Group. It was in 1974 that Aditya Birla, the founder of
the Kumar Mangalam Birla empire, set up his first overseas plant in Thailand-followed by
units in The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia-manufacturing a diverse range of
products: from viscose staple fibres to carbon black. Its overseas gameplan is an
extension of its domestic strategy: achieve cost-competitiveness through economies of
scale. In Thailand, for instance, it boasts a capacity of 1.20 lakh tonnes per annum of
carbon black, which makes it the largest producer in South East Asia. The financial crisis
in Asia-which has made acquisitions cheaper-has come in handy for CEO Kumar Mangalam
Birla's strategy to spread across markets. Even as he plants his feet in North
America-where he has a joint venture with the $1.40-billion Canadian wood
products-manufacturer Tembec-he is consolidating his presence in Asia. Now, Birla is on
the lookout for cheap assets in Indonesia and Thailand in the paper, textiles, and
synthetic yarn businesses. Low-priced acquisitions will not only enhance his cost
competitiveness, they also fit in with his overall objective of expanding his fibre and
yarn business in Asia by 15 per cent per annum. Exports from the region, particularly
Thailand and Indonesia, are booming because of the devaluation of their currencies. Points
out the 30-year-old Birla: ''We are keen on expanding in South East Asia, which accounts
for a quarter of our turnover.'' More important, the group has managerial capabilities to
expand through M&A. Asianisation is obviously paying off for the group.
India Inc.'s Asia
Ventures - II
THE GODREJ GROUP
If there is one Indian giant that is
confident of an Asian resurgence, it is the Rs 3,090-crore Godrej Group. Sure, the
currency crisis has severely hit the Rs 745.39-crore Godrej & Boyce (G&B), which
manufactures office equipment, furniture, and safety equipment. But by leveraging its
strengths in steel furniture, G&B-which has a subsidiary each in Malaysia and
Singapore-hopes to make a dent in Asia. Today, 90 per cent of the Malaysian venture's
products are exported to neighbouring countries while the Singapore company sells to the
domestic market.
Of course, G&B's ambitions of emerging as a regional
player have received a setback for now. While the currency crisis has made exports by
those operations cheaper, it has made imports costlier. The main raw material, steel, has
eroded G&B's subsidiaries' reserves. In fact, the crash of the Malaysian ringgit and
of the Singapore dollar has eaten away 30 per cent of the net worth of its Malaysian
business, and 15 per cent of the Singapore company. Yet, it is stepping up its investment
in the region, counting on a resurgence. Its third manufacturing base, which will market
office furniture in Asia as well as in the local Vietnamese market, is coming up in Hanoi
at an investment of $60 million (Rs 240 crore). The group is also scouting for
manufacturing opportunities in Malaysia and Singapore. Its reasoning: only by increasing
scale through cheap acquisitions can it hope to neutralise the sting of devaluation.
Indeed, despite its setback, the group is confident that its financial standing will allow
it to raise funds for such acquisitions. In fact, the 46-year-old CEO of Godrej &
Boyce, Jamshyd Godrej, still has faith in the region. Asia is, undoubtedly, an integral
component of Godrej's long-term strategy.
India Inc.'s Asia
Ventures - III
THE MAHINDRA & MAHINDRA GROUP
For the Rs 3,456.35-crore Mahindra &
Mahindra (M&M) Group, an auto-manufacturer that is building its strengths in auto
parts, technology infusion is critical. It will help M&M graduate from low-tech
components to high value-added products, making it a tier-I supplier. Asia, particularly
Thailand, which has distinguished itself as an Original Equipment Manufacturer-supplier,
never seemed as tempting to M&M as it is now. Indeed, it is crucial to the company's
future strategy. Until now, M&M had limited business linkages with South East Asia as
most of its exports were targeted at Europe, Africa, and the US. It is only in the past 2
years that the group has realised the potential of Asia, and, consequently, stepped up
export of utility vehicles to Malaysia and The Philippines. Now, Anand Mahindra, 41, CEO,
M&M, plans to use Asia as a sourcing base. For, his farm equipment and utility
vehicles businesses will benefit from cheaper imports from South Korea and Thailand, which
have well-developed ancillary bases. The second prong of M&M's Asia strategy is
increased penetration, to be achieved by acquiring a stake in a distribution network in
countries like Thailand and Indonesia. The rationale: it takes at least 5 years to set up
a distribution network in a new country. Mahindra knows the downsides only too well.
''Indian business scouting for acquisitions need to remind themselves that although
sticker prices are low, an overseas venture in Asia still poses all the risks and rewards
that it did earlier. Affordable price is no guarantee for long-term success.'' Sure. But
if M&M is risking it nevertheless, it's because it expects to reap richer rewards.
