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STRATEGY
Can Wadia Tailor A New Life For Bombay
Dyeing?The CEO must sell the
loss-making DMT plant to focus on textiles and cash in on the company's brand value.
By R. Sriram
Love me or hate me--but don't
ignore me. For the 28 years that the 55-year-old Nusli Wadia has been the CEO of Bombay
Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. (Bombay Dyeing), he has steered the Rs 861-crore textiles
major through numerous shifts in strategy, unsuccessful takeover bids (Union Carbide in
1994, AEC in 1995), and, of course, controversy. Be it his role as point-man for Ratan
Tata, the CEO of the House of Tatas, or his battles with the Ambanis of Reliance
Industries Ltd (RIL), Wadia has the reputation of being a feisty fighter. A CEO you ignore
only at your own peril.
Unlike wife Maureen Wadia's magazine, Gladrags, however, no
longer are Wadia's companies on the visibility charts. Flagship Bombay Dyeing slipped from
No. 103 in 1998 to No. 151 on the BT-500 this year. And the textile and di-methyl
terephthalate (DMT)-major's scrip is languishing at Rs 50--down from the heady days of
1994-95, when it touched a high of Rs 450! "There is absolutely no (investor)
interest in some of these companies," states a recent report by HSBC Securities,
which dropped Bombay Dyeing from its list of India's Top 100 companies this year. In
contrast, Wadia's one-time arch-rival, RIL, is continents ahead, at No. 3 on the BT-500.
Not surprisingly, Wadia wants to jettison the cause of Bombay
Dyeing's slow death in the 1990s: its 180,000 tonnes per annum (TPA) DMT plant at
Patalganga (Maharashtra). While Wadia was not available for comment, BT learns that JM
Morgan Stanley received the mandate to sell this loss-making petrochemicals venture 6
months ago. Which may, finally, mark the end of Wadia's megaplans to integrate backward
(into the refining of building-blocks like paraxylene) or forward (into the spinning of
synthetic fibres).
In fact, Bombay Dyeing initiated talks last year with the
German chemicals major, Degussa AG, but differences over pricing prevented the deal from
being finalised. That the sale of the plant is taking so much time must be worrying Wadia.
A company barely in the black in 1998-99--it reported net profits of Rs 7.86 crore after 2
successive years of losses--Bombay Dyeing seems to be, finally, fed up with coping with
the downward spiral in petrochemical prices.
And, as the company enters its 121st year, the sale of the
DMT plant fits in with Wadia's new agenda: transform the dowdy dowager into an up-market
textiles company. He wants to change from a mere fabrics-producer to a brand-driven
company, marketing value-added downstream products. While this intent is no secret--in
1997, Wadia hired the consultancy company, Warwick Management Group (WMG), to restructure
his textiles business--the nuts-and-bolts of the strategy are now only being screwed on.
THE OLD CHEMISTRY. A star-performer just 4
years ago, Bombay Dyeing--which neither has a refinery nor a plant to spin fibres--must
take part of the rap for the DMT division's poor performance. Its one-off attempt at
backward integration not only squeezed its margins, the reliance on imports of paraxylene
left the company vulnerable to the vagaries of the global market. Moreover, Wadia built up
the unit's capacity: from an unviable 60,000 tpa in 1985 to a massive 180,000 tpa, making
it not only the largest producer in the country, but also among the world's Top 20.
Spurred by the global crash in prices and the falling duties
on DMT, Bombay Dyeing has had to regularly slash prices. From over Rs 50,000 per tonne in
1994-95, the domestic price of DMT is ruling at Rs 25,000 per tonne today. More worrying
is ril's 1-million tpa capacity of Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA), a substitute for DMT.
After all, the price-difference between the two, once over Rs 10,000 per tonne, has
narrowed to Rs 2,000 per tonne now. And Bombay Dyeing has started losing customers, some
to PTA, others to the recession.
Says V. Ramanan, 41, Director (Research), BNP Prime Peregrine
Research: "DMT has become a marginal business except for small companies, or for
those with batch-process plants. And their customers are either sick or are getting taken
over." For instance, Bombay Dyeing's major customers--Parasrampuria Synthetics, Orkay
Industries, Petrofils et al--have turned sick. Another regular, Raymond Synthetics, piled
up accumulated losses of Rs 40 crore in 1998-99 while Century Enka--the third-largest
producer of polyester in the country--is shifting to PTA.
