May 3, 1999
|
|
|
|
SONIA GANDHI Scrambling for Power Determined to project herself as a key player in national politics -- without or without power -- a new Sonia Gandhi bargains, compromises and manipulates to ensure the Congress' primacy. By Swapan Dasgupta, Javed M Ansari and Harinder Baweja
In time to come, Congress President Sonia Gandhi will remember April 23 as the Friday she would love to forget. It was the day, 10 Janpath insiders say, "Madam" was in an ugly mood, mostly sullen and sometimes on a short fuse. A very different Sonia from the beaming leader who posed repeatedly for photographers the day the 13-month Atal Bihari Vajpayee government was downed by one vote. A very different Sonia from the one who came away purposefully from Rashtrapati Bhavan two days before to tell the world about a minority Congress government that would be in place in 48 hours with the support of 272 MPs. Sonia had every reason to be embittered. Ever since Subramanian Swamy's tea party, she left no stone unturned to achieve what every politician wants: power. She spoke to every player, called on "senior" leaders like West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu and former prime minister I.K. Gujral, heard out a history lesson from former prime minister Chandra Shekhar, cornered Jayalalitha and placated her at the same time, and maintained an open house at 10 Janpath. She involved herself in the nitty-gritty of parliamentary arithmetic and caste equations. In a fortnight, she imbibed more about the cruel world of politics than she did in the past 15 months. Installing herself was her way of proving that she was more than a symbol. If she couldn't do that, she was even preparing to lose this battle, allow Vajpayee back and win the war against the BJP minus the irritants of the Third Front.
Yet, it almost came to nought. In the afternoon, she got confirmation that the Samajwadi Party (SP), Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and the Forward Bloc (FB) with a total of 27 MPs had conveyed to the President their inability to support a Congress government. When she called on President K.R. Narayanan in the evening, it was with the embarrassing admission that she was wrong on all three counts-she had the support of 233 MPs, not 272; a Congress-only government seemed unlikely; and that she would need more than 48 hours. The President said he wasn't coming to any "hasty decisions". The game plan was breathtakingly audacious. First, dislodge Vajpayee on the floor of the Lok Sabha. Next, bulldoze your way into being sworn in as prime minister of a minority Congress government. Then, ram through a confidence vote, capitalising on the fear of polls and desertions from the BJP-led coalition. Finally, consolidate power-there was no need for a Parliament session for six months, the budget having been passed-and recommend elections in November. In case she lost the vote of confidence, she would still be the caretaker prime minister until a poll. It was a plan her mother-in-law would have approved. After all, it bore remarkable similarities with Indira Gandhi's moves that toppled Morarji Desai and brought the Congress back to power with a resounding majority in 1980. The assumption was that a country exasperated with shaky coalitions would rally round a determined Gandhi who had dared to gamble. And win.
Surjeet, the man for all seasons, was entrusted with the responsibility of delivering the erstwhile United Front and the Rashtriya Loktantrik Morcha (RLM) comprising the SP and Laloo Prasad Yadav's Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) to Sonia. He, along with Basu, were also to complement Sonia's direct dealings with AIADMK chief J. Jayalalitha. The Surjeet-Basu duo nearly messed it up. Apart from tilting public opinion sharply against Sonia, they failed in the numbers game. Sonia had banked on the CPI(M)'s ability to persuade the seven RSP and FB MPs to fall in line. But ideology being a matter of expediency to him, Surjeet couldn't gauge the extent to which small groups-particularly those emerging from non-Stalinist traditions-cling to faith. Surjeet then earned the SP's ire. It's not merely that both Sonia and Surjeet seemed unappreciative of Mulayam's political compulsions in Uttar Pradesh but that the Congress was compounding the offence by playing footsie with the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Sonia, for example, truly believed that she had charmed Mulayam into acquiescence after a 40-minute meeting on April 20. Mulayam left 10 Janpath saying "we have never shied away from sacrificing in the battle against communalism" but sang a different tune the next day. At a non-Congress parties meeting he convened on April 21, he attacked the Congress savagely and even railed against imposing an "Italian prime minister" on India. The meeting ended on a bitter note despite some vague talk about the need for a Basu-led coalition. The irascible bhadralok may yet emerge as a last-ditch choice if the CPI(M) Central Committee buys the line. If that happens, it won't be by design, although many senior Congress leaders believe this was Surjeet's diabolical objective in the first place and that Sonia walked into the trap. If anything, Surjeet angered Mulayam by trying to isolate him politically from both Jayalalitha and Laloo. For example, even before the non-Congress parties could take a final