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THE USUAL
SUSPECTS
After Summer, the FallClinton in a soup means Vajpayee has to be curried
Swapan Dasgupta
At the best of times, failure is difficult to digest; at the
worst of times, it is abhorrent. For the US, May's 10 N-tests are not only a failure of
the counter-proliferation regime so carefully nurtured since 1993, they are a monumental
foreign policy disaster. It will take time for the ramifications of Pokhran II and Chagai
to sink in, but the two neighbouring curry powers have conclusively smashed the
universalist pretensions of the West's nuclear apartheid. They have made N-might, as
Samuel P. Huntington foresaw (in The Clash of Civilisations), "the central phenomenon
of the slow but ineluctable diffusion of power in a multicivilisational world".
President Bill Clinton may have mocked India's achievement as
"a nutty way to go", but his concerns run deeper. First, a recalcitrant Senate
may well defer ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) since the ban on
N-tests have been shown to be completely unenforceable. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Jesse Helms has already advocated such a course. Secondly, the presence of two
new N-weapons states is certain to prompt demands for a review of the present Sino-US
honeymoon since China has been shown to be the common villain. The Heritage Foundation,
for example, has demanded a Congressional inquiry into Clinton's reported approval of
missile technology transfers to China. "If true," says a recent Heritage report,
"these allegations represent a betrayal of US security."
It is because the reverberations from India and Pakistan
extend well beyond their immediate neighbourhood that Washington is concerned over the US
espionage establishment's "greatest failure in more than a decade". The CIA, in
particular, has egg on its face because it established a Non-Proliferation Centre as early
as 1991 to both identify and pre-empt the world's N-rogues. "Look, we are wrong. We
were all wrong," the state department's top intelligence officer told a Senate
committee in exasperation after India's N-tests. The CIA has also admitted its failure to
recruit any Indian spies with access to the N-programme. A "botched attempt"
even led to the expulsion of its Delhi deputy station chief last year. There is also
concern that neither carrot nor stick could stop Pakistan going ahead with its
well-publicised tests.
It is silly to believe the US will now admit the futility of
persevering with an iniquitous CTBT and press for universal N-disarmament. The menacing
noises about signing the CTBT "without conditions" reflect the profound
nervousness of the N-haves at the global system being redefined. The stakes are far too
high. A combination of sanctions and diplomacy may meet Indian aspirations half-way, but
they are certain to destabilise Pakistan and make it turn to the Islamic world for
succour. Counter-proliferation having failed, the West has to consider a policy shift.
This, however, will take time and a new US administration. For Clinton, N-accommodation
signals defeat. To be remembered for anything more tangible than Monica Lewinsky, he has
to bludgeon the interlopers into unconditional surrender.
Clinton and a vengeful CIA know that Pakistan is fragile.
Arm-twisting will push it to unbridled fanaticism. A liberal India is a different ball
game. Senator Dianne Fienstein said the N-tests wouldn't have happened in a Congress
regime, and Newsweek has stressed Clinton's anxiety "for a more predictable party to
take power in India". No wonder there is an unseemly rush in "predictable"
circles to take lessons in competitive cringing. |