Cover Story: Kargil War: Will the War Spread?

As India makes initial gains and Pakistan remains resilient, there are growing fears that the border conflict may go beyond Kargil.

"War is fought with the will of the government, competence of the armed forces and support of the nation."

These days the sayings of the famed 19th century Prussian military strategist are much in demand in the subcontinent. Including the better known "war is a mere continuation of policy by other means" that Pakistan seems to be following with almost religious fervour in Kashmir. As the battle between India and Pakistan for control of the commanding heights in Kargil enters its sixth bloody week, the conflict, instead of abating, is showing ominous signs of intensifying. The death toll continues to be alarmingly high. By June 24, India had lost as many as 175 armed forces personnel and 550 were injured. The Indian Army claims it has killed over 350 Pakistani army regulars and injured twice that number -- a figure hotly disputed by Islamabad.

Indian soldiers with Bofors guns targeting Pakistani intruders in the Drass sector.

Last week saw India make substantial progress in its effort to push back the intruders across the 110-km stretch of the Line of Control (LoC) between Zoji La Pass and Leh. In a dramatic assault, the Indian Army recaptured the key peak of Tololing that overlooks the strategic Srinagar-Leh highway which Pakistan had hoped to paralyse. It was the army's first big victory in an area considered a chicken's neck and it thwarted Pakistan's major objective of cutting off Drass and thereby Leh from the rest of the valley. Yet there was little time for India to celebrate as its troops engaged the Pakistani Army in pitched battles to regain vital peaks such as Tiger Hill, Jubar and Kukarthang and to push back intrusions that in many areas still extend up to 4 km on the Indian side of the LoC.

As the casualties mounted, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government faced growing pressure from the armed forces to end its policy of restraint and allow Indian troops to cross the LoC at least in the Kargil sector to enable them to cut off Pakistani supply lines to the intruders. Such a decision is fraught with risks as it may result in the battle spreading to other areas along the 3,000-km Indo-Pak border. The big question that loomed last week: Are we heading for a full-scale war with Pakistan?

WILL INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WORK?
Time is running out. Tough measures like squeezing Pakistan economically must be taken.

An Indian truck escaping from Pakistani Shelling

The Indian armed forces have so far scrupulously observed Vajpayee's orders not to cross the LoC but their patience is running thin. Diplomatically, the policy of restraint has paid off with even leaders of the powerful G-8 warning Pakistan, without naming it, to pull back the intruders and restore the sanctity of the loc. But India warned the countries last week that its policy of restraint cannot be open-ended and that international pressure has to go beyond just lip sympathy. As Brajesh Mishra, principal secretary to the prime minister and national security adviser, says, "We do not have unlimited patience and time."

	Battle Equations
Pakistan		India
$3.7 billion	Defence Expenditure (1996)	$10.4 billion
5,20,000	Army	9,80,000
2,120	Tanks	3,314
1,590	Towed Artillery	4,175
45,000	Air Force	1,10,000
429	Combat Aircraft	777
20	Helicopters	34
22,000	Navy	55,000
9	Submarines	17
3	Destroyers	6
8	Frigates	18

The G-8 countries have sensed the urgency in India's tone. US diplomats have told their Indian counterparts that President Bill Clinton is "personally involved" in bringing the conflict to a quick end and point to his telephone tough talk with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on June 15 as proof. They have assured India that the US is looking for a solution that would "take only days not weeks". On June 24, Clinton dispatched General Anthony Zinni, chief of the US central command, and Gibson Lanpher, deputy assistant secretary of state, to Islamabad to reportedly pressure Pakistan, especially its army, into ending the aggression.

That Zinni and Lanpher did some arm-twisting was clear from the tone of Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesman Tariq Altaf who said later, "The US has brought a narrow point of view which is not fair and balanced and will only encourage India to talk of war and wider conflict." There were many in Pakistan who pooh-poohed the US initiative. General (retd) Mirza Aslam Beg, former chief of army staff, said contemptuously, "We don't give much importance to the visit. We are not an American colony. We cannot be dictated to by others and will do what suits our national interests."

Meanwhile, India has been pushing the G-8 countries to take some tough economic measures against Pakistan. Especially since the country's foreign-exchange reserves are disastrously low and it depends heavily on funding from international agencies such as the IMF to bail it out. It is also in the interest of the US to rein in Pakistan. There are concerns the country is increasingly becoming the hub of Islamic fundamentalism and supporting the Osama Bin Laden type of terrorism that the US wants to crush. The international community too does not want a full-scale war to break out between India and Pakistan as it has the potential to escalate into a nuclear battle. India has launched a massive diplomatic offensive to get the world to see its point of view. It knows it will have international support so long as it does not cross the loc. Therefore, Vajpayee is likely to give the army the go-ahead to cross the LoC only when all diplomatic efforts to get Pakistan to pull out are exhausted or the military action of rooting out the intruders from Kargil gets bogged down.

