Defence:Kargil: Is the Army Covering Up?

After the triumph, the brass is now being accused of glossing reports that show they have ignored warnings about a Pakistani build-up in Kargil. The truth.

On July 20, barely four days after the last of the Pakistani intruders had been evicted from the Kargil sector, Indian Army troops who had fought so valiantly to accomplish the task received a tersely-worded telex message from the tactical headquarters which read: "Op Vijay Stop Use of correct terminology Stop Use of word bunker while referring to sangars constr(ucted) by en(emy) on own side of LC is prohibited Stop Request instr(uct) all tps (troops) to use correct expression of sangar stop."

WARNING IGNORED

WHAT THE IB SAYS
ť As early as June '98, Shyamal Dutta, director, Intelligence Bureau, wrote a note -- reference No. 28/AK/98(1) 1332-37 -- outlining increased activity in the Kargil sector. He warned of Pak army regulars building up at various posts and of increased fighter aircraft activity in Skardu.The report was marked to the PM, HM, Cab Sec, Def Sec, Home Sec and the DGMO.
ť In October '98, another IB report said militants were being trained at Olthingthang for infiltration into Kargil.
ť Again in October, another IB report said that Pakistan was surveying the area with RPVs.

WHAT THE ARMY SAYS
IB reports always talked of infiltration and not a massive intrusion. Even infiltration reports on Kargil were few as compared to the Valley so there didn't seem any reason to panic. Also while IB may produce individual reports, in its periodic assessment to the armed forces brass from 1998 onwards it does not talk of any major offensive by Pakistan in the Kargil sector.

For those unfamiliar with military jargon the distinction between a bunker and a sangar may seem like a minor quibble. But soldiers on the battlefront understand the significance. So does the government. For, proof of bunkers will blow its premise that the Pakistani intrusions took place only in April '99. It could also add teeth to the Opposition's charge that the government had been lax in guarding the country's borders. That's because a sangar is a crude fortification made by piling up stones and can be built in a couple of days and is highly vulnerable to shelling. A bunker is made up of tonnes of concrete and steel capable of withstanding a sustained onslaught and can take several weeks to construct. Up in the Kargil heights where temperatures remain below freezing point for most part of the year a bunker may take several months to erect because cement doesn't set easily.

Before the telex message, the army didn't seem queasy about describing the Pakistani bunkers. During the operations, its messages to various brigades fighting the war clearly mentioned the word bunkers (see box). Nor did the army stop its commanders from speaking about what they had to come up against. In mid-June, Colonel Khushal Thakur, commanding officer, 18 Grenadiers, who had just captured a feature called the Hump, close to Tololing, told India Today's Special Correspondent Ramesh Vinayak: "We found at least three bunkers which had steel girders and cg (corrugated galvanised iron) sheets."

Now the army brass vehemently denies that there were any bunkers constructed by the Pakistanis in the Kargil sector. Senior officers maintain the term was used loosely by its commanders to describe a sturdier version of sangars. And that intelligence messages sent during operational command were estimates that had to be verified by spot inspections.

Last week, in a presentation to the four-member Subrahmanyam Committee probing the lapses that led to the Kargil war, the army even showed them photographs of the sangars found on key heights. It was important that the committee believed its version. Because, apart from the army, key cabinet ministers in the Atal Bihari Vajpayee Government maintain that the Pakistani intrusions began only in April and were detected by May. It's an issue that the Subrahmanyam Committee is investigating thoroughly.

The past week also saw the army erupt angrily over the Brigadier Surinder Singh controversy which had turned political. In a release it stated, " If we were to be dragged into electoral politicking, it will be a sad day for the army." It all began when during the war Singh was removed as commander of the 121 Brigade that controlled the Kargil sector. In a petition dated June 28, 1999, to Army Chief General V.P. Malik requesting his reinstatement, Singh had charged the top brass with ignoring his requests to beef up surveillance and give additional troops to patrol the Kargil area (see box). In his letter he hinted that he had even briefed Malik and senior commanders about the "enhanced threat" in the region. Singh wrote: "It is obvious that the resources were not given because right up to the Army Headquarters no one had any idea of the enemy attempting an operation of this scale and magnitude."

BUNKER TROUBLE

WHAT THE FILES SAY
Although the army says Pakistan never put up bunkers, for instance, during the war on June 23 Sig.No 178290 to its battalions says: "Alpha Post at MU 5562, 5 km south-west of Marpola. Three bunkers comma two sangars. Post at MU 5563 two emplacements, two bunkers, one tent. Military activity at MU 3062. Probably dug outs, three shelters, one bunker."
Its commanders who captured peaks also mention seeing bunkers and destroying them.
If bunkers exist they blow holes in government position that infiltration took place only in April 1999.

