EXTRACTS FROM INTERIM REPORT
Jain's Soft Targets

ON V.P. SINGH: It can safely be concluded that the growing connivance of the DMK government with the LTTE having been brought to the knowledge of the National Front government, effective steps were not taken by the Central government to check it, whatever may be the reasons.

It appears that V.P. Singh only extends lip sympathy when he states that he has the highest regard for the Gandhi family and Rajiv Gandhi's security was his personal concern. If such was his concern, then he ought to have considered the question not in a myopic way but with farsightedness ... It is unbelievable that V.P. Singh could be swayed by the opinion of the security and bureaucratic experts. But it appears that the question of Rajiv Gandhi's security was examined with a closed mind ... A very serious question which requires consideration by the Commission is whetherV.P.Singh was actuated by malice, bias or animus in not providing security of such nature and level as would have protected Rajiv Gandhi ... Extraneous considerations also appear to have been very much in focus ... Rajiv Gandhi was not given due attention in respect of the capability available in the state and in respect of the threat scenario of Rajiv Gandhi, the consideration thus was not an honest one ... The required seriousness, anxiety and concern was lacking and responsibility of security was shifted to states without taking into account the non-availability of the required nature and quality of proximity security unit in the states and such a casual consideration of the question cannot be said to be prompted by genuine and bona fide intentions ...

ON CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Blame lies equally at the door of the government headed by Chandra Shekhar looking into the time, place and the situation. The nature and quality of security needed under the circumstances prevailing under Chandra Shekhar's time was not provided. Alternative security scheme was devised during the time of V.P. Singh's government and that the amendment of the SPG Act was not thought of then, cannot be pleaded in defence by him. The threat scenario during this period had drastically changed and required a complete streamlining of the security arrangements for Rajiv Gandhi, which was not contemplated at all...

After the dismissal of the dmk government during the period of Chandra Shekhar, there was a crackdown on the ltte. How effective was the crackdown can be assessed by the fact that it was this period during which the intelligence group of LTTE cadres led by Sivarasan went about their job undeterred and managed to carry out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. During March 1991, fresh wireless sets were installed by the ltte in Madras which were extensively used to pass coded messages to ltte Intelligence HQ at Jaffna ...

ON P. CHIDAMBARAM: In the speech (Lok Sabha, February 25, 1991) ... he demanded a public inquiry into all that has happened in Tamil Nadu affecting ... national security and public order. According to him it was not only a matter of law and order but a problem affecting national security and he demanded an assurance from the prime minister that the public inquiry committee will be constituted to go into all that has happened in the latter half of 1989 and in 1990, into all that the DMK did in furtherance of its clandestine and secret objective of carving out a separate Tamil Nadu in support of secessionism ...

P. Chidambaram, in his deposition on 21.11.1996, stated (Annexure M-122): "My speech in Parliament reflected the position of my party on the issue of the dismissal of the dmkgovernment and proclamation of President's rule in Tamil Nadu. that was a political statement made on behalf of my party in the debate on President's Rule. I offered in my speech to lead evidence to substantiate the allegations on behalf of the party. I had no difference with what I had expressed in Parliament on behalf of the party ... Although Chidambaram adhered to the contents of his speech in the Lok Sabha made on 25.2.91, it looked from his deposition that he has gone a little mild and soft in his deposition as compared to the contents of his speech ... Can a Member of Parliament be allowed to speak anything he likes in total disregard of the truth? ...

It may be stated that Chidambaram was there in the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao and besides that, he was also given additional charge relating to matters connected with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi ... It was expected from P. Chidambaram that he would place all material and adduce all ... evidence with regard to the facts and accusations mentioned and levelled by him in his speech ... on 25.2.1991 ... Why he did not choose to act, is best known to him.

VERMA COMMISSION REPORT
Archival Value

Ironically, the P.V. Narasimha Rao government that instituted the inquiry was also responsible for the non-action. When the report was first tabled in Parliament in December 1992, the Union Home Ministry, headed by S.B. Chavan, rejected the commission's findings. But under pressure from Congress MPs , the Government quickly backtracked and within six months accepted the report in toto.

It took the Government another two years to form a Group of Ministers (GOM) comprising Chavan, Arjun Singh, V.C. Shukla, Jagdish Tytler, H.R. Bhardwaj and Satish Sharma to advice the Cabinet on what action needed to be taken. Within two months, the GOM recommended the prosecution of senior officers but it remains a decision that still has to be acted upon. The commission detailed the roles played by the Centre, the Tamil Nadu Police and the Congress and named the people whose decisions, or lack of them, led to the lapses that facilitated the assassination:

The Tamil Nadu Police, Verma said, had failed to strictly enforce the prescribed standards of security. Verma blamed the state police for not ensuring Rajiv's proximate security at the public meeting in Sriperumbudur. This enabled the entry of unauthorised persons, including the ltte's human bomb. The GOM recommended action against IGP R.K. Raghavan and F.C. Sharma, the then IGP (intelligence). The state government then headed by Jayalalitha, however, dropped the charges. The 12 policemen suspended soon after the blast for having deserted their place of duty were also reinstated.

It was only in 1996 that the explanation of four Central government officers was called for. Former cabinet secretary Vinod Pande, Intelligence Bureau chief M.K. Narayanan, home secretary Shiromani Sharma and secretary security G.S. Bajpai were let off the hook by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the proceedings were inititated after their retirement. According to government rules, officials are immune from past actions if they are two years into retirement. The Narasimha Rao government did not call for their explanation early enough.

Congress functionaries, including the local Lok Sabha candidate Maragatham Chandrashekhar, had, said Verma, been party to a security lapse. The Congress workers "exhibited a total lack of awareness of their obligation to co-operate with the police force ... and their intransigence created impediments in effective access control, necessary for Rajiv's security". The Congress ignored recommendations to initiate disciplinary action against them.

Five years after Justice Verma submitted his report, the findings have been relegated to the fate that most commissions of inquiry meet: lost in the bureaucratic and political maze.