The Nation: A.B. Vajpayee: The Dove at War

India Today, July 12, 1999
July 12, 1999

A B VAJPAYEE
The Dove at War

The prime minister does a balancing act by setting policy guidelines with a minimum of operational interference.

By Saba Naqvi Bhaumik

Final Say: Cabinet colleagues have been told to take their cues from Vajpayee's restrained position. He man who staked his reputation on peace and friendship with Pakistan has, paradoxically, ended up being the country's first non-Congress war prime minister. Leading the Indian state not when bouquets are arriving from Pakistan but when each day brings news of military victories tempered by human casualties. For Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee Kargil could prove the supreme test of leadership.

So far he has done something of a juggling act -- keeping open unofficial channels of diplomacy with Pakistan while giving the military a free hand on the war front. While planning every stage of the diplomatic parleys, he is clear that military strategy is better left to the generals.

Arun Singh: Is the bridge Vajpayee's morning begins with a session with Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra who drops by at Race Course Road before attending to work at the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) in South Block. Mishra remains Vajpayee's closest adviser on defence and foreign affairs. But the basic decision-making forum is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) which has met at least five times a week since the Kargil conflict began. Chaired by the prime minister, these meetings held at his residence or at South Block last for anything from an hour to three hours. Besides the prime minister, the CCS consists of the home, defence, external affairs and finance ministers, their secretaries, the chiefs of intelligence agencies and the three military chiefs.

It is at these high-security meetings that the service chiefs brief the political bosses about the situation on the battlefront. Political directives are given and diplomatic possibilities discussed. Explains External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh: "What we have is a military diplomatic situation. And conflict management is an enormous job." Singh, for instance, briefed the CCS after his mission to China and the failure of the talks with Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz.

The pros and cons of crossing the LoC has been thoroughly debated at these sessions. The intelligence and service chiefs have also devoted a great deal of time on assessing the military and political situation inside Pakistan. But no analysis has yet been done of the massive intelligence failure in detecting the Pakistani build-up on the Indian side of the loc. Says Mishra: "There has been no post mortem as yet."

What the prime minister has done instead is make it clear to his cabinet colleagues that they should follow his lead in outlining the Indian response and should check with him before taking any new position on Kargil. Vajpayee was forced to enunciate his stand after some early gaffes by Defence Minister George Fernandes and BJP President Kushabhau Thakre. Fernandes has since wisely kept his mouth shut and remains an integral part of Vajpayee's informal war council consisting of Mishra and Singh. Through the day, the prime minister picks up the internal rax line to check facts with his three closest aids-in-arms. Says Singh: "We meet daily or he calls me on the rax. I seek his guidance for every diplomatic initiative".

The Vajpayee team still has some hopes pinned on back-door diplomacy, such as the mission undertaken by former Pakistan foreign secretary Niaz Naik. Besides, Vajpayee has had at least six telephone conversations with Sharif since the Kargil conflict began.

Handling war for Vajpayee does not merely involve talking to the enemy. He's also had to keep at bay the recalcitrant forces within -- the more hardline elements in his party and the Sangh Parivar, sections of which have been recommending the dropping of a nuclear bomb on Pakistan and crossing the loc. Home Minister L.K. Advani, who sits in on the CCS meetings, is the link between the party and the government. But he is not really in on all aspects of war management. The party is pointedly kept out though it is in the forefront of countering the awkward notes struck by the Congress. Yet, there is a crucial distinction made between the party and the government. In spite of the BJP's increasing hard line on Pakistan, the Vajpayee administration has stuck to the line that the Lahore process can be resumed once Pakistan pulls back from the loc.

Vajpayee has also side-stepped the Congress demand that a special session of the Rajya Sabha (where the BJP is in a minority) be convened to discuss Kargil. The Congress' ardour to take on the BJP now, without resolving the Kargil conflict, is not shared by all anti-BJP parties. And Vajpayee scored a major point over Congress President Sonia Gandhi when one of Rajiv Gandhi's closest aides, Arun Singh, was appointed special executive assistant to the external affairs minister last week.

A former corporate executive who became something of a defence specialist during his stint as minister of state in Rajiv's government, Singh is known to be a fine strategic thinker. His decade-old report on military reforms is highly regarded. Inducted into the government for the duration of the crisis, he will be the bridge between diplomatic initiatives and military compulsions. The appointment will, of course, be resented by the Congress which has bitter memories of Singh's fallout with Rajiv over the Bofors issue. But it could also signal Vajpayee's growing willingness to induct competent professionals into the government, regardless of their non-involvement in the BJP.

Clearly a prime minister has many fronts to watch besides keeping track of territory recovered and lives lost on the border.

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