"PTA is preferred to DMT as it is more energy-efficient.
A lot of polyester companies have switched over to it," adds V.S. Rama Rao, 42,
Manager (Commercial), Century Enka. No wonder the division's turnover has been dipping:
from Rs 441.21 crore in 1996-97 to Rs 325.40 crore last year. Even though prices were up
in the first quarter, the prices of its feedstock are also rising. In any case, the
company will face problems in finding buyers as no polyester capacities are slated to come
up over the next 3 years. Which will make it even more difficult for Wadia to find a buyer
at a good price.
THE NEW CLOTHES. If Wadia does manage to
sell the DMT division, Bombay Dyeing will, once again, be a focused textiles player, which
will do its valuations wonders. Despite its reach of 650 outlets and a head-start in
developing premium suiting and shirting brands like Vivaldi, the company never quite
exploited the opportunity. Now, its textiles business will focus on 3 categories: apparel,
home collections, and furnishing products (bed-linen and bath-linen).
Wadia, obviously, hopes to leverage the brand and its
domination of these categories as well as transform its retail operations to focus on
branded garments. Similarly, in exports--Rs 220 crore in 1998-99--Bombay Dyeing is trying
to move away from grey fabrics into value-added products. While it is difficult to find
fault with this tack, Wadia is a late entrant in the competitive readymades market, where
he faces entrenched players like Arvind Mills and Madura Garments besides Raymond and
Grasim Industries.
Again, the fault is all Bombay Dyeing's. It wasted time and
energy in high-volume and low-margin items like terry towels and grey fabrics, losing out
on an opportunity to position itself as a premium garments-maker. Wadia made 2 mistakes.
One, to presume that Bombay Dyeing's brands would sell through its sheer distribution
strength. It didn't work. For instance, Madura Garments' shirts brand, Peter `Honest'
England, sold 2 million pieces in 1998, and is already a Rs 80-crore brand. By contrast,
Bombay Dyeing's Vivaldi sold just 51,000 pieces in the same year.
The second mistake: by focusing on the DMT business and
textile exports in the early 1990s, Bombay Dyeing did not take cognisance of the market's
potential. While readymades account for just Rs 30 crore of Bombay Dyeing's turnover
today, Madura Garments is a Rs 200-crore company, and Arvind Mills' garments division
reported sales of Rs 150 crore in 1998-99. "No old styles of marketing will work
here. Success in the branded garments business will happen to firms who work on building
their brands," declares Fazle A. Naqvi, 35, Director (Marketing), Indus-League
Clothing, a former Vice-President (Marketing) of Madura Garments.
No wonder Wadia is trying to make up for lost time. The
objective: increase the share of readymades in turnover from 15 to 25 per cent in 3 years.
Recently, 2 premium brands--Princeton (shirtings) and Forest Hills (casualwear)--have been
launched. Expect more as well as an overhaul of the Vivaldi brand. Admits Prem Mallik, 57,
Executive Director (Textiles), Bombay Dyeing: "Bombay Dyeing has great brand recall.
We want to cash in on that."
At the same time, Wadia's Operation Beauty will convert
Bombay Dyeing's 650 outlets into proper showrooms, selling all its products, but focusing
on readymades and home furnishings. Without the advantage of a strong readymades
brand--and the disadvantage of proactive competition--Bombay Dyeing will have to fight
every inch of the way for shelf- and mind-space. That's why it is boosting its ad-spend
from Rs 8.91 crore in 1998-99 to Rs 10 crore in fiscal 2000. Even that may not be enough
given that Madura Garments spent Rs 3 crore on just one brand, San Frisco, which it
launched recently.
Funds are not a problem. Although its profits have been
falling, Bombay Dyeing is cash-rich. For instance, it has Rs 346.50 crore locked up in
units of the Unit Trust of India. That said, Bombay Dyeing scores low on most performance
parameters. For instance, its interest-costs (Rs 71.35 crore in 1998-99 against Rs 63.53
crore last year) are up, and its ROCE (6.90 against 10.64 per cent in 1996-97) compares
unfavourably with the industry average of 15.10 per cent. However, Wadia is making amends.
For one, he is trying to change the company's top-down structure, replacing it with more
collective decision-making. Still, more fundamental changes are needed: a buyer for the
DMT unit, and a market savvy readymades strategy. Otherwise, Wadia can never hope to nurse
Bombay Dyeing to life after near-death. |