WHAT THE ARMY SAYS
Categorically denies that Pakistan had built any bunkers. Such signals about bunkers were just assessments that had to be physically verified. Claims army commanders loosely used the term bunkers for sangars. These are fortifications made out of stone which take a couple of days to build unlike bunkers which are made from concrete and steel girders.

Singh may be right about the army's shocking failure to anticipate an intrusion of almost 10 km inside Indian territory across a 140-km stretch of the Line of Control (LoC). But he tends to gloss over his own shortcomings. A former senior officer in 3 Division believes that while Singh was willing to do battle, his problem lay in his ability to present his case cogently. He usually ended up sounding "alarmist" because he would give no rationale for his perception of an enhanced threat in the region. Singh had been transferred to the brigade on promotion in June 1998. By August, when Malik visited the area, the new brigadier demanded in his briefing sophisticated surveillance tools like remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs). Malik had to politely point out that RPVs were not yet in the army's inventory.

Singh was also soon at loggerheads with his boss, Major General V.S. Budhwar, the GOC-in-C of 3 Division, especially over deployment of troops. But recent media reports that Singh had written a redressal of grievance letter to Malik last November pointing out how these differences were proving detrimental has been dismissed by Army Headquarters as "fabricated". A copy of Singh's letter was not found at the divisional headquarters, something that he is duty-bound to give. Malik's secretariat, based on its dispatch registers, denied that it had ever landed at the office. India Today though learns that the dispatch section in 121 Brigade does have a book entry of a letter with a similar file name having been sent. But the fact that no copies of the letter are available either at the brigade, division, corps or Army Headquarters deepens the mystery.

Singh's handling of the operations once the intrusions were detected didn't inspire confidence in many who served under him. On learning that there were intrusions in the Batalik sector, he dispatched a platoon of 16 Grenadiers to search a height called Bakri Hut. The platoon was told only 10 Pakistani infiltrators had occupied the heights, but as it turned out there were over 50 of them. Eight of the soldiers died in an ambush. Soon after, some of the new battalions that were pressed to assist 121 Brigade were also stunned by the confusion that prevailed over the extent of intrusions. On one occasion in mid-May Singh is said to have ordered two companies to retake Tiger Hill and Mashkoh Valley. But they refused to move because they were ill-equipped and had not been properly acclimatised. Just how much of the threat had been underestimated by Singh was proved when it finally took a full brigade to do the job.

Yet, it was not only Singh who had failed to gauge the magnitude of the intrusions. Although the first signs were detected on May 3, it was only a fortnight later, on May 19, that the true extent of the intrusions was known. By the time the army got its act together more than 100 soldiers had been killed, many of them mowed down because the enemy's firepower was grossly underestimated. While the army performed outstandingly after that, the initial failure to detect the enemy is what the Subrahmanyam Committee is probing. A major part of that blame is being pinned on the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) which is responsible for all external intelligence. Every six months it is supposed to make an assessment of the threat of war from Pakistan and warn the armed forces apart from regular reports about enemy build-up in sensitive regions.

As recently as April RAW maintained there was no threat of war. Curiously, in its previous six-monthly review late last year RAW talked of the possibility of a "swift, limited offensive action" by Pakistan. When the forces probed it they dropped that assessment. But this was shortly after the prime minister's Lahore trip in February. Experts say the Subrahmanyam Committee needs to probe whether that had anything to do with a change in RAW's assessment. Also surprisingly Vajpayee maintained there was no intelligence failure during the Kargil war. And RAW chief Arvind Dave was made governor of Arunachal Pradesh soon after the war which many considered a promotion.

The IB, which also gathers intelligence along the borders, claims that it had kept the army and the government informed of increased activity in the Kargil sector as early as June 1998. IB officials maintain that the army paid little heed to their warnings. The army brass hotly disputes this, pointing out that references to Kargil made up barely 2 per cent of the IB's annual assessment of the region. But it is also true that the corps was ignoring its own intelligence which right from June '98 up to January '99 reported heightened activity across the Kargil sector including an increase in troop movement, helicopter sorties and animal transports. While the army cannot absolve itself of the blame, what also comes through is the complete lack of coordination among the intelligence agencies. As the Subrahmanyam Committee tries to pin the blame, it will also have to recommend how the entire set-up can be revamped to prevent further Kargils.

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