position on a coalition arrangement, the AIADMK and RJD gave their letters of unconditional support to Sonia. But isolation only aroused Mulayam's Lohiaite doggedness. The SP may finally be cajoled into submission but now Sonia can at best hope for an arrangement where she is primus inter pares, not monarch. Mulayam has denied Sonia the lustre of victory. Sonia's strategy ran into another unexpected roadblock. Conventional wisdom deemed that the BJP coalition would fall apart after the confidence vote. The Samata Party and Biju Janata Dal (BJD) MPs were presumed to be the "migratory birds" Arjun referred to. Amazingly, the coalition held firm. L.K. Advani's argument that an alternative formation must show the President a committed support of at least 270 MPs was a binding factor. Secondly, the managers of the coalition worked overtime to ensure that the supporting parties kept their flock together. Ironically, the Congress' success in enticing a Telugu Desam MP proved counter-productive. It added to Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu's anti-Congressism. "We have at least succeeded in preventing Sonia from becoming a caretaker prime minister," said a senior BJP leader. The boast may yet be premature. But if Sonia or anyone else succeeds in replacing Vajpayee, the BJP side believes the credit should go to Rashtrapati Bhavan. Its perception is that the President is not playing with a straight bat. Murli Manohar Joshi has described his conduct as "expressly partisan". The criticism began with his instruction for a confidence vote even when Parliament was in session and has stretched to the inordinate time given to Sonia to get her act together. Secondly, Rashtrapati Bhavan didn't clarify whether a defeated government could be recalled. "The persisting uncertainty is an invitation for horse-trading," complained a BJP leader. At this stage, Sonia could do with all the help she can muster. In stepping out of 10 Janpath and scrambling for power she demolished her own mystique. From the enigmatic baton-carrier of the dynasty, she reduced her stature to just another player in the political pack. In failing to carry out her initial assurances to the President she confirmed the charge that she too engaged in purely "negative politics". The sheen she acquired after last year's assembly election victories and after Pachmarhi has worn off. She is like any other politician, willing to make compromises and strike deals with Laloo and Jayalalitha. Her positions are negotiable. If yesterday it was a Congress-only government, today she will consider a coalition and tomorrow it may be outside support to a Third Front or back to the Congress-only line. Even if she finally yields to the opinion of Pawar and opts for a mid-term poll she could find it hard to erase the perception of being in a tearing hurry to grab power. Preferably directly or else by proxy. What has caused this transformation? Conspiracy theorists believe the answer is Bofors. On March 31 Vajpayee sanctioned the prosecution of former defence secretary S.K. Bhatnagar. Simultaneously, the government sought the President's assent for pressing charges against former external affairs minister Madhavsinh Solanki. Did these make her turn? Or was it the belief that Vajpayee was finally getting his act together, following the Lahore bus journey and the budget? Or was she misled, as many Congressmen believe, by a wily Arjun and a self-serving cabal? There are no clear answers but today Sonia finds herself vulnerable. The immediate provocation for Vajpayee's fall was Jayalalitha's pullout. Yet the Congress line that the government fell under the weight of its own contradictions hasn't been bought. Sonia was a proactive player in the process, including having a common minimum programme vetted by Manmohan Singh ready. All for replacing the fragility of the Vajpayee regime with another unstable order. The 12th Lok Sabha may somehow delay its premature demise. Sonia, Basu or Vajpayee, another election seems inevitable. If not in September, in November or March. When the battle for India resumes in the villages and cities, Sonia will campaign with customary vigour. But this time her involvement will lack novelty. She can't honestly look people in the eye and say, "Try me, I'm different." In a week of chasing power, a week of being exposed to a world away from the sycophancy of the Congress, Sonia has joined the political class. Now it's for her to survive there. The mask is off. -with Saba Naqvi Bhaumik
|
|
Issue Contents | Write to us | Subscriptions | Syndication BUSINESS TODAY | INDIA TODAY PLUS | COMPUTERS TODAY © Living Media India Ltd |
 |
 |
The plan may still fructify,
but with modifications. In trying to rush through the formation of a minority Congress
government, Sonia banked heavily on Rajiv Gandhi's managerial approach. She dispensed with
established structures. The Congress Working Committee (CWC) and the Congress
Parliamentary Party armed her with full authority to "take all appropriate measures
to deal with the situation". In practice this meant that while important leaders were
consulted, the key roles were assigned to a core group comprising Arjun Singh, Makhan Lal
Fotedar and retired bureaucrat Ram Pradhan. Experienced players like Sharad Pawar were
there without quite belonging. Lending a helping hand was CPI(M) General Secretary
Harkishan Singh Surjeet. 
