|
|
METRO TODAY | DAILY NEWS | ASTROLOGY | ARCHIVES | INDIA TODAY | HOME |
|
|
IC814
HIJACK "You don't teach us Islam" A hijacker on board IC 814 to Indian negotiators. By Harinder Baweja and Saba Naqvi Bhaumik Nearly 68 hours after IC 814 was hijacked, A.R. Ghanshyam, commercial counsellor at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, arrived in Kandahar and established direct contact with the hijackers. His first report, received in Delhi at noon on December 27, was alarming. The hijackers had threatened to kill passengers one by one if India did not send a team of negotiators to Kandahar immediately. For the first time since the hijack began, the masked men also gave a deadline: 1.40 p.m. This was the hijackers' first victory. Disoriented by angry relatives demonstrating outside the prime minister's residence, the Government announced that a 52-member team would leave for Kandahar immediately. After a technical snag and a delayed departure, the relief plane reached Kandahar at 5.30 p.m. For the seven-member core negotiating team, the job was daunting. They had varying reports of what the terrorists wanted. A fax message from Kandahar to the ATC in Delhi asked for the release of Harkat-ul-Ansar ideologue Maulana Masood Azhar and "some Kashmiri militants". Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil had conveyed a similar demand to Ghanshyam. Erick de Mul, the UN functionary who spoke to the hijackers a day before, was given a different demand. He was told by the hijackers that the price was one militant in exchange for 10 Indian and five foreign passengers. "At least release the women,
children and the elderly." Senior Intelligence Bureau (IB) official Ajit Doval did the talking with the hijackers on behalf of the negotiating team headed by Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint Secretary Vivek Katju. Doval began with the request that the hijackers first release all the women and children. The idea was to gauge the extent of commitment of the hijackers and to play on their human instincts. "We were trying to size them up," said a negotiator. The plea fell on deaf ears. The hijackers had a price for everything.
"We will release women, children and sick passengers only in exchange for Maulana Azhar," was the constant reply. Only one of the five hijackers, who spoke chaste Urdu and fluent English, negotiated with Doval, other voices interjecting with periodic threats. For all the five days of negotiations it was the same voice that spoke for the terrorists. "We tried to wear him down and tire him out but he had negotiating skills as well. He, in turn, tried to wear us down also, issuing threats at crucial points." The hijacker, in fact, also kept changing tack. At first he said they would release the women and children in exchange for Azhar. This soon changed to releasing 35 hostages after Azhar was handed over to them. This gave the Indian negotiators a little more time. They told the hijackers to come out with a whole package. "Release Rachna Katyal as a humanitarian gesture.'' On December 28 morning, the Indians tested the waters again and asked the hijackers to at least release Rachna, wife of the slain Rupin Katyal. The Katyal family had issued an appeal to the hijackers through TV and also asked the Government to convey their request to the hijackers. The response of the hijackers to this demand of releasing a woman who was married on December 3 and widowed on December 24, worried the negotiators. "We'll let you know,'' was the terse response from the plane. They reverted 30 minutes later with a flat no. That's when the negotiators realised the hijackers were possibly consulting what Jaswant Singh described as the "third party". "Their handlers told them: Be tough with Indians, only then will they buckle,'' says a negotiator. Doval then tried giving the dialogue a religious hue. "It is against the tenets of Islam to hijack innocent passengers,'' he said, by now sure through the Urdu they spoke that they were Pakistanis. The hijacker promptly retorted, "You don't teach us Islam.'' "Spell out your demands,'' the hijacker was then told. He repeated they wanted Azhar and some more Kashmiri militants. "Who are these? You keep changing your statements. Give us the names. How can we give you Azhar? If we do, you'll come up with another set of names. Tell us all your demands,'' the negotiators told him. It was then -- again, after a delay -- that the hijackers threw a piece of paper out of the plane. The paper contained their demands in writing. They wanted 36 militants released, $200 million (Rs 860 crore) and the body of terrorist Sajjad Afghani, killed in Jammu last June. The hijackers communicated through walkie-talkies provided by ATC Kandahar and also used the aircraft's VHS set. "Give us straight answers. Keep your sentences short." -- Hijackers The most protracted round of negotiations began after the piece of paper was thrown out of the plane. Now the Taliban also actively involved itself in the talks. It had access to the hijackers even earlier but now virtually played broker between the Indian negotiators and the hijackers. Having got the terrorists to withdraw the demands for money and the coffin of Sajjad Afghani, the Taliban tried to give the impression it had reverted to the background. But, said a negotiator: "The Taliban was always on the side of the hijackers when it came to the release of militants. We got the impression they were part of the conspiracy." Confronted with this twin offensive, the negotiating team took on different roles. While Katju negotiated with the Taliban, Doval engaged the hijackers. Having closed its mission and left Afghanistan in September 1996 when the Taliban captured Kabul, India's relations with the Afghan regime was zero. But once