Cover Story: Pakistan; Marching to the Brink

The public approval of Sharif's ouster may give way to despair if the military regime fails to deliver the country from the total collapse facing it.

It was a coup straight from central casting. At 6.10 p.m. on October 12 the face of the Pakistan Television (PTV) news announcer faded from the nation's television screens in a hiss of static and was replaced with shots of marching troops and the soundtrack

The key men were Lt-General Mohammed Aziz, the chief of the general staff, and, most crucially, Lt-General Mahmood Ahmed, who commands the army's Tenth Corps stationed close to Islamabad. It was Ahmed's troops who, at around 6.15 p.m., stormed the gates of the PTV Centre and shut down the station. Meanwhile, truckloads of soldiers bounced through the dark, wide streets of the capital and surrounded the official homes of Sharif and his cabinet ministers.

As Musharraf's plane approached Karachi at about 6.30 p.m. the pilot was denied permission to land. But the plane did not have enough fuel and so circled the airport. If there was a decisive moment in the coup then this was it. When the soldiers swept into the airport the air traffic controller's mind changed. By 7.47 p.m. Musharraf's plane was on the ground and within two hours he dismissed Sharif and took charge.

Why Nawaz Sharif just had to go
Having subverted every institution, he had begun to look like a dictator. Then the ghost of Kargil came to haunt him.

In Pakistan dire predictions of an imminent army coup are part of the warp and weft of political life. Yet over the last few months rumours of military action have been gathering strength. Roots of the army's animosity towards Sharif go deep, beyond Kargil, beyond the sacking of the popular COAS Jehangir Karamat last October, right back to the autumn of 1997 and the first indications that Sharif's basic instincts were dictatorial not democratic. It is an indication of the reluctance with which the army assumed power that it watched the emasculation of first the judiciary, then the presidency, then party politics and finally the introduction of the Shariat Bill with all the exceptional power that it granted to the prime minister without taking action.

SHARIF'S DOWNFALL

Feb 17, 97: Sharif is elected prime minister securing a record 136 seats in the 217-member National Assembly.
Dec 2, 97: Sharif overcomes serious constitutional crisis over appointment of judges. President Farooq Leghari resigns and Chief Justice Sajjad Ali goes on leave.
May 28, 98: Pakistan replies India's nuclear blasts with six nuclear tests. Emergency declared.
Oct 7, 98: Gen Jehangir Karamat, army chief, forced to resign for political remarks. Musharraf succeeds and two superceded generals resign. Sharif emerges all powerful.
Feb 20, 99: Resented by the armed forces, Sharif signs Lahore pact with Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee.
May 26, 99: Kargil war begins after Sharif approves Pakistan Army's plan to capture key heights.
July 4, 99: As Pakistan Army faces defeat in Kargil, Sharif meets Clinton in the US and agrees to withdraw troops. Army gets flak and becomes sullen.
Oct 12, 99: Two weeks after promoting Musharraf as joint chief of staff, the PM sacks him. Coup follows.

It was perhaps inevitable that Sharif would attempt to make the army as subservient to his wishes as every other part of the state. In October last year Karamat, the incumbent COAS, had recommended that some kind of "national security council" be formed to give the army a greater role in government. Sharif and his advisers, once they had recovered from their surprise at the general's unexpected announcement, met the challenge as they have met all perceived threats to their power: through confrontation and implacable force. Sharif asked Karamat to resign. It was a direct challenge to the power the military has always exercised in Pakistan and both men knew it. Yet, Karamat decided against resisting the civil administration and gave up his post.

The army brass was livid and felt it had been humiliated. Sharif's first choice for Karamat's replacement, Ziauddin, was rejected. The corps commanders were clearly unwilling to allow a man known for his close connections to the Sharif family and his PML loyalties to lead them. But neither was the prime minister prepared to accept General Ali Quli Khan, the senior-most candidate. Instead Musharraf was settled on as someone both sides could live with. Ali Quli Khan resigned and Ziauddin was appointed director-general of the ISI as a consolation prize. Sharif, like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with General Zia, felt that Musharraf was not a threat. He was clearly wrong.

Musharraf's exact role in the instigation of what became known simply as "Kargil" is still not known -- though it is obvious he did not oppose it. What happened through June, July and August is well known but it is the developments after the July 14 order to pull out the militants from the Kargil heights that is crucial. It was clear that either Sharif or Musharraf had to go for the debacle. However, it was internal army politics that provoked the final denouement. The army brass was simply not prepared to tolerate Ziauddin as their chief, partly because he was a Sharif appointee, partly out of prejudice against an engineer (the army has never been led by a non-combat soldier).

On September 18, according to The News, a reputed Pakistani daily, a meeting of key corps commanders was convened where the contingency plan to frustrate Sharif's design to oust Musharraf was drawn up. On September 24 the plan was approved by the services chiefs. When Sharif called Ziauddin to the prime minister's residence just over two weeks later, the army knew exactly what to do.

Between the rock and the hard place
Having thrown out Sharif, the reluctant general did not know what to do next. The emergency gives him time.

After Musharraf's emotional broadcast to the nation outlining the reasons for his coup, a holiday atmosphere prevailed throughout Pakistan. People seemed genuinely relieved that the government had fallen and that the military had taken control -- an indication of just how unpopular Sharif had become. In the eastern city of Lahore, where support for Sharif was considered strongest, there were demonstrations in favour of the army takeover. In Peshawar, the city near the Afghan border, celebratory gunfire was heard through the night.

