INTERVIEW OF THE WEEK:
MAJOR-GENERAL VS BUDHWAR
"Singh was removed for his inept
conduct" As General Officer Commanding of the Leh-based 3
Infantry Division, Major-General V.S. Budhwar was the immediate boss of the controversial
brigade commander Brigadier Surinder Singh. Dragged into a flaming war of words, Budhwar
finds himself in the thick of a raging row following sensational charges flung at him and
the army brass by Singh, who until mid-June was the commander of 121 Infantry Brigade at
Kargil. Did Budhwar ignore warnings of an enhanced threat perception? Did he withdraw
patrols that could possibly have detected the intruders? Was he busy fighting ego battles
while Pakistan fortified itself and built logistical bases on the heights that Budhwar was
supposed to be guarding? Though advised by his seniors to maintain a "dignified
silence", Budhwar gave his first interview since the controversy to Special
Correspondent Ramesh Vinayak. Striking a
"I-am-not-to-blame" posture, Budhwar fielded a range of questions on why he
should not be held guilty for the intrusions and why Singh alone should shoulder the
blame. Excerpts:
Did you ignore repeated written warnings by the
brigade commander at Kargil, Brigadier Surinder Singh, on Pakistan's plans to cross the
Line of Control (LoC)?
Let me state categorically that there were no warnings, verbal or in writing, by
Brigadier Singh about the possible intrusion. Except for his briefing note that was put up
during the visit of COAS General V.P. Malik on August 29 last year, none of the other
communication initiated by 121 Infantry Brigade hinted at an enhanced threat perception in
the Kargil sector.
But his briefing to the COAS did project an
enhanced threat perception.
It was a flawed projection based on reports about the positioning of three
additional battalions by Pakistan across Kargil. This was a routine summer posture by the
Pakistan Army in response to the accretion in the force level by us. When the snow melts,
even we push up incremental troops on the loc and so does Pakistan. In military terms,
movement of at least a division or more constitutes an enhanced threat perception. Two or
three battalions don't enhance the threat perception.
Brigadier Singh's so-called enhanced threat perception
boiled down to air defence gun attacks by Pakistan on the Srinagar-Leh highway, and a
rogue action against some Indian forward post. Whatever he is saying now is an
afterthought.
Brigadier Singh claims that even after his briefing
to the COAS, his requests for more troops and resources were ignored.
I didn't get any such request from him. Nor is there any record at 121 Infantry
Brigade headquarters to support his claim of having sent any letter to me or to the army
chief.
Then what about the letters that he is quoting?
Either Brigadier Singh is fabricating letters in the army records or somebody else
is doing it on his behalf. He is quoting letters which don't exist.
But Brigadier Singh did demand more resources and
equipment in his August 29 briefing.
121 Infantry Brigade was provided with enough resources to maintain its defence
posture on the loc. By seeking things like radars, remote-piloted vehicles and
high-resolution satellite imaging which are not on the army's inventory, he was asking for
the moon.
Instead of providing additional troops as desired
by Singh, you effected a pullout early this year.
As per the threat perception, five battalions were deemed adequate for the 220-km
stretch of the loc. The three additional battalions that were deployed to augment the
summer posture were withdrawn by the end of January after winter had set in full blast.
Normally, the accretion of forces is withdrawn by November-end. It was Brigadier Singh who
had fixed the dates for their withdrawal.
According to Brigadier Singh, the troops did not
have adequate winter clothing.
As a brigade commander, he perhaps didn't know what he had in his inventory. Since
January last, 1,000 pieces of special winter clothing were provided to 121 Infantry
Brigade. This was more than sufficient for the soldiers patrolling the heights above
14,000 ft.
Were the unheld areas where the intrusions took
place being patrolled?
Patrolling was done to the extent that was feasible. There was limited patrolling
after the snow set in. There are serious limitations to patrolling the unheld areas
because of rugged terrain and heavy snow level.
If patrolling was being done, why couldn't you
detect the intruders who were almost 8 km inside the LoC?
Because there were no intelligence inputs with regard to what Pakistan did. After
all, Pakistan must have formulated its intrusion plan long before putting together nine
battalions of the Northern Light Infantry, training them and equipping them. Yet, all that
the intelligence agencies hinted at was the infiltration threat in Kargil. There was no
specific input from any quarters about the type of operation Pakistan undertook. The army
cannot operate anywhere and everywhere. The areas where the intrusion took place were
almost out of bounds for the patrols in the winters.
You mean that the army has no blame to share for
the intrusions?
The accountability for the intrusion does not lie here (with the army).
What were the serious professional differences
between you and Brigadier Singh?
None that I know of. Nor did he ever bring these out. Our relationship was amiable
and functional.
When Brigadier Singh talked about the impending
threat, you reportedly dubbed him an alarmist.
I never used this expression.
It seems there was a command failure due to bad
blood between you and the brigade commander.
There was no such failure. He is trying to shift the blame for his incompetence to
his seniors. Don't forget that a complete turnaround in the situation was achieved within
two months of Pakistan's misadventure.
Why was Brigadier Singh divested of the command in
the middle of the operations?
I don't hold him responsible for the intrusion. He was removed because of his inept
conduct during the war. Once the war began, there was complete decision inertia at 121
Infantry Brigade. The commander could not come to grips with the situation. He was
incompetent.
If he was so incompetent, why did you have him as
brigade commander in the first place?
In "no war no peace", I tried to take him along, though there were
weaknesses in his performance. But when it came to brass tacks, firm action had to be
taken.
Isn't it humiliating for a twice-decorated soldier
to be shunted out in the middle of a war?
I would still call it an honourable exit. He is now making all sorts of allegations
to prove that he was helpless.
Isn't he justified in spilling the beans?
It's just out of the heartburn at being pushed out of command that he is getting
back at his own organisation. He perhaps does not know he is being used by vested
political interests. Anyway, he has a history of casting aspersions on his seniors.
How much blame do you take for the Kargil
intrusion?
If I'm to blame, let the Subrahmanyam Committee decide. I gave the nation an
outright victory but instead of felicitating me, attempts are being made to portray me as
a villain, as the guilty general of Kargil.
At the time of the intrusion, weren't you busy
constructing an amusement park with a zoo at Leh with the help of troops?
I was only giving a facelift to the war memorial, the only one that exists in
Ladakh. Improving the environment around the army establishment is part of my job. And
what is wrong if I do so with non-combat resources?
Are you worried about the controversy kicked up by
Brigadier Singh?
Not in the least. I am a happy-go-lucky type and haven't lost any sleep over it. |