WHY THE BORDER BUILD UP?
Despite war preparations, how the Kargil conflict progresses in the next fortnight holds the key.

While India is waiting for the foreign countries and agencies "to deliver", the army is taking no chances. In the past three weeks, mechanised and artillery divisions have advanced to forward positions all along the border in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir where five out of India's 11 corp formations are stationed. The army has cancelled all leave -- "100 per cent recall" in military parlance -- and all personnel have been asked to report back. Trains have been pressed into service to transport tanks and heavy ammunition to Pokhran and Jaisalmer in Rajasthan. Ammunition reserves have been sent to forward locations in Rajasthan and other sectors. This gives the Indians the option of an offensive strike anywhere along the border.

The army, navy and air force are on high alert and preparations are on to stock fuel for the air force and the army's artillery units. Defence Minister George Fernandes, who flew to Kutch to review the military preparedness, says the armed forces are ready to give a "befitting reply". As part of civil defence preparedness, sirens and blackout drills have been conducted in the border areas. India's Prithvi and Agni missiles are reportedly in operational readiness in view of Pakistani comments that it may even exercise its nuclear options.

A sense of confidence has returned to the army after the success in Tololing. It had been caught off balance by the failure of intelligence agencies, including its own, to detect the massive intrusion. Army chief General V.P. Malik told India Today: "Now both my feet are on the ground. We are fully balanced in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere." One reason for the build-up in the border areas is that the army does not want to be caught off guard again. As a serving general says, "We are now a step ahead and have sent a message to the Pakistanis that they better not try to take us on elsewhere."

As part of the propaganda blitz, the army has been providing proof of the extent of Pakistan's involvement in Kargil. Last week in Delhi it displayed a range of captured armament including maps and identity papers showing that many of the intruders were Pakistani army regulars. Malik told the press on June 23 that the Indian Army is respecting the government's directive not to cross the LoC despite the "constraints" it has placed on the ongoing operations in Kargil. The army is unlikely to immediately open up other sectors of conflict unless Pakistan expands the base of the war.

Meanwhile, Pakistan too has kept five of its 11 corp formations in a state of readiness. BSF field reports indicate a high level of activity including movement of heavy vehicles and transfer of equipment to the Punjab sector from where Pakistan is most likely to launch its attack in the event of a war. Indian Army sources say the Pakistani build-up is not yet in an "aggressive mode". Nor have the two armies made any decisive movements of their strike corps, which would signal that a war was nigh. But as a senior Indian Army officer observes, "Pakistan is always known for whistling in the dark."

ARE THE ARMIES PREPARED?
Both sides may not be keen on a major war due to constraints on men, money and machines.

A soldier taking stock of ammunition at a railway station near Jaisalmer

Men and equipment make for a winning combination in a war. Except the one raging in Kargil. The mounting Indian casualties are partly being attributed to the scarcity of critical combat aids. This, many say, is because of the mismanagement of the country's defence spending in the past decade. Vice-Admiral (retired) K.K. Nayyar, a member of the 1990 Arun Singh Committee on defence expenditure, claims, "The Kargil crisis is directly attributable to the starvation of funds for the armed forces during the '90s."

� An army requisition for low-intensity conflict equipment worth less than Rs 50 crore has been awaiting approval of both the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs since 1997. Its clearance would have provided the forces in Kargil with critical aids like night-vision devices (cost about Rs 2 lakh a piece; shortfall about 700), commando equipment (worth Rs 11 crore), snow mobiles (Rs 2 crore for 10) and rocket and grenade launchers (requirement: 5,000 and 2,000, costing Rs 10 crore).
� About 10 per cent (between 20-40) of the Bofors FH 77 B guns have been dysfunctional for want of spares. The lack of spares has forced cannibalisation (stripping parts of one gun to use them in another). So grave was the perceived shortage of spares that the Parliament's Standing Committee even suggested "lifting of the ban on Bofors for licensed production" of its spares in India. Less than a month after that warning, India is importing shells for Bofors guns at prices up to $1,000 (Rs 43,000) a piece.
� The army has no battlefield surveillance and gun-locating radar and is woefully short of self-propelled guns and communication equipment. If some of these spares and equipment had been available, they would not only have reduced casualties but may also have prevented the very occurrence of the conflict. Says Jasjit Singh, director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA): "Kargil represents the failure of India's conventional military deterrence."

