Viewpoint: Just Say No

India Today
November 9, 1998

VIEWPOINT
Just Say No

Signing an unchanged CTBT doesn't suit India

P K Iyengar

The possible signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by India and Pakistan is the focus of much attention in contemporary diplomacy. The United States is pressing India to sign. It is holding that as both a threat and a carrot for the lifting of economic sanctions. Within the country, some persist with the view that CTBT is discriminatory and therefore India should not sign it. Others are of the view that as we have already declared ourselves a nuclear weapons state, CTBT should be acceded to -- given economic compulsions.

All in all, there seems to be a general lack of understanding of precisely what this treaty embodies. Why is it discriminatory? What are the implications if we decide to sign CTBT in its present form?

After the permanent and indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, the attention of the superpowers moved to those countries which had not signed the NPT and thus kept their nuclear options open. India, Pakistan and Israel were considered "threshold" states which could weaponise if they wanted to. CTBT was therefore discussed in great detail at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. The idea was to stop underground nuclear tests by all states.

But the key feature which is discriminatory was that the nuclear weapons states would be allowed to maintain their existing arsenals. The rest of the world, irrespective of nuclear capabilities or security concerns, could not test or build such weapons. Further, the treaty had no association with initiatives for nuclear disarmament. In essence, it said the rich would stay rich and the poor have to remain poor. Not surprisingly, India refused to fall in line.

When it became obvious India would not sign the CTBT, a special clause was introduced saying if India along with other states did not sign and ratify the treaty before September 1999, CTBT would not become operative despite being ratified by all other countries. The UN General Assembly would then be called upon to deal with the situation. Perhaps extraordinary sanctions would be applied.

Pokhran II has added a new dimension to the CTBT saga. After Pokhran I in 1974, the nuclear powers buried their heads in the sands of illusion and refused to face reality. With Pokhran II India has iterated that it is a nuclear weapons state. To continue to reject this reality is childish and counter-productive.

In the ongoing debate on CTBT, a number of important points need to be kept in mind. First, the weaponisation aspect. Will signing CTBT in its present form prevent us from weaponising if it becomes necessary in the future? Here we should be very careful in deciding how much testing is adequate to weaponise.

Weaponisation implies making a nuclear device available to the military in a form that is readily usable. This is not an easy task, as the experience with the Arjun battle tank has shown us. I find it difficult to believe that it will be possible to develop a reliable and deployable system with absolutely no additional testing. Let us not forget that none of the nuclear powers has weaponised after just one or two nuclear tests; the US alone has conducted over 1,000 tests.

Next comes the scientific aspect. It has not been given enough importance. Both the US and Russia are continuing their research in nuclear technology. There are indications that some of this research is proceeding in the direction of fissionless nuclear weapons. This has been emphasised by two of the best-known weapons experts in America: Nobel laureate Hans Bethe and Theodore Taylor. The Russians have also expressed similar views.

If such weapons are built, say 20 years from now, they will not be within the purview of CTBT and NPT -- because the weapons would not use uranium or plutonium. These treaties would then become irrelevant. There would be a whole new class of weaponry. Countries like India -- which have caught up with today's nuclear technology -- would again be 20 years behind.

Finally, there is the national aspect. Our stand on keeping the nuclear option open has been a considered one based on geopolitical realities. If after the recent tests we were to sign CTBT with no change in it -- and in our status -- what would be the point of our previous position? What would we have gained from the recent tests? Do we then not compromise our security interests? Also, if we sign the discriminatory CTBT on what grounds can we refuse to sign the equally discriminatory NPT?

When the CTBT was being actively discussed, the then prime minister made it very clear there was a national consensus on this issue and that India wished to keep its options open. None of this has changed. Even so, the CTBT seems to have become a political football and the consensus of a nation has been lost.

Decisions like the one on CTBT can't be based on narrow grounds of expediency but on wider perceptions of our past and future and of our role in world affairs. While there may be strong pressures and inducements to sign CTBT without any modification, the aspirations and interests of the nation should not be forgotten in arriving at a negotiated settlement. It is at such times that the statesmen stand out from the politicians.

The author is former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

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