Defence: Missiles; Dubious Shield

Diplomacy

India Today
October 19,1998

:MISSILES
Dubious Shield

Playing on fears of Pakistani and Chinese missiles, the DRDO embarks on a Rs 2,000 crore project to protect Delhi. But as the US experience shows, such a system is thin against long-range missiles.

By Manoj Joshi

From the dawn of air warfare in the 1930s, science fiction has toyed with the vision of a shield against missiles. In the '80s, for a brief while, the idea leapt from the pages of the Flash Gordon comic strip into the concept of the Strategic Defence Initiative a.k.a. Star Wars. Very soon, faced with the hurdles of technology and scientific scepticism, it atrophied.

The idea has now been reborn in India. Playing on fears of Pakistani and Chinese missiles and nuclear weapons, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which played a key role in India's May nuclear tests, has along with the Air Force and Army embarked on a ballistic missile defence project which could undermine stated commitments that India would construct only a "minimum nuclear deterrent". This could trigger a destabilising arms race with Pakistan and China.

The DRDO project, cleared by the Government last month, will integrate a number of high-end Russian-made anti-aircraft-cum-anti-ballistic missile systems that the Army and Air Force want to acquire-like the Russian S-300V and S-300P systems-with an Israeli fire control radar and battle management system to serve as an anti-missile shield. Current estimates for a limited shield around Delhi are pegged at Rs 2,000 crore but anyone familiar with defence budgeting will realise the costs are likely to be 10 times that amount and that too only for the national capital's protection.

The system envisaged can deal with Pakistani M-11 type missiles but not the longer range Ghauri or Chinese strategic missiles whose peak velocity can be in the order of 4 km per second. There are other imponderables as well. Instead of committing itself to a "no-first-use" pledge, Pakistan is likely to field nuclear-tipped missiles ready for launch with very little time for counter-measures.

"If I were a Pakistani," says an expert, "I would increase my arsenal two or threefold." This is what the Soviets threatened to do when the Reagan administration unveiled Star Wars. Pushed by Republican right-wingers, the US has since spent $50 billion (Rs 2,12,500 crore) on its National Missile Defence (NMD) system but has yet to field anything capable of defending a single US city against a missile attack. While the US can afford to spend tens of billions of dollars, India cannot afford to be that profligate.

But even with the projected expenditure, can the DRDO deliver? It has been 15 years since it started the Integrated Missile Development Programme to build among other things two types of anti-aircraft missiles-Trishul and Akash. There are no indications as yet that the missiles will be inducted into the Indian arsenal in the near future. The latest setback came last month at the Balasore test range when India's Patriot-clone Akash failed to engage a slow-flying Nishant remote-piloted vehicle. DRDO officials say this was the first test using an indigenously developed Rajendra phased array radar and that they are "very encouraged" by the results.

Experts say that there is a larger objection to any anti-ballistic missile programme. Minimum nuclear deterrence and a ballistic missile defence system do not go together. "Currently India, China and Pakistan or for that matter Russia and America have a kind of a stable deterrence based on the vulnerability to each other's nuclear weapons," says one expert. Creating a shield such as the one envisaged by the DRDO may look nice on paper but in practice it will compel China and Pakistan to take counter-measures which will up the ante all around.

At the root of the problem lies the confusion over what the deterrence theory is all about. Nuclear weapons, says defence analyst K. Subrahmanyam, are not weapons of defence in the conventional sense. "Instead of being used, they are meant to deter such weapons from being used." The debate over defence and deterrence was what the SALT-I (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) agreement was all about. It was clinched in favour of "deterrence" with both the US and the USSR agreeing to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) that sharply limits such weapon systems. "The present confusion is the result of politicians not being able to differentiate between the job of scientists and strategists," says Subrahmanyam, adding that when this happens scientists will run away with the strategic agenda.

Having initiated the nuclear arms race, the Russians and Americans realised the futility of such systems and signed the 1972 ABM which many consider the "foundation of strategic stability" between the two. The 100 ground-based interceptor missiles that both have at a single site each are more of a holdover of that era rather than a commitment to anti-ballistic missile defence. The Gulf War and the proliferation of missiles in the region propelled the US to call for the Theatre Missile Defence system which has since been expanded as the NMD.

But most critics see this as more of a political project whose viability is questionable. The same Republican-dominated US Congress that once advocated Star Wars is pumping more money than is required into the programme. The American thrust for anti-ballistic missile defence stems from the requirement of its armed forces committed to conflicts outside the US with much less capable adversaries. Despite its grandiose title, the NMD does not intend to provide the US with a shield against Russian or Chinese missiles but against "rogue states" whose missiles, in the near future, can engage US troops stationed near them such as those in the Persian Gulf and Japan. At present, the only anti-ballistic missile systems deployed are the Russian S-300V and the Patriot (pac3), both capable of handling only short-range Scud-type missiles. The NMD is trying to develop a series of missiles that will take the battle to outer space-such as the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system and the Exoatmospheric Re-entry Vehicle System (ERIS). Both these projects are already suffering from cost overruns and technical glitches. The only success seems to be the US-Israeli Arrow 2 missile but it may not work against long-range missiles such as the Iranian Shahab. Critics charge that even if the NMD works, it will counter only 12 missiles in a battle.

The Indian context is different. The country must deal with the missile forces of two adversaries which are numerous and proximate. Any conflict involving ballistic missiles runs the imminent risk of becoming an all-out strategic war involving nuclear weapons. DRDO officials don't want to comment on the issue. But it is ironical that through the late '80s it was the DRDO and its chief A.P. J. Abdul Kalam who urged India to make ballistic missiles because they were unstoppable. Now they want to construct a shield against them. Perhaps this is what the arms race is all about.

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