However, the army's decisiveness seemed to have deserted it as Musharraf dawdled over what to do next. By the following day clues began to emerge explaining the delay. Brigadier Rashid Qureshi, a senior spokesman, said that the army's actions had been a "spontaneous uprising". His statement was widely seen as an implicit admission that the army had no plan about its subsequent moves. Experts agreed. "Musharraf is a commando. He acted swiftly and decisively but did not think about what would happen next," said one western diplomat. "It doesn't look like they had an exit strategy worked out." Says Tariq Jan, a fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies: "The situation was imposed on them. The army was not ready."

The army chief is certainly caught between a rock and a hard place. There are a number of reasons for returning Pakistan to constitutional rule as soon as possible. The most obvious is that world opinion -- so far harshly condemnatory of the coup -- must be turned around if Pakistan is to avoid what one economist called "economic meltdown". Howard Hill, a business adviser for a multinational, said that Musharraf had to create an atmosphere that would encourage foreign investment. "That would involve giving dates for a possible election," he pointed out.

The Pakistani economy is basically reliant on a drip feed of foreign loans from multilateral agencies, most notably the World Bank and the IMF. Both bodies have indicated that they are deeply concerned by the army takeover and are likely to withhold loans. Pakistan has a foreign debt of more than $30 billion and rapidly diminishing foreign currency reserves. At last count the reserves were down to around a billion and shrinking fast. The IMF has already refused to release a $280 million tranche of a $1.6 billion aid package and is unlikely to do so soon.

However, there were also factors pressing for an imposition of martial law. According to Roedad Khan, a top former bureaucrat who served six presidents, Sharif had ruined Pakistan's structure of government. "We were on the point of total institutional collapse. He had destroyed virtually every institution in the country. The army was the only institution left," Khan said. It may be that martial law is simply the only way to run the country. Azhar Khan, the chairman of the Pakistan National Congress, a coalition of opposition parties, said that swift elections would be a mistake. "The West is pressing for restoration of democracy but we need at least two years to sort everything out," he said. But some interim measure clearly had to be found. Musharraf surely was aware that the goodwill on the streets would evaporate rapidly if the basics of life don't improve for the common man.

Is there a way out of the labyrinth?
Sharif is not totally out; Banazir is discredited. All this leaves Musharraf with hardly any fall-back options.

As Musharraf tries to find a way out of the labyrinth the most vexing question is who is likely to head a civilian government. Pakistan People's Party (PPP) chief Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister, appears marginalised. A warrant for her arrest, following her conviction on massive corruption charges, is still outstanding in Pakistan and she is generally seen as discredited. Neither is she very popular with the army. "We have our hopes but have to admit that we are not too optimistic at the moment," said one PPP worker last week.

If Benazir is out of the picture then the scene becomes crowded with dozens of alternative candidates should the army decide to appoint a civilian leader. All have high hopes. All, including the fundamentalists of Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, have welcomed the army's actions. One key player may well be Ejaz-ul-Haq, the son of General Zia. He is a senior and well-thought of member of the PML and has publicly said that he would happily take the leadership of the country. Though his father's reputation may rattle international opinion his hawkish views and military connections may make him attractive to Musharraf and his advisers.

Musharraf knows that his constitutional position is weak. He knows that his ousting of the prime minister is totally illegal and must be concerned about protecting his own position from any attack. The last thing he wants is to be ousted himself, or even prosecuted, by a civilian administration that he puts in place. Somehow the COAS has to reconcile all these factors and come up with a broad based, consensus-building, stable solution.

This means that Sharif is not yet finished. According to the ousted prime minister's family, the first demand made to him as he was taken into protective custody -- where he still remains -- was that he should resign. He refused and has preserved some power as a result. If he sanctions any new government then it will help Musharraf immensely. Says one senior Pakistani politician: "Sharif's not out of the game entirely. He still has something to offer." Musharraf, however, is likely to discredit Sharif by pressing charges of treason and corruption against him. The other option for Musharraf is to allow the ruling PML, which after all swept the board at the last elections, to continue in power, albeit minus Sharif and under close supervision.

Also the army, even if it wanted to, might not be able to sustain the government of a country with as many problems as Pakistan. General Zia's administration was floundering until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came to its rescue by triggering a huge influx of foreign loans and outright gifts. Musharraf's military is unlikely to receive much other than brickbats if it assumes complete control. His attitude may well be tempered by the democratic experience, however flawed, of the last 11 years. According to Tariq Jan and other experts, the culture of democracy is far more broadly established and understood now than it was before Zia seized power. "This is a necessary correction of a trend towards democracy," says Jan, "not an interruption." What is crucial is the attitude of the outside world. Many experts believe that a less dogmatic position would be more constructive. "We have to look to the future," said one diplomat in Islamabad. "Nobody's interests will be served by pushing Pakistan over the brink. We have to deal with who is in charge and work for the best for the country and its people."

The two major concerns of India and the West is that Pakistan might lurch in the direction of hard-line Islam and that its nuclear capability might fall into the wrong hands. At the moment there appears little chance of that. The senior military men in Pakistan may be devout Muslims but they are not fanatics by any means. Sharif's swing towards the right wing religious parties and his endorsement of Shariat law for the country was one of the reasons behind his dismissal. And the army held the red nuclear button anyway. Last week there was no sign of even an increased guard on any nuclear installations.

Despite the problems facing the country the overwhelming feeling in Pakistan last week was still optimistic. Two things are certain: that Sharif's elected government has been dismissed and the army is in power and that people believe that their country will be more democratic as a result. Perhaps only in Pakistan could such contradictory statements be so easily reconciled.

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