March 15, 1999
|
|
|
|
THE MAKING OF THE INDIAN ATOMIC BOMB Wrong Then Wrong Now India's quest for nuclear weapons is a history of bad timing. By Subramanian Swamy THE MAKING OF THE INDIAN ATOMIC
BOMB This book traces the history of Indian official thinking on atomic energy and the institutional framework that formalised our policy in this area since 1948. The author formulates an interesting thesis: "International public opinion, to the extent that there is such a thing, is now where India was nearly half a century ago. But India has moved on from its once lofty, idealistic standpoint. India has demanded its right to become a nuclear power just when the atomic age has come to an end, and thus remains an outsider, a spoiler, but for reasons completely opposed to its original purpose." I am inclined to subscribe to the author's thesis, since I was among the daring few (alas, as an academic then) in the '60s who wrote extensively on the need for India to develop a nuclear deterrent but am sharply critical of the decision of the A.B. Vajpayee Government to test nuclear devices in May 1998. India has missed the bus twice, first in the late '60s and '70s and now in the '90s for opposite and contrary reasons. In the '60s, nuclear weapons and deterrents were mystical brahmastras, within the reach of only a select few countries. International opinion had glorified their possession, especially since the five permanent members of the Security Council were the only ones with such capacity. At the same time the spectre of India begging for PL 480 food from the US, the 1962 defeat at the hands of the Chinese, the 1965 stalemate in the Indo-Pakistani war, that led to a brokered peace, had made us look weak and incapable of joining the hallowed league. Our chanting of Jawaharlal Nehru's disarmament mantra therefore was taken as a cry of the weak. The world sniggered at us. Had we gone nuclear just before the 1971 Bangladesh war or just after (when we had acquired the capability), India would have been accepted as an international player and a nuclear weapons power. It would have demolished our "beggar" image in one blow. As the author correctly notes, by the time we did detonate a device, in 1974, its effect was washed away by our perceived hypocritical stance that it was for "peaceful purposes". There was no need for this stance, since public opinion in India has been consistently, 80 or 90 per cent, in favour of this parmanu astra. Because of our stance the world powers propagated, and international opinion was thus formed, that the 1974 explosion was not to be taken seriously. We were further portrayed as betraying the Nehru "legacy". But in 1974, we were still decades ahead of Pakistan and not far behind China (at that stage emaciated by the Lin Biao failed coup). By doing little to implement or even formulate a consistent policy and outlook on the nuclear issue, we triggered adrenalin flow into Pakistan's nuclear bloodstream. And by the consequential sanctions, we scuttled our own peaceful programme which Vikram Sarabhai had drawn up in exchange for signing the NPT. In effect, we got the worst of both worlds. By 1998, a determined and fanatic Pakistan had closed the gap and China had streamed way ahead. As Itty Abraham notes, the world in the meantime had contracted the disarmament fever. We were out of step with the trend we had originated in the '50s. Pokhran II and Vajpayee's supplicant letter to President Bill Clinton gave Pakistanis the moral edge to demonstrate what they always craved to prove: that they are as good as us, if not better. The parity syndrome was established to the hilt. China sneered at us. The US confirmed our outcast status. The world rebuked us. Abraham's thesis is thus worth reading and debating. However, he has relied largely on official sources and is unaware of the intellectual ferment on this issue during the '60s and '70s. He has no clue about our political dynamics or the workings of our vested interests. But, his conceptualisation and articulation are admirable. and his book is a welcome addition to the literature on nuclear weapons development. NEW RELEASES « The Best
of Interiors and Lifestyle India « The Word
Divine « A Bundle
of Blunders |
|
Issue Contents | Write to us | Subscriptions | Syndication BUSINESS TODAY | INDIA TODAY PLUS | COMPUTERS TODAY © Living Media India Ltd |
 |
 |
