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Crime and
Over-punishment Hanging 26 people
for Rajiv's murder will reopen the debate about the death penalty
When the designated TADA court in
Poonamallee delivered its judgement in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination trial, it
effectively saluted the Indian investigative and legal system. The uncovering of the
circumstances leading to the murder of the former prime minister, and of 17 others, on May
21, 1991, was a task of extraordinary magnitude. It was accomplished most successfully by
the Central Bureau of Investigation's special investigation team (SIT). Credit is also due
to Judge V. Navaneetham, who has delivered what is likely to be the most important verdict
of his career. His work could not have been made easier courtesy the enormous media and
political interest in the case.
Nevertheless, the judgement has raised some disturbing
questions. The sit's chargesheet named 41 conspirators. Of these 12 are dead and three --
including V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE chief -- are absconding. Each of the 26 in custody has
been sentenced to death. If a record has been set, it is certainly a dubious one. Capital
punishment is the ultimate weapon in the state's armoury. It is not evoked in every case
of murder and, indeed, recommended only for the rarest of rare cases -- for crimes of
unimaginable morbidity. There is no denying Rajiv's assassination was more than just
culpable homicide. It sought to pre-empt and subvert governmental policy and amounted to a
war against the state. Even so, to send 26 people to the gallows for one murderous crime
does appear an overreaction. As the court itself admits, the 26 had varying roles to play
and, therefore, varying degrees of guilt. In a sense, unequal crimes may have been treated
as equally culpable. This is a crucial point for legal and civil society to ponder. What
the Poonamallee judgement will do is reopen the old debate about capital punishment.
Nuclear powers often argue that the very presence of the ultimate weapon is a better
deterrent than its (over)use. There may be a legal analogy here.
Guns, not Roses
Farooq must assert his authority by undertaking a
full-fledged war on terrorism
There has been a certain predictability to
the aftermath of the murder of 23 Kashmiri Pandits in Wandhama on January 25. The act has
been duly condemned. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral has blamed Pakistan for masterminding the
massacre. The state Government -- in fact, every politician of any worth -- has vowed to
fight the terrorists to the finish. Even so, the odds are high that within days the
carnage will be forgotten. Indeed, the Kashmir problem itself will once again be relegated
to the Indian polity's collective amnesia. It is facile to speak of a "political
solution" -- whatever the term means -- to the extremist problem. This amounts to
beating about the bush; India -- if a mixed metaphor be permitted here -- needs to grasp
the nettle.
India's defensiveness on Kashmir is difficult to understand.
The global information war with Pakistan has rarely been fought adequately. That free and
fair assembly elections restored popular government to the state in 1996 is an achievement
that has not been optimally highlighted; and exploited. Nor has Pakistan's sponsorship of
terrorism been suitably exposed. When he became chief minister, Farooq Abdullah promised
Kashmiris who had fled the state he would make the environment conducive for them to
return. Farooq can only redeem his pledge by asserting the authority of his regime,
weeding out fifth columnists and strengthening local institutions, particularly the police
and intelligence network. Above all else, terrorism is a security issue, a question of
upholding law and order. The state must not enter into a dialogue from anything other than
a position of strength. The mailed fist must be deployed before the velvet glove. This is
the equation that worked in Punjab. Farooq and Kashmir cannot ignore its compelling logic.
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