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| May 22, 2000 | ||
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Some defence experts even then questioned Kumaratunga's policy of going for the "head of the beast", or trying to regain full control over the North and East provinces (which the Tigers claim as Eelam or Tamil homeland). They warned that such a tactic could result in the army over-stretching itself by wresting military real estate from the Tigers that may prove hard to defend. Miraculously, for a while Kumaratunga's strategy even appeared to succeed. She not only evicted the LTTE from the Jaffna peninsula in 1995 -- not a mean task considering that the Tigers had held it for the previous five years -- but had its feared leader Velupillai Pirabhakaran on the run in the jungles of Wanni. But the Lankan Government had underestimated Pirabhakaran's fighting skills again. For, the LTTE chief, realising that he could not match the army's superior artillery fire, withdrew to the jungles with his entire armour intact and began to regroup his forces. Contrary to rumours that the Tigers were weakened because of internal conflicts, Pirabhakaran began recruiting a new commanders, at least 10 years younger than him, and put them in charge of major regiments. To match Sri Lankan armour he knew he had to acquire an artillery that could rain as much firepower if not more. For that he needed access to the sea to land the guns clandestinely purchased from other countries. By then the LTTE was rumoured to be involved in smuggling narcotics and other contraband to help fund its battle. On July 18, 1996, he launched Unceasing Waves-1, a meticulously planned operation to storm and capture the strategic Lankan Army base at Mullaittivu on the east coast (see map). Apart from a major land battle, the LTTE involved its naval arm, the Sea Tigers, to encircle the base. The attack began at 1 a.m. and within hours the surprised army base was routed. Besides a major psychological victory the LTTE got a rich haul of arms and ammunition, including two 120 mm howitzers and a huge range of mortars. To match the Tigers' spectacular success at Mullaittivu, a week later the army launched operation "Sath Jaya" (True Victory) in a bid to open an alternative supply route to Jaffna on the A9 highway that had for long remained under Tiger control. Initially, the army made impressive gains and captured Kilinochchi town bringing almost an 80-km stretch under its control and linking it to Jaffna. Emboldened by the success, the army triggered "Operation Jaya Sikuru" (Sure Victory) designed to not only ensure that the highway remained under the forces' control but also to clear the Tigers from the surrounding jungles of Wanni. This is where the Tigers had lured the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to battle and had bogged it down for months. The army employed massive firepower and did make substantial inroads. But in retrospect it stretched its resources too far and too thin and consequently found it difficult to defend the gains made. The LTTE knew that and planned its next move meticulously. A year later the Tigers decided to regain Kilinochchi and launched Unceasing Waves-2. Within three days of intense fighting the rebels gained control of the Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass axial road that had taken the army over a year to capture. The Tigers were in no hurry to take Jaffna and for their final assault on the Peninsula they prepared for a year. In his mid-40s, Pirabhakaran had put on weight and was much the family man in the jungles. He lived with his wife and three children constantly moving locations. The young firebrand, with a penchant for western movies and admiration for Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, had grown into a mature leader. He continued to be a good listener and his soft voice always belied the image of a ruthless fighter. He remained the supreme commander of his force, plotting all their moves. Says D. Sivaram, an LTTE analyst: "He still has the reputation of being one of the few Tamil leaders who hasn't sold out to the cause. His aim was to build a conventional army that could ensure an independent Eelam." By November 1999, the LTTE was ready to make its final assault on Jaffna, called Unceasing Waves-3. They began by capturing strategic towns on the A9 highway and overrunning Sri Lankan bases guarding them. Then on March 22, the cadres mounted their assault on Elephant Pass. In a brilliant manoeuvre, they cut off the drinking water supplies to the two divisions stationed in and around the pass, and encircled them. The attack on Elephant Pass caught the army napping, and forced the Government to make desperate changes in the army brass. In a major blunder, the dehydrated divisions were ordered to withdraw at high noon under a scorching sun. In what is considered the defining moment of the battle on April 27, the LTTE overran Elephant Pass. Many of the 800 Sri Lankan Army casualties were a result of dehydration. There were also reports of mutiny and large-scale desertions. With the fall of Elephant Pass it was clear that the LTTE would go for the jugular. Equipped with captured artillery and equipment purchased clandestinely from outside, the LTTE is in a position to match the army's firepower. That's why the Kumaratunga Government panicked and desperately appealed to other countries, including India, for help. Now the war over Jaffna has become a do-or-die battle not just for the 25,000 troops stationed in the peninsula but also for the Kumaratunga Government. To boost the sagging morale of the army, the President has decided to suspend all developmental work and focus on defence. But with defence expenditure already constituting 34 per cent of the annual budget the economy is headed for trouble. As Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, executive director, Centre for Policy Alternatives, says: "Development expenditure was already less than zero and except for those who have a stake in the war economy people complain loudly." Even if Jaffna peninsula falls to the LTTE, the war is far from over. If Pirabhakaran declares Eelam it would be a pyrrhic cry. For unless his forces capture the Eastern province where Tamils constitute only 30 per cent of the population (the Tamil-speaking Muslims constitute 30 per cent there but do not identify with the LTTE), it will prove a major obstacle in winning over the local population. Taking Jaffna will give Pirabhakaran tremendous bargaining power when he sits for peace talks which are certain to resume after the battle is over. Talks for devolution of power -- which Kumaratunga had initiated by suggesting that the North and East provinces get more autonomy and possibly making Sri Lanka a federal state rather than a unitary one -- had broken down. India has stepped into the diplomatic void and offered to mediate with "all the parties" concerned if they are agreeable. It is certain to be a tortuous process but something that is absolutely necessary. But with the scent of victory still fresh, the Tigers may find it difficult to give up speaking with guns.
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It
may already be too late. Kumaratunga and her Government are much to blame
for allowing the LTTE not only to regroup but to return with such ferocity
that the current battle may prove to be the most decisive of the on-going
ethnic war that has seen over 20,000 dead in the past two decades. When
she had launched Operation Riverisa (sun rays), a major military offensive
against the LTTE six years ago, Kumaratunga had grandly called it the
"War for Peace". She and her chief adviser General (retd)
Anuruddha Ratwatte, deputy minister of defence, had hoped that by
weakening the striking power of the world's most ruthless terrorist
organisation she could isolate it politically and ram through a settlement
that would ensure the rights of the Tamil minority without compromising
the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. (Of the island's 18 million
population, Sri Lankan Tamils comprise 12.7 per cent and Indian Tamils 5.5
per cent.)