July 13, 1998

Jayalalitha must behave--or Vajpayee must call her bluff

If there is an eerie sense of deja vu to the mess the BJP-led coalition finds itself in, it is not misplaced. It has been as effectively crippled by blackmail as the previous ruling alliance, the United Front (UF), was. The UF regime's prolonged bouts of inactivity -- as a prelude to its eventual collapse -- were blamed upon the CPI(M) and the Congress, both of which supported it from outside. It was then felt that an entirely participatory coalition was a better guarantor of longevity. Now J. Jayalalitha has turned this logic on its head. Her aiadmk is the Government's kamikaze squad, apparently determined to sink the rest of Atal Bihari Vajpayee's regime with it. There is the anomalous situation of AIADMK ministers attending office but AIADMK MPs boycotting Parliament. From day one, Jayalalitha's demand has been clear: dismiss the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu, constitutional proprieties be damned. It is an attitude which flies in the face of claims that "regional parties have a national outlook".

The idea of one small party holding to ransom an entire government -- and an entire country -- is as tiresome as it is recurrent. There is a certain difference between bazaar bargaining and political negotiation. This escaped Sitaram Kesri in November 1997; it has similarly eluded Jayalalitha. Since the Vajpayee Government has ruled out using Article 356 in Tamil Nadu, it is time for Jayalalitha to move on. One course would be to reconcile herself to her local rival's survival. Alternatively, she can sell her support to the highest bidder, help put together a non-BJP government and ensure the DMK's removal. What she cannot do is persist with the cycle of menacing threat followed by strategic retreat. While the onus may be on the recalcitrant lady, Vajpayee cannot sit back and do nothing. With each day, his government's credibility suffers that much more. Slowly but surely he is painting himself into a corner which will leave him with only one option: to call Jayalalitha's bluff.

Defending those Frontiers

Don't allow the National Security Council to become just another IAS sinecure

The impending National Security Council (NSC) is unlikely to do much in a country still not quite attuned to matters strategic. Pokhran II provides a compelling logic for an institution to undertake national security management. By suggesting that a cabinet committee on national security be at the apex of the NSC, the "task force on the NSC" headed by former defence minister K.C. Pant has been prudent. It has thus placed the new body within the existing constitutional and political framework. But whether or not the NSC can actually get off the ground depends on how it copes with the rusted steel-frame -- the bureaucracy. The entrenched IAS lobby is unlikely to take too kindly to the task force's proposal that three small secretariats be set up to assist the prime minister's national security adviser.

The challenge before the Government is to provide "integrated thinking and coordinated application" of political, military, diplomatic and scientific and technical resources for national security goals. There is, therefore, a need to ensure that the NSC does not become just another committee of secretaries -- which mostly and somewhat inefficiently rubber-stamps decisions already taken by ministries concerned. Actually, the biggest problem confronting the NSC idea is the sheer lack of expertise on issues relating to national security. Whatever expertise is available is confined to governmental departments. Even when seconded to bodies like the NSC, government servants will promote the interests of their parent organisations. Tapping talent from the fields of business, banking and academia is as important as nurturing it by facilitating the study of strategic doctrines, foreign languages and so on. Without requisite intellectual infrastructure, the NSC will be a non-starter.

Issue Contents | Write to us | Subscriptions

© Living Media India Ltd