Diplomacy: Sino-US relations: The Beijing Tango

Bonhomie between the US and China is all for the good, but their South Asia focus bodes ill for India.

If it were just an affair of the heart, it would be mildly amusing to see the world's only superpower courting a wannabe. But when it begins to look as if South Asia is the dower that America is offering China, alarm bells begin clanging in Delhi. Last week, even as the Clinton-Jiang Zemin love-fest wound down, a testy Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement declared that the Sino-US approach smacked of "the hegemonistic mentality of a bygone era".

But then, the US affair with China did begin a long time back in the 1840s when the American Board of Foreign Missions "discovered" Asia. The gush of emotion and hype accompanying President Bill Clinton's June 25-July 3 visit to China made it abundantly clear that the American ardour for the Middle Kingdom has redoubled in its vigour.

Clinton's journey to Beijing represents a remarkable turnaround for a man who attacked his predecessor George Bush for being too lenient with China's human rights record. In 1996, when China began lobbing missiles near Taiwan, Clinton ordered two nuclear-armed aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits. Now, despite continuing evidence of Chinese nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan and Iran, Clinton has undertaken, what US critics say, is kowtowing to Beijing.

Viewed from Delhi, the Clinton tour would have been an interesting but unremarkable event, but for a US-China joint statement declaring that the two countries were united in their assessment of the problems of the region and intended to aid in their resolution. Even before the nuclear tests sent Indo-US relations plummeting, Indian officials watched bemused as the Clinton administration soft-pedalled missile and nuclear proliferation issues. But the visit seems to signal a Sino-American joint strategy that has rekindled India's '80s fear of a Sino-US-Pakistan axis.

Besides the tough statement by the official spokesman, Indian officials are not saying much, especially for the record. Privately, they are quite sceptical of the new Sino-American approach. "By its supply of nuclear and missile technology, China has been a major part of the problem," says an MEA official, "we can hardly believe that it has suddenly decided to become a kind and helpful neighbour."

Both Beijing and Washington say that they have nothing but the most benign interests in the region. However, China's record of aiding Pakistan's nuclear and missile capability and the American insensitivity to Indian security concerns have been too blatant to be overlooked. Delhi is, therefore, understandably upset at what some officials say are "crude attempts" to introduce China as a kind of honest broker into South Asia. But here, too, the story has a history.

Richard Nixon's path-breaking visit to China in February 1972, came in the wake of Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing via Islamabad. This action, it is believed, persuaded the US to back the Pakistani military dictatorship's attempt to crush the Bangladesh rebellion. After the visit, the two sides issued the Shanghai Communiqu where the Chinese declared their firm support for "the Pakistan government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination".

The June 27 joint statement is milder on Kashmir. This is because of the focus on China and America's main worry -- the emergence of India as a nuclear weapons state. According to an official in the Prime Minister's Office, "Both the United States and China want a roll-back of the situation in South Asia to a position prevailing before the nuclear tests. Unfortunately for them, this is simply not a realistic option." As the official rejoinder to the Sino-US statement notes, "India will continue to take decisions in this regard on the basis of its own national security requirements."

Indian officials say that this convergence of interests on proliferation in South Asia is self-serving. While both are mouthing their concerns in terms of concern for peace and stability, their major concerns relate to the power balance in the region. "China as a neighbour of India has to confront the military reality of India's declaration of itself as a nuclear weapons state, while the US interests, though peripheral, are significant, especially in the Persian Gulf," says one official. Indian missiles tipped with nuclear weapons are a factor that the Chinese military or the American forces in Diego Garcia or the Persian Gulf would have to take into account in the future.

Not all Indians are alarmed at the development. Specialists like Vinod C. Khanna, director of the Delhi-based Institute of Chinese Studies, accept that there is a convergence of interests between the US and China on certain issues such as the recent nuclear developments in South Asia. However, says Khanna, "to argue that a Sino-US condominium is emerging, with the US handing over South Asia to China's sphere of influence, involve a potentially dangerous misreading of the foreign policies of the US and China and indeed how the international system operates today."

In looking at issues at a macro level it is often difficult to factor in the attendant personal issues at stake. Clinton's term as president will end in another two and a half years and he cannot contest for the office again. With his reputation taking the knocks it has in the past year, non-proliferation is one area on the basis of which the he hopes to stake its claim in history. In his first term, the US was able to deftly persuade signatories to indefinitely and unconditionally extend the unequal npt and sign the equally flawed CTBT. But the CTBT has not come into force. Next year, a review conference will have to decide what is to be done with it if India and some other designated nations do not sign it.

Blinded by the dazzle of the summit, it is a bit difficult to see that there remain many imponderables in Sino-US relations. Chief among these are the US' own contrary ways. Even as Clinton woos China, opposition Republicans maintain a drumfire of criticism of Chinese human rights practices and on its proliferation record. For their part, the Chinese remain suspicious of US motives and there are feelings, occasionally articulated, about the US goal of somehow derailing communist party rule and "containing" China.

Relations between the two powers separated by the Pacific Ocean are also shaped by a larger global balance of power. For the near future the United States will be the only superpower in the world and China seeks US endorsement, at the expense of Japan, Russia and India, to be recognised as the pre-eminent Asian power. The reality is somewhat different. Japan's economy, though troubled, is 16 times the size of China's. Russian economic and military strength is still substantially greater than China's. Though India has not been able to match its spectacular economic growth, in its size and potential it is a country very much like China.

Deeper down, despite the hype, there is another problem. The Sino-US romance is a facade. Actually, all that the two currently share is a diplomatic and commercial relationship which has, in the case of South Asia, developed a convergence of self-interest.

DIFFERENT STROKES

US-China Joint Statement/India's view

Our shared interests in a peaceful and stable South Asia and in a strong global non-proliferation regime have been put at risk by these tests.
China must in turn accept its share of the blame for its aid to Pakistan.

We call on India and Pakistan to ... refrain from weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons, or of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
This formulation aids Pakistan to keep Ghauri and Chinese-supplied missiles, but prevents India from testing or deploying Agni.

We urge India and Pakistan to participate ... in ... negotiations for the treaty (on banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the FMCT).
India has never said it will not do so, being an early supporter of the FMCT.

We are committed to assist India and Pakistan to resolve peacefully the difficult and long-standing differences, including the issue of Kashmir.
Delhi is leery of any mediation, especially from such "disinterested" mediators.

Our policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology for nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes in India or Pakistan.
This is like locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.