Part of the reason for this has been the severe defence cuts. From a peak of 3.6 per cent in 1987-88, the share of defence expenditure in India's gross domestic product (GDP) had slipped to 2.33 per cent in 1998-99. Though this is a global trend, India spends a smaller proportion of GDP on defence than Pakistan and China do. Yet, experts believe the real devil is not in the amount that is spent on defence but the manner in which it is spent. Comments A.K. Ghosh, former finance adviser in the Ministry of Defence: "Money is used best when it flows according to a plan. The Indian armed forces have not had a long-term plan for years." The fault is not really theirs because the plans made were not approved. In fact, since 1985 defence has been on a virtual plan holiday. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90) was cleared by the cabinet only in 1989, rendering it ineffective. The Eighth Plan (1991-95) was never cleared and even the Ninth Plan (1997-2002) is yet to be approved.

As a result the army is short of at least 300 T-90 and T-72 battle tanks and about a thousand 155 mm artillery guns to sharpen its edge in a full-scale war. Besides the other two services have also been severely impacted by budget cuts. For the air force to score a decisive victory over Pakistan, it should have at least 44 squadrons. It currently has only 39 and a half squadrons. Naval preparedness is no better. An IDSA study shows that between 1990 and 1999, the number of principal naval combatants like submarines and destroyers fell from 44 to 36.

Hinting that the forces are clearly unhappy with the state of affairs, Malik said last week, "If a war is thrust on us we shall fight with whatever we have, but in the meantime the government must take serious steps to see that whatever is needed by us is made available as early as possible." Nobody wants to admit it but a reason for the delay in striking decisively in Kargil was that the forces were ill-prepared for such an offensive. As a senior officer says, "Preparedness is not like a light switch that you can turn on and off at will. It needs time and planning." The Pakistani Army was clearly better prepared as it struck first. But it is aware that in a full-scale war the odds are heavily stacked against it. And so at the moment it is content to take on the Indian Army only in the Kargil heights where it enjoys an advantage.

ARE POLITICAL COMPULSIONS A PUSH?
Only if India gets bogged down in Kargil and casualties cross the threshold to tolerance

High Alert: pakistani guns guard a key oil installation in karachi

Defence experts in Pakistan believe that Nawaz Sharif and his army are unlikely to launch another offensive across the border unless compelled. Part of the reason is that Pakistan is stunned by the increasing diplomatic isolation it faces over the violation of the LoC in Kargil. Sharif knows that any move by Pakistan to spread the war would, as a diplomat put it, "have its head banged in by international condemnation and possibly action". Yet the Pakistani prime minister cannot back out of the Kargil war without a face-saving solution. Otherwise he is doomed politically. Pakistan is banking on the fact that the ruling BJP in India also would not want a full-scale war as it would mean dealing with a messy situation with general elections round the corner.

There is also the feeling that by capturing the Kargil heights Pakistan has succeeded in embarrassing the Indian Army. With over 50,000 troops committed to the LoC, the Indian Army is too heavily concentrated in Kashmir. General Beg believes that itself would inhibit India from engaging in a full-scale war. He says, "India really can't launch a major offensive elsewhere because of its high commitment in the valley. If it does, it faces the danger of being more vulnerable in Kashmir."

While Pakistan maintains that many of its objectives have already been met by the intrusions, Indian decision-makers believe that they have succeeded in "tightening the noose" around the aggressors. They are convinced their diplomatic efforts are paying off. Militarily too the steady gains in Kargil indicate that the army will succeed in driving out the intruders. The time frame though is still unclear. The unusually reticent Fernandes indicated last week that September could be the date. However, if the Kargil campaign gets bogged down in the next two or three weeks and the casualties mount, the government is bound to be pressured by public opinion to act decisively against Pakistan. While that may not push India into a full-scale war, the government may give the army limited permission to cross the LoC in Kargil.

A decision to cross the LoC even in Kargil is a risky gambit. It could apply to Pakistan too if it pushes more troops into Kargil. As a general says, "War takes place because of malintentions, misjudgements and miscalculations, and when it is started it is two parties that fight and not one. Sometimes it is possible to manage the spin. But even the spin can get out of control." Also no country goes to war with only a military objective. Primarily it is a political decision. India will have to decide what it wants to achieve:

� Dismember Pakistan as in 1971.
� Settle the Kashmir dispute irrevocably in its favour.
� Teach Pakistan a hard lesson that will frighten it from any future military misadventure.

The nuclear dimension makes it an even more dangerous option and is a major deterring factor against an all-out war. A war is also an extremely costly affair and can seriously set back the nation's economic development by several years. Nor can a country succeed in war without adequate domestic political consensus and preparing the world for the consequences as India did in 1971. Says Lt-General N.S. Malik, former deputy chief of army staff: "No soldier can win the war unless the nation backs him." Adds a senior government official: "It will certainly not be a hasty decision to go to war."

Last week, with the flurry of diplomatic efforts by the US, there were encouraging signs that the conflict will remain localised to Kargil though it may take several months to resolve. Clausewitz has advice for such a situation: "War is an act of violence. Pushed to the utmost bounds, as one side dictates the law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to an extreme." Both sides need to heed the caution.