August 10, 1998

Indian diplomats negotiating with the Pakistanis disagree. They point out that a policy of putting Kashmir on the negotiating table without including other issues such as ending hostilities along Siachen or improving trade relations is fraught with risks. As an agreement over any kind of settlement on the Kashmir issue is unlikely, talks would break down rapidly anyway. And Pakistan would use it as a ploy to give bilateral dialogue a bad name and call for third-party intervention on Kashmir. Also, they point out that this time round some of the demands made by Pakistan for starting the negotiation process, such as "recognition of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference as the legitimate Kashmiri representative", "release of Kashmiri detainees" and "cessation of search/arrest operations", is a gross interference in the internal affairs of the country and clearly untenable.

Suspecting that the Pakistanis were out to sabotage the talks, the Indian delegation stuck to its old position of keeping the dialogue with Pakistan "composite and broad-based". This essentially meant that the Indians fell back to their June 23, 1997 proposal calling for a dialogue on eight issues, namely Jammu and Kashmir, peace and security, CBMs, Siachen, terrorism and drug-trafficking and economic and commercial cooperation. At that meeting, there was a controversy over whether India had in fact agreed to set up a working group on Kashmir along with seven others to continue the discussions.

Pakistan on the other hand maintained that the situation had changed dramatically after the nuclear tests and wanted Kashmir and CBMs to dominate the dialogue. In the first round, Raghunath and Ahmad spent 90 minutes trying to work out the modalities. In retrospect, the Indians now admit that the talks had broken down at the end of that very round. Unlike the Pakistani foreign office spokesperson who was candid and forthcoming in his talks even with the Indian media, the Indian delegation continued to hold out hope saying "the process is on". The fact was that after the 90-minute meeting held at midnight on July 29, there was only a brief exchange at Bentota on July 30 when Raghunath and Ahmad accompanied their respective prime ministers for the retreat.

That day, however, talks between joint secretaries took place between 1.15 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. in the evening. Once again, it was amply clear that the dialogue could not be resumed because while India kept stressing its "broad-based, composite" approach, Pakistan continued to insist on "progress on Kashmir". As an official pointed out, Pakistan was not even willing to have an eight-day dialogue on all the eight items placed on the agenda.

The last thing the Pakistanis told their Indian counterparts was that they were willing to discuss the other items too but that there should be a gap of at least a week or a fortnight between the discussion on Kashmir and the subsequent discussion on any other item. The Indians feared it was a ploy to hold discussions only on these two subjects and then walk away from the negotiating table saying no worthwhile progress is possible. "We can't play on a pitch dug up by them. They want us to play with their bat and their ball and a third umpire," said a harassed official of the Ministry of External Affairs.

The Indians kept trying to work out the modalities under the impression that Sharif's views on relations with India were divergent from that of his hawkish Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan. But the fact is that even before Sharif left for Colombo he had decided to take a hard-line stance.

SHARIF'S calculations were based on many factors. With the Pakistani economy facing an imminent collapse owing to international sanctions, he knows that time is running out for him and he can't wait for an elaborate dialogue. His key advisers also believe that the earlier impression of Vajpayee being a moderate was incorrect especially after Home Minister L.K. Advani and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Madan Lal Khurana made tough statements about Kashmir. Given the wafer-thin majority Vajpayee has in Parliament, Sharif believes that the Indian prime minister's position continues to be tenuous. He is also keen on exploiting the lack of political consensus in India over the nuclear tests.

There is no domestic political pressure on Sharif to resume a dialogue with India. If he initially showed keenness on engaging Vajpayee in a dialogue it was because he was under pressure from several key countries, especially the US, to do so. The UN Security Council, which had passed a resolution deploring the nuclear tests, also wanted the two nations to enter into a bilateral negotiation, including, to Pakistan's delight, discussion on "the root cause" of tension, Kashmir. So Sharif was keen on giving bilateralism a quick burial but the Indians were clearly caught by surprise at the speed with which he did it. By using a forum like SAARC to declare that talks had broken down, Sharif was grabbing international headlines.

Pakistan's strategy in the coming months would be to use every available international forum to embarrass India. On August 15, it is mounting massive functions to commemorate 50 years of the 1948 UN resolution calling for a plebiscite on Kashmir. At Durban, it is likely to use the NAM forum to again announce that dialogue with India is useless. Then the summit meeting of South Asia and Central Asia heads of government in September will be another opportunity to rub it in.

All this is clearly a build up for the UN General Assembly which begins it session, also in September, where Pakistan is likely to move several resolutions calling for a Security Council intervention in Kashmir. Kalim Bahadur, professor of South Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, warns: "Resuming a dialogue with Pakistan would be very difficult now . Pakistanis will take a hard-line and try to create a nuclear scare as they did on the eve of the tests. They will intensify low-level conflict in Kashmir as a start." That it has already done even during the current round of talks. Pakistan's hand is suspected in last week's terrorist attacks on villages in Doda that left 18 dead. On the line of actual control there was intensified shelling and 21 people including four securitymen were killed on July 31.

India's game plan is to project itself as a sober, credible and responsible nation that is treading the nuclear weapons path with a great deal of maturity. And also to show that it is not likely to be shaken either by Pakistan's petulance or any nuclear sabre-rattling that it may indulge in. For a brief while Vajpayee, before the Colombo talks, flirted with the idea of taking daring steps that included agreeing to have an exclusive dialogue over Kashmir. He toyed with the idea of unilaterally declaring a no-first-use of nuclear weapons against Pakistan as an indication of India's non-aggressive intent and also willingness to bring about lasting peace in the subcontinent. He adopted a tough stance when his key aides advised him that a conciliatory approach over Kashmir would neither resolve the problem nor find political support. And to reserve the no-first use option for a tactically more suitable occasion.

Experts, however, argue that India should have come far better prepared for the Colombo talks instead of being caught on the wrong foot especially when Pakistan proposed its controversial CBMs. It could, for instance, have come out with its own set of counter-CBMs that could have taken the wind out of the Pakistani sails. Yet, there is plenty of support for a hard-line Indian stand as long as it is imaginatively played out. As former foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey says, "It is going to be a long-drawn war of nerves. We should be willing to make just the right concessions at the right time. But hold on to our core position that Kashmir is an integral part of India."

Can India lower tensions and also beat Pakistan at its propaganda game? One method is, as Bahadur says, "Do something that does not require the Pakistan Government's cooperation. For example, offer some unilateral gestures, such as a no-first use of nuclear weapons." The other is by possibly moving back its missile storage facilities to a position that is less threatening. As Kuldip Sahdev, a former diplomat and ambassador to Japan, says, "We just have to be patient and make it clear that India wants peace. And we are willing to wait to achieve it." Given the gulf between the positions of the two countries, the chances of progress are slender. A meaningful dialogue still seems to be in the intensive care unit.

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