Nuke watch: Weapons; Worrying over Broken Arrows

A clearly defined command and control structure has to be set up quickly to avoid dangerous nuclear mishaps.

In October 1962, at the height of the Cuban missile crisis, a sentry at the US air force base in Duluth, Minnesota, thought he spotted an intruder. He sounded the alarm and airfields throughout the region were put on alert to prevent Soviet agents from sabotaging US nuclear forces. At the Volkfield airbase in Wisconsin the wrong alarm bell rang, signalling a nuclear war. Pilots immediately ran to their nuclear-armed bombers and started taxiing down the runway to carry out a retaliatory strike. Fortunately, the base commander contacted Duluth and when he realised what had happened drove his car on to the runway and stopped the bombers. The suspected Soviet saboteur at Duluth that triggered the whole incident was, ironically, a wandering bear.

As India, Pakistan and even China begin to accept the new reality of an overtly nuclear-armed subcontinent, questions of who should authorise the launch of such weapons has taken on an added urgency. Especially to prevent worrying incidents like the one at Duluth that could lead to what is known in technical parlance as a NUCFLASH (pronounced nukeflash) or a nuclear weapon accident that another country could mistake for an attack. Or even a "broken arrow" incident where an aircraft or missile carrying nuclear weapons crashes on a test flight as has happened in the US and Russia.

Last week at a meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, members pointedly asked senior officials from the Defence Ministry two such questions: Had a command and control system been put in place for the control of nuclear weapons? Had the procedure for safe handling and storage of nuclear weapons been finalised?

Ministry officials have been known to obfuscate their answers on less sensitive issues. On this subject they were even more vague. The members were told that "the Government has initiated action to update the scheme for effective political control over nuclear devices/weapons". As for safety procedures, "these have been revised and updated in keeping with requirements in this regard". Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in a recent Washington Post interview indicated that "India does not intend to build a large arsenal or create an elaborate command and control system like other nuclear weapon powers".

Defence experts are, however, demanding more explicit answers. Analyst K. Subrahmanyam believes that India, like the US, should now legislate who should authorise a nuclear strike. As he says, " It would also send out a signal to hostile countries that India is in a position to retaliate with absolute certainty." Most feel that the decision should lie with the prime minister. There is also the need to lay down a chain of political and military succession to authorise a nuclear attack in the unlikely event of an enemy strike over Delhi wiping out key decision makers. In nuclear parlance it is called a "blue-sky attack". In the US the warrant of succession has around30 key people, including the chairman of the Senate.

With India stating that it is willing to sign a pact not to carry out a nuclear strike first or a policy of we-will-only-hit-back-if-we-are-struck, the risk of a whimsical political or military decision is reduced. As also the need for elaborate command and control structures to prevent misuse. Experts like General K. Sundarji, former chief of army staff, call for the setting up of a national command authority (NCA) to decide on the use of nuclear weapons. Its political composition would be like that of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs but it will have a group consisting of strategic, technical and civil experts who will advise it on what response should be apt. Also needed is a national command post with powerful communication equipment to transmit orders and monitor their progress. "If the NCA is the brain then the command post acts like its nervous system and sensory organs," says Sundarji.

With the Government announcing that it will legislate a bill setting up a National Security Council, the command authority structure could be worked around it. It is also likely to result in the creation of the long felt post of chairman of joint chiefs of staff for the three armed forces so that the prime minister has a single line of command.

Meanwhile, it is learnt that the Government is setting up a national command post outside Delhi which would not only have all communication and radar facilities but also the strength to withstand a direct hit. Measures have also been taken to ensure proper coded security to authorise a strike. Instead of the press of the button it is more likely to be agreed codes sent over several separate communication channels so that the armed force in charge of nuclear weapons knows it is an authentic order.

Among the other things being worked out is who will store the nuclear core. A consensus is building around divided control. While the concerned armed force will be in charge of the launcher -- which right now is either a Prithvi missile or an aircraft -- the nuclear core to be mated with the warhead is to be kept by a separate establishment. Only when key decision makers anticipate a crisis will the order be given to nuclear tip the warheads. Such an approach, say experts, would add to safety measures, reduce the risk of unauthorised use and cut costs considerably.

How elaborate the command and control structure needed should be will be determined by how many nuclear weapons India requires to feel secure. The current thinking as indicated by Vajpayee is for a minimum deterrence which means around 100 weapons. Not the kind of massive retaliatory force that nuclear powers often quote -- an ability to kill one-fifth of a hostile nation's population and destroy one-half of its industry. India's planners realise the more weapons it possesses the bigger the headache. And the cost.

PAKISTAN
Bizarre Revelations

Running as a subtext to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan are some strange events. The first was the claim by Pakistani officials, on the eve of their tests on May 27, that India was planning a pre-emptive strike on their nuclear facilities.

Now in a bizarre and shocking sequel, a Pakistani scientist who has defected to the United States says that it was Pakistan which was planning a strike and that too, well before the Shakti tests. Iftikhar Chaudhry Khan, 29, is one of the five Pakistani scientists who have reportedly defected to the West because they say they opposed a plan to strike at India, drawn up at a top-secret meeting on April 25 in the presence of Pakistani Army Chief Jehangir Karamat and Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan. While the other defectors have yet to surface, Iftikhar Khan, who has been talking to the US media, says he was an aide of Altaf Hussain of the Khushab Nuclear Research Centre. This is where a 50 MW research reactor to produce weapons-grade plutonium has been constructed with Chinese help.

Pakistan has, predictably, denied the entire story. Ayub Khan says, "This man is a total fraud and an impostor," and that there had never been any plan for a nuclear strike. Pakistani scientist Samar Mobarikmand, who led the team that carried out the nuclear tests, says that the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission did not have the post of an "assistant research officer", it did not have anyone by the name of Iftikhar Chaudhry Khan, nor for that matter Altaf Hussain. There has been no official reaction by the Indian government. Indian analysts have differed in their views. Many believe that the whole episode is a put up job by one or the other intelligence agencies, designed to highlight nuclear instability in the region. However, some like Major (retd) Shankar Bhaduri, who is associated with the Indian Defence Review, says that it is too much to expect that the entire incident has been staged. "I believe that a discussion on targets in India took place; but it was not for an actual strike but a routine planning conference to educate the Pakistani army brass about the effects of their new weapons."

This is just the beginning. Jane's Intelligence Review plans to carry a detailed story with interviews with some of these scientists. Should they turn out to be senior people and provide credible detail on the intriguing event, Pakistan may have a lot to answer for yet.

--Manoj Joshi