Cover Story: Kargil War-- Battlefront: Decisive Push

Last week's victories at Tiger Hill and Jubar heights have given the Indian Army the psychological advantage it needed to drive back the Pakistani infiltrators.

For a while the Indian Army was like a lumbering elephant at Kargil -- slow to react and retaliate. But by July 8, at least to the Pakistani infiltrators, it must have resembled a juggernaut as it notched up several key victories in the battle for the heights. It was a major reason that forced Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to rush to Washington DC to seek a way out of the conflict.

The wins started a fortnight ago with the army recapturing the key Tololing peak and the surrounding ridges that overlooked the vital Leh-Srinagar highway. By last week, the Indian Army had taken back vantage points on Tiger Hill close by. And for the first time since the war began in May, the highway was re-opened to civilian traffic. It was an indication of just how successful the army has been in thwarting one of Pakistan's main objective of paralysing the lifeline between the state capital and the major district headquarters.

That was not all. By July 8, the army had moved its might to the Batalik heights which Pakistan had occupied in the hope of severing Leh from the Valley. It recaptured major vantage points on the Jubar heights and was poised to take control of most of the ridges. If the war continues, it would still take several weeks, possibly months for the army to clear all the occupied territory. But last week it appeared confident of achieving its objective. As General V.P. Malik, chief of army staff, told India Today (see interview): "There is now much greater confidence both at the tactical as well as the strategic levels. We know what we have to do and we will achieve it."

The toll continues to be high: close to 350 Indian soldiers have died in the war and around 500 are seriously injured. But there is a significant difference. A month ago, the soldiers carrying the stretchers looked a demoralised lot as the enemy seemed to hold the advantage. But now, they are swearing revenge. "We'll go back and kill the b.......," said one, his face flushed with anger, in Drass. Most of the injured were similarly charged. "I killed three of them and would have stayed on but sir ordered me to evacuate," said one.

Just a month ago, the large-scale intrusion had caught the Indian Army ill-equipped to handle the crisis. One example: A majority of the Indian troops stationed at Drass and Kargil did not have extreme cold-climate clothing or bullet-proof jackets. They had outdated communication sets that were a burden to lug around. It came home more vividly when the Indian Air Force (IAF) was called in to assist and lost three aircraft within three days of air operations.

As the casualties mounted rapidly and the army realised it hadn't made much headway the brass changed tactics. There was no point just blindly dispatching companies in the hope that they would be able to evict the intruders who had by then taken up vantage positions on key heights and spread themselves as a senior officer described "like chicken pox". So they went in for what in military parlance is called a "tactical pause". They told the government they needed at least two to three weeks to not only bring additional troops into the area but also to stock up their arms and ammunition. Five additional brigades were brought in and clothing and equipment rushed from all over the country.

The army also decided that instead of going after the intruders in all the sectors, it would first concentrate on freeing the Srinagar-Leh highway from any threat. Securing the highway was possible only by neutralising the infiltrators occupying the heights over Drass; they were lodged a mere 4 km away from the highway at Tololing and 8 km away at Tiger Hill. To achieve this, a three-pronged strategy was devised:
ť To stop any further ingress, get troops to encircle these points from as many sides as possible.
ť Use air power to demoralise infiltrators and inflict damage to bunkers and tents occupied by them.
ť Soften the area being occupied by the intruders and press ground troops into action for a hand-to-hand combat to finish them or push them back.

The army brass had learnt a lot of lessons from the first big success -- the capture of Tololing and its key heights Point 4590 and Point 5140 between June 12 and 18. The most important one was: size up the enemy before launching ground troops and take him on from a place where he is least expecting you. This is what was done before the assault on Tiger Hill began. Troops encircled Tiger Hill from three sides before the final assault for the top (see box).

The two victories have had a major psychological impact on the battlefront. As Brigadier Arun Aul, brigade commander, 56 Brigade (in charge of Drass) put it, "There are signs of panic among the Pakistanis. They are beginning to crack now because they are being hit very hard." A change of strategy by the IAF also helped in the recapture of Tiger Hill and important locations in Jubar in Batalik. The success of air strikes till then had at best been average. Not surprising, since there were compulsions not to cross the Line of Control (LoC) and fly not less than 9 km above enemy positions lest the aircraft be targeted by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). The strategy was then revised. Nocturnal air raids were carried out to break the spirit of the intruders. And the more accurate but expensive laser-guided bombs (each costs Rs 1 crore) were used to cut off enemy supply lines.

As the war shows signs of drawing to a close, the Indian Army has begun looking "beyond Kargil". But it is not a very happy sight. Already three divisions are stationed all along the LoC at Kargil. These troops will have to be stationed there through much of the winter. Besides, the recaptured heights would have to be manned round the clock. Expenses alone, one officer estimated, would amount to maintaining "three Siachens". The Indian Army spends Rs 3.5 crore a day to retain its hold over the Siachen Glacier. India may be winning the Kargil war but at a heavy price. Unless it learns from its mistakes, like allowing the army's preparedness to deteriorate precariously by budget cuts, Pakistan may be emboldened to carry out its threat of creating more Kargils.

Taming the Hill
It took over a month's planning to recapture one of the most strategic heights in Drass

A soldier at the foot of the strategic Tiger hill which was recaptured by the army in a massive three-pronged operataion.

It's a dreaded height that looks like a conical feature but actually has scores of spurs and ridges. Tiger Hill in the Drass sector was proving lethal for the Indian Army. From here, the well-entrenched intruders were directing precise artillery fire on the Srinagar-Leh highway just 8 km away, restricting movement of army convoys carrying ammunition and supplies. Though the capture of Tiger Hill on July 4 came as a major victory for the army, the operation has so far left over 30 soldiers dead and another 65 wounded.

Colonel Khushal Thakur, commanding officer of the 18 Grenadiers, knew the assault on Tiger Hill was a daunting task. In early May, the 8 Sikh, on a mission to assess the enemy's strength, had returned with six dead, 40 injured and a lieutenant missing. Thakur, who had already lost 25 men at Tololing, had to find a way to minimise casualties. After studying maps and aerial photographs and a thorough recce of the target, he decided on the most difficult route -- the eastern slope. A sheer cliff that the intruders would have least expected the troops to climb.

For three days beginning July 1, the Grinders (as the 18 Grenadiers are called) lugged arms and ammunition up the slopes -- flame throwers, high explosive bombs, rocket launchers, grenade launchers, lmgs and more. Such was the volume of their arsenal that it took 270 men just to carry 540 mortars of the 81 mm variety.

By July 3 evening, it was time for action. Soon after sundown, 136 artillery guns started a 30-minute pounding of enemy positions. The objective: to stun the intruders and force them to lie low. At the same time three companies began their climb, two from the eastern slope and one from the south-eastern side. The relatively easy gradient on the south-eastern side brought the troops in front of an enemy bunker at a point called Tongue. The bunker was neutralised with rocket launchers, but the exchange left one soldier dead and four injured. The other two companies had to use mountaineering gear to inch their way up. By the time 10 of them made it to Tiger Top, they had lost five of their colleagues.

Though they had seized Tiger Top, both 8 Sikh and 18 Grenadiers realised the spurs and ridges were still flush with infiltrators putting up a stiff resistance, just as they were at Collar, India Gate and Helmet on the western slope. This was also the intruders' supply route, and had to be cut off. The attempt to do so at Helmet on July 7 left the 8 Sikh with 15 dead.

Tiger Hill may have been tamed, but the clearing up operation around it is proving to be a bloody exercise.

-Harinder Baweja in Drass