the hijacked plane reached Kandahar, it became imperative for the mea to build bridges. The first contact was established when Afghan Deputy Chief of Mission in Islamabad Habibullah Fauzi got in touch with the Indian High Commission to say that the hijacked plane wanted to land at Kandahar. After speaking to the External Affairs Minister in Delhi, the mission told Fauzi to let the plane land and to keep it there. They were also requested to secure the safety of passengers, crew and the aircraft and to terminate the hijacking. Initially, the Taliban took the position that it had nothing to do with the hijackers but that it would allow refuelling since the hijackers were getting restless. The Taliban, in its own way, was pressuring the Indian Government. At no stage did the Indian negotiators have any doubts that the Taliban would do nothing to harm the cause of the "Islamic crusaders". Muttawakil constantly reminded the negotiators that one passenger, Anil Khurana, who was released because he was a diabetes patient and was very ill, had wept on his shoulder saying that if he had been a minister's son, half the Cabinet would have landed up in Kandahar. When, following instructions from Delhi, the negotiators asked the Taliban to request the hijackers to accept another aircraft and crew since IC 814 had developed faults, the answer was a flat no. Doval was working under severe constraints. "We don't even know in which jails these 36 militants are lodged," he told the hijackers. In an effort to buy time and to wear them down, he said, "You don't know what the legal system is like in India. It's a very long drawn procedure. Do you want to wait that long?'' he asked the hijackers. The voice from the plane snapped back: "Give us to-the-point answers. Don't try and take us on a run around. Keep your answers short and tell us: are you willing to release the militants or not?" The negotiators tried again to change tack. They even invoked Centre-state relations, saying they would have to ask Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's permission to secure the release of these militants. "He may not agree," Doval said. Pat came the reply, "Rubaiya was released when he was the chief minister." The hijackers constantly reminded the negotiators that Rubaiya Sayeed had been released in exchange for five militants. Till late in the night of December 29, Doval kept trying to scale down their demands. Talks broke down on an ominous note, the hijackers saying, "We will blow up the plane and you will be responsible for the death of all the passengers." The hijacker's voice had by then become, as a negotiator put it, "desperate, shrill and firm". The Taliban too was alarmed by reports that the three service chiefs had briefed the Indian Cabinet. They feared an Entebbe-style Indian commando raid and issued a statement that they would ask the hijackers to leave unless matters were quickly resolved. In Delhi, this warning was taken seriously. The Government assessed two possible future destinations of the hijackers: Libya or Sudan. Jaswant reassured the Cabinet that he had received word from the Libyan foreign minister offering all assistance. That still left Sudan, another rogue state. The aircraft, it was calculated, could fly the 3,200 nautical miles to Khartoum. The next morning, on December 30, the hijackers found the plane surrounded by the Taliban militia. It was a message for both the hijackers and the Indians. The negotiating team was again told by the Taliban that its patience was wearing thin and that the aircraft would be forced to leave Kandahar. It was apparent by then that, as far as India was concerned, it was a "lose-lose situation". Even before the deal was formalised, Muttawakil told the world media that the talks now centred on the number of militants India was willing to release. "You don't know in which age these people are living." -- Negotiator to Indian Cabinet This was the most tense of all rounds. The delegation was simply presented with two options: that India release Azhar along with four others from the list of 36 or three militants demanded by the hijackers. It left precious little room for bargaining. It was clear that India would have to release Azhar. That was the bottom line. In Delhi, the Government was in a quandary. Intelligence reports suggested the hijackers now meant business and could blow up the aircraft on January 1. Plus, there was the terse assessment of the team in Kandahar: "You do not know in which age these people are living. It's better we agree." The deal was finally clinched when the Indian Government decided to hand over three militants. In terms of numbers, it was better that it give three rather than five. There was one final hurdle. Farooq could countenance the release of foreign mercenaries but he was unwilling to free Mushtak Ahmed Zargar who had killed many of his National Conference workers. It took a lot of persuasion before he grudgingly consented. On December 31 morning, the hijackers negotiated their safe passage and the Taliban agreed to let them cross the Afghan border in 10 hours. They wanted to take Taliban military commander Akhtar Usmani with them once they deplaned but had to settle for his brother. After eight harrowing days the passengers finally walked to freedom but only after Jaswant Singh had personally delivered three militants and seen them drive off with the five hijackers. Going to Kandahar was Singh's own idea. No one really liked the idea but only one cabinet member objected. The hijackers succeeded while the Government is still trying to sell the line that it got what it calls the best deal in the given circumstances.
|
|||||||||||||
| Top |
 BUSINESS TODAY | INDIA TODAY PLUS | COMPUTERS TODAY Write to us | Subscriptions | Advertise with
us |