India Inc.'s Asia
Venture - IV
THE ESSAR GROUP
If the Rs 3,261-crore Essar Group had
stuck to steel instead of diversifying into a host of areas like power, refineries,
shipping, telecom, and banking, it would have not only become a domestic giant, but also
managed to Asianise early. Surprisingly, however, the conglomerate, which seized every
other opportunity that came its way, decided to go slow on entering one of the
fastest-growing economic regions in the world. It was only a year ago that the owners-the
Ruias-began to factor Asia into their business strategy. But Essar chose steel to forge
its links with Asia, when its Indonesian venture, pt Essar Indonesia, commissioned a
2-lakh tonnes per annum hot-rolled coils plant. The choice was logical: Essar is already
India's lowest-cost producer of steel. Half of the Indonesian operations' output was meant
for the local market, and the rest for exports. Unfortunately, the Ruias' timing was
horribly wrong: their plant went on stream when Asia was melting. Essar had to change its
strategy or get buried under the economic debris. Demand was drying up in the Indonesian
market. So, Essar had to shift its focus entirely on the export market. Fortunately, as
the rupiah headed southwards, steel exports from Indonesia became even more competitive.
In May, 1998, PT Essar Indonesia exported nearly 5,000 tonnes of hot-rolled coils, and
plans to end the year with a total of 80,000 tonnes. That is well short its total output,
but the Ruias hope that exports will rise and pull them out of the crisis. Explains
Prashant Ruia, 27, Director, Essar Power and Essar Projects: ''We are using Indonesia as
an export platform.'' By converting a problem into an opportunity, Essar has proved how
India Inc. can leverage Asia in more ways than one.
India Inc.'s Asia
Ventures - V
THE INDO RAMA GROUP
Both its beliefs-that manufacturing
should be expanded across markets and that exports are crucial for survival-led the Lohia
family-owned Rs 3,138.17-crore Indo Rama Group to Asia. Its vehicles: the Thailand-based
Indo Rama Chemicals and the Indonesia-based pt Indo Rama. A business that was founded in
1962 in Jakarta is now a regional empire. While the global ethos pervades the group's
operations in Asia, its sharp focus on synthetic yarn has allowed it to invest in both
scale and vertical scope. Its capacities in synthetic fibres in Indonesia and India are
2,12,000 tonnes per annum (tpa) and 2,37,300 tpa, respectively. Vertical scope shields the
company from fluctuations in raw material prices while economies of scale make it
cost-competitive. In India, the group is integrating backwards into the manufacture of
Purified Terephthalic Acid-a crucial polyester input-and forward integrating into
textiles. The Indonesian and Thailand operations have already forward-integrated into
textiles. The group's strategy was put to an acid test by the Asian financial crisis.
Faced by declining domestic demand, pt Indo Rama pushed its overseas sales of synthetic
yarn and fibre to 80 per cent of turnover, up from 58 per cent. True, a sliding currency
made exports cheaper. But cost and quality management were crucial, too. Avers Chairman
Mohan Lal Lohia, 67: ''Our global competitiveness does not stem from currency devaluation,
but from investments in economies of scale and our endeavour to be globally competitive.''
And Asia was the route he chose. The lesson: Asianisation can obviously lead to global
cost-ompetitiveness.
THAILAND
Population: 60.1 million
Per Captia GDP: $3,060
1991-1996 GDP Gowth Forecast:
8.2 % p.a.
1999 GDP Growth Forecast: 1.8 %
1999 Export Forecast: 9.5 %
1999 Inflation Forecast: 3.1 %"
1999 Currency Forecast: 41 baht/$ |
In a short period of time,
Thailand seems to have transformed itself from one of the strongest economic performers in
the world to a virtual basket-case. Obviously, there were many factors at play in creating
this calamity, but the main elements were excessive lending and undercapitalisation by
banks and finance companies; over-reliance on unhedged, short-term foreign borrowings; and
insufficient returns on investments funded by both domestic and foreign borrowings. This,
in turn, was caused by over-investment in property and lending and investment decisions
influenced by cronyism and corruption, and a long-term decline in the competitiveness of
the Thai industry.
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. Domestic demand (or
Gross National Expenditure) will decline in real terms in 1998 (-- 6.2 per cent) and 1999
(--1.6 per cent). The only saving grace for the Thai economy is that this decline in
demand will hurt imported goods much more than locally-produced goods, thanks to the
exchange rate shift. And exports should do with improved competitiveness and reasonable
demand growth in the developed economies. The upshot is that real GDP will not decline by
as much as domestic demand. Real GDP is expected to decline by almost 3 per cent in 1998,
before a return to positive, but weak, growth in 1999. But, in the long run, Thailand's
performance will not equal the boom decade leading upto 1996, and growth will average at
only 6 per cent per year over the decade to 2008.
BUSINESS OUTLOOK. Manufacturing
dominates the Thai economy, accounting for a third of its GDP. The weakness of domestic
markets combined with a more competitive rate will cause manufacturers to shift production
to export markets. After a period of adjustment, growth in manufactured exports will,
eventually, lead the recovery in manufacturing. Many non-banking finance companies will
fold up by the end of the restructuring process now underway, and the rest of the sector
will be heavily rationalised.
POLITICAL OUTLOOK. The new government
was formed in early December, 1997, with the Democrat Party's Chuan Leekpai as Prime
Minister heading a 7-party coalition. While Thailand has been compared unfavourably with
Indonesia, for instance, in terms of the speed of economic reforms, it is now rated
favourably in terms of the potential for popularly-driven political change. The government
also now seems to be more focused on macro-economic management, which is good news for
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