August 17, 1998

Clever compromises hold the key to redeeming Indo-US relations.

James Clad

Despite the bluster and recrimination since Pokhran II, India and the US have common interests to project and protect. Both countries may lie closer to agreement than commonly supposed, with a visit by President Bill Clinton a matter of "when" rather than "if".

India's security rests just as much on capping the prohibitively expensive nuclear weaponising process as on bringing latent nuclear capabilities out of the closet. This, really, is all the recent tests have done. Further, both the US and India share an interest in monitoring and, if necessary, constraining Chinese ambitions in Asia. Rhetorical White House gestures suggesting otherwise were intended primarily as domestic selling points for Clinton's China "engagement policy" prior to his recent visit to that country.

Even so, despite privately communicated second thoughts by American legislators, India's Government is mistaken in expecting toothless sanctions. Simply put, the non-proliferation lobby is the single most important national security constituency in the US.

Nevertheless, the important broadening of bilateral relations over the past decade has not gone into reverse. The truth is -- unlike US relations with China, Japan, or South Korea -- the State Department still retains the predominant role in setting India policy. But the relationship has changed irrevocably since even a decade ago, as the steadily more influential pro-India business lobby on Capitol Hill attests.

It will pay to be realistic. Although Clinton remains personally keen to visit India, a November timing now looks improbable. India should welcome a visit not as a "reward" for good behaviour, but as a device to signal parity treatment vis-a-vis China.

These realities should impel a solution. But while the Indian Government affects a non-hurried stance, the need to resolve the south Asian affront to the test ban regime is actually quite time-sensitive. There are several reasons why this is so.

One, India's economic woes impel rapid resolution of the nuclear problem. India's policy makers do not have the luxury of dawdling. Sanctions, when they come, will arrive at a bad moment for domestic and global business sentiments. Two, regional security. India's neighbourhood is shifting. To take an example, the US aim to normalise ties with Iran rests largely on restraining Teheran's nuclear weapons drive.

India's behaviour in May has hastened that drive. Its leadership, in achieving a new equilibrium, can retard it while preventing Pakistan from seizing the initiative. The US knows that Delhi, not Islamabad, is the key driver in the process. But Pakistan could yet succeed in cleverly leveraging the appearance of its acquiescence to the test ban regime.

Three, prestige and normal relations. It's a bit rich to hear admonitions of nuclear responsibility coming from China. The hectoring, lecturing tone after Pokhran carried more than a morsel of hypocrisy. But the anguish is real, as Australian and Japanese reaction indicates.

Senior State Department officials felt personally let down that Pokhran came just as a major internal review had dramatically lifted India's profile in America's Asia policy. Stabilising the test ban regime while injecting, as price of participation, some specifically Indian perspectives will help end this isolation.

With this in mind, we may reach a solution comprising some or most of the following elements.

Without formal CTBT accession, India will embrace a test ban regime via specific declaratory language which reflects consensus by scientific advisers that testing can cease.

India's de facto refusal to sanction fissile material exports will be formalised via entry into global fissile materials' export negotiations. In turn, the US will acquiesce in new, India-generated items.

The US will assent to measures indicating renewed emphasis on the NPT's provision for efforts toward disarmament.

India will seize the initiative in south Asia via announcements on cross-border normalisation. Strategic decisions facilitating the use of energy sources from India's neighbours -- Bangladesh, Nepal, even Pakistan -- will build on the Vajpayee heritage of the late '70s. That was when India's relations with the rest of south Asia were at their best.

Private assurances about non-hostile positioning and equipping of nuclear capable weaponry will become explicit. India must also intensify Indo-Pakistani foreign secretaries' meetings. A cross-border normalisation may result, without quite zeroing in on Kashmir.

These elements constitute a road map for the coming weeks as the US and India deal with life post-Pokhran. For America's part, we can't dismiss Indian security concerns as fabrications. The worry about China is a prime example. Nor need we always put the word "Pakistan" into every sentence dealing with India's security goals.

For India's part, recognition of American political realities will both hasten a solution and help regain the initiative. But time, really, is of the essence. India's economic as well as traditional security demands that we both, to borrow a memorable phrase, "get to 'yes'".

The author is professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University, Washington D.C., USA

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