Diplomacy: INDO-US Ties; Steeped in Duality

Diplomacy

India Today
Sep 7,1998

INDO-US TIES
Steeped in Duality

The attack on terrorist camps in Afghanistan does not presage closer cooperation but the imminent deal on nuclear issues could change things.

By Manoj Joshi

Vajpayee and Clinton If the opinion of its students and practitioners are anything to go by, foreign policy is much too lofty for the comprehension of the lowly. Where terms like crisis and opportunity grace the descriptions of normal political behaviour, international relations have wilfully taken recourse to the obscure. One such concept being bandied about to describe the present state of Indo-US ties is the Chinese character Ji. Pronounced "Chi", it represents duality -- crisis and opportunity.

Two seemingly unrelated events in the past 10 days point to the increasing convergence of Delhi and Washington. On August 20, US missiles devastated a number of sites in Afghanistan -- the camps where fanatical Pakistan-based Islamic groups trained militants to conduct a jehad (holy war) against India. And last week in Washington, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's special envoy Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott enjoyed a spectacular bout of conviviality that culminated in a home-cooked dinner at the Talbotts.

At present, Indo-US relations remain grounded in potential rather than reality. A definite date for President Bill Clinton's off-again, on-again visit to India remains elusive. American officials say this is contingent on India signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and participating in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations. India, as Vajpayee and his special envoy have signalled, is ready to do both, but not unconditionally.

The key hurdle is the definition of "weaponisation" in the nuclear context. US concerns over both sides deploying weapons stem more from Pakistan's predicament than fears of India. Ironically, it is the same factor that prompted India to undertake the Pokhran tests in the first place. According to Indian sources, the US Administration is yet to decide whether or not to accept India's concept of a "minimum nuclear deterrent" and take steps to lift economic sanctions.

This explains why there was glee in South Block at the US strikes against terrorist bases in Afghanistan. At the bjp National Executive meeting in Jaipur, Vajpayee said he was confident the US "will now come to the conclusion that wherever there was terrorism, against anybody, we will have to fight it". In Delhi, after a perfunctory criticism of "unilateral action", the official spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said India had repeatedly "highlighted the need for prompt and effective cooperation" to eradicate terrorism, especially since India was a victim of "state-sponsored, cross-border terrorism".

The bombardment was, of course, no special favour to India. The US says it acted on the information that exiled Saudi multimillionaire Osama bin Laden was behind the bombings of its embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam. This, despite the FBI not yet completing its inquiries into the incident. As far as US public opinion is concerned bin Laden is today's Public Enemy No. 1.

Yet, American machismo was tempered with discomfiture. The retaliatory strikes seriously embarrassed Washington's friends in Islamabad and generated a fierce anti-US mood in Pakistan. Instead of being able to contain India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability through an integrated strategy, Pakistan's political and economic weaknesses -- are compelling the US to deal with the two countries separately.

This was apparent in the third round of talks between Singh and Talbott. While both sides are mum on details as to what transpired, the context of the dialogue suggests a major shift in the way the US looks at India. In 1993, when Indo-US relations collapsed following Robin Raphel's comments on Kashmir, all the US did was to have Peter Tarnoff, its under-secretary of State, talk to ambassador S.S. Ray. But last week, to round off the tete-a-tete at the Talbott residence, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the President's National Security Adviser, Samuel (Sandy) Berger "dropped by".

The contrast to the formal manner in which talks with Pakistan are going is obvious. These are being held in London and the principal interlocutor is a relatively junior official -- Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. Perhaps, says an mea official cattily, "the difference between a potential ally and a client state is now becoming apparent". The contrast could not have been expressed better, with India collecting $4.1 billion (Rs 17,425 crore) through Resurgent India Bonds to handle the post-Pokhran sanctions and Pakistan having to be bailed out by the IMF through a special waiver organised by the Clinton Administration.

The US policy of equating Pakistan and India is fraying. US South Asia specialist Stephen Cohen who is now a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington says he is most concerned by the developments in Pakistan. "It is in the common interest of both the United States and India," he says, "to ensure that Pakistan doesn't slip into extremism." In this context he cautions India against pushing Pakistan against the wall through a nuclear arms race, a development that could result in a "nuclear Somalia", which would be far more dangerous for India than the US.

Despite India's wishful thinking, the US attack on terrorists in Afghanistan could well be a one-shot affair. Taliban officials say that the US offered to hold talks with them after their attacks. Indeed, US cooperation with the Taliban dates back to 1994. Many believe the US played a key role in encouraging the student radicals through 1995-1996. Those who thought there could be joint Indo-US cooperation in combating terrorism would do well to hear US Under-Secretary of State Tom Pickering, when he cautioned India last Wednesday against emulating the American strategy of "hot pursuit". "India, Kashmir and Pakistan present a very, very different case than many places around the world," he declared, referring to the heavy concentration of troops on both sides of the border. Pickering acknowledged that the US attack had killed Pakistanis belonging to various terrorist organisations. Also, that the US was "looking at" the question of Pakistan's support for terrorism in Kashmir but, for the present, "there is no change in our views".

Former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit points to Pickering's statement as talk that limits Indo-US cooperation in containing terrorism. "I can see the practical wisdom involved in not following the US example, but who are they to say so?" he asks. According to him, India should ask the US for discussions on the issue of containing terrorism and pin down Washington on the "threshold they think should be crossed before India can strike at those responsible for thousands killed by cross-border terrorists."

Despite a sea change in the context of Indo-US relations and the enhanced level of interaction between the two sides, key issues remain to be clinched. The crisis caused by Pokhran may be over, but the post-nuclear solution is still to be hammered out.

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