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COVER STORY
Kashmir's Bloody Puzzle
Can it be Solved?

With Pakistan insistent on exporting terror, peace in Kashmir is an uphill task. But the government has staked its reputation on the talks with the Hizbul. Is there a definite gameplan that could lead to peace?

By Ramesh Vinayak and Harinder Baweja

Kashmir doesn't only defy solutions, it also defies logic. In normal circumstances, the massacre of 100 innocents -- mainly pilgrims on the Amarnath yatra and poor migrant labourers from Bihar -- in seven different incidents last Tuesday night would have invited a chilling bullet-for-bullet outcry from an outraged nation. Yet, far from retribution, there was the novel spectacle of Union Home Secretary Kamal Pande talking peace with nominees of the Hizbul Mujahideen, the largest Kashmiri militant outfit, and issuing a joint statement that smacked of restraint and responsibility. There was the equally unique sight of a BJP prime minister responding to the targeted killing of Kashmir's minority Hindus with the assertion that our doors are open for talks within the Constitution and with insaniyat -- humane conduct.

Has Kashmir finally turned the corner? Far from epitomising permanent strife, do the grisly August 1 massacres symbolise the desperation of armed fanatics out of tune with the mood of a violence-weary people? Or is it just another false dawn? A case of a beleaguered Government clutching at straws?

Like most things centred on a problem that has defied an enduring solution since 1948, there are no pat answers. But one thing is clear. For the first time since Indira Gandhi made peace with Sheikh Abdullah in 1975, Kashmir is witnessing the tentative moves towards another realignment.

It all began towards the end of April when the Government had already opened channels of communication with the leadership of the All Party Hurriyat Conference -- a political conglomerate of separatist organisations. It was then that Delhi received feelers from Abdul Majid Dar, chief of the Hizbul in the Valley, indicating his willingness to discuss a possible cease-fire. It was made clear to the Government that the offer enjoyed the blessings of Syed Salahuddin, the Hizbul's Pakistan-based supreme commander.

Anxious to supplement its Hurriyat initiative, the Government responded quickly and positively. Dar made a secret visit to Delhi where he met senior raw and IB officers. They suggested he return to the Valley and secure the endorsement of the group's district commanders. As a gesture of goodwill, the Government instructed the security forces to refrain from operations against the Hizbul during the period Dar was talking to his men. Apart from his group, Dar also spoke to Syed Ali Shah Geelani who was then Hurriyat chairman. Geelani was also the ideologue of Kashmir's Jamait-e-Islami, a parent body of the Hizbul.

Initially, Geelani responded favorably to Dar's proposal but then changed his mind. Dar told him he was proceeding nevertheless, a defiance that still rankles with the Hurriyat leadership. On July 23, the day before he announced the cease-fire from his hideout outside Srinagar, Dar got instructions from across the border to call off the whole thing. Dar replied that he had gone too far to retreat at this juncture. Dar's exchanges with Pakistan were intercepted by the Indian authorities and this convinced them that the Hizbul offer was worth pursuing seriously.

On July 24, Dar made his announcement and it was endorsed by Salahuddin from Pakistan the next day. Four days later, a Home Ministry statement asked the Hizbul to make contact with Home Secretary Pandey.

Why did the Hizbul propose a cease-fire?

Tactical retreat being a key element of guerrilla warfare, it is understandable that the Hizbul's ceasefire proposal is greeted with some scepticism among the security forces. There is a fear that, like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Hizbul would use prolonged negotiations and a respite from operations to regroup and strengthen itself. "How can a tiger turn vegetarian overnight?" asks a senior police officer in Kashmir.

In theory that seems improbable but in practice it is possible for wounded killers to seek sanctuary. That, in a sense, is what has happened to the Hizbul. Senior officials reckon that the group's sudden desire for peace has much to do with the hammering it has received from the security forces over the past year. In the first six months of this year, for example, it is estimated that of the 321 militants killed, 180 were local Kashmiris, mainly from the Hizbul. So seriously has the Hizbul suffered that its top cadres have stopped claiming to be a part of the organisation for fear of being identified and eliminated.

Nor has the adversary been Indian security forces alone. Over the past year, the Hizbul has been feeling the heat from an unexpected quarter: Pakistan. There were consistent reports that the Hizbul was being accorded second-class treatment by the Pakistan Army and the ISI. Once favoured by Islamabad for its local Kashmiri orientation, the Hizbul was first used as a launching pad for Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries into Kashmir. However, now that the mercenary-dominated groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) are more entrenched, Pakistan finds the Hizbul dispensable. Hence the speed with which it was expelled from the Pakistan-based United Jehad Council. Ironically, Salahuddin was the chairman of the body.

"The Hizbul may be the largest group with local cadres but it is outfits like let and JEM that have the maximum punch in terms of firepower, funds and communications equipment," says dig (Kashmir) K. Rajendra Kumar. Moreover, the non-Kashmiri groups have now established their own networks. Which explains how mercenaries like let head Ali Jehad and Al-Badr chief commander Lukman have entrenched themselves in the Valley.

How long will the cease-fire last?

The success of the cease-fire depends, first, on an agreement on modalities. The tricky questions that have to be sorted out are: Will the Hizbul militants come overground and lay down arms? Will they supply a list of their members to the committee that has been set up to implement the ceasefire? There is also the vexed question of how the forces will distinguish Hizbul militants from the rest. Will the security forces be able to exercise restraint under provocation? A post-mortem of the 30 killed at the Amarnath yatra camp in Pahalgam revealed that 20 died from retaliatory fire by the CRPF.

For the Government, successful implementation of the cease-fire is crucial. The growing tensions between local Kashmiris and foreign mercenaries for control of the "freedom struggle" has come as a window of opportunity to the Government. By opening lines of communication with those whom Home Minister L.K. Advani describes as "domestic dissidents", it can claim its operations are directed against Pakistani-backed jehadis. No wonder the prime minister coupled his overtures to Kashmiri militants with a stubborn refusal to talk to the perpetrator of cross-border terrorism -- Pakistan. "We don't shake hands with those who have a blazing gun in the other hand," said a senior foreign office official. With the Kashmiri-mercenary ratio in the armed groups having shifted from 7:3 in 1992 to 3:7 now, it is clear the Government wants to drive a wedge between the two and simultaneously paint Pakistan as a promoter of terrorism.

At a formal level, Pakistan's military ruler General Pervez Musharraf welcomed the Hizbul's cease-fire. "An opportunity has been created," he told the BBC last week, "and we must make use of it because I don't think it is going to last forever." However, it is clear that there is some confusion in Pakistan over what it perceives could become an important propaganda coup for India.

Pakistan's unease stems from two factors. At an ideological level, it finds the very idea of jehadis breaking bread with India absolutely repugnant. It has put enormous pressure on Salahuddin to involve the Hurriyat in the discussions, thereby hoping that its participation in tripartite talks would be made a precondition of a political dialogue. Simultaneously, it has encouraged the let and JEM to issue appeals to the Hizbul cadres and commanders to challenge their leadership's "betrayal" of jehad. The August 1 killings were prompted by a desire to demonstrate that Hizbul isn't the only group of consequence in Kashmir and that its cease-fire won't affect the armed struggle.

At the same time, however, Pakistan is under pressure from the US to prove its anti-terrorist credentials. President Bill Clinton's prompt telephone call to Vajpayee on August 2 was a categorical signal to Islamabad that Washington doesn't approve of orchestrated explosions of spontaneous bloodletting. Particularly when the target happens to be innocent civilians on a holy pilgrimage. To Islamabad this disapproval matters because it is still at the mercy of the West to bail it out of its economic mess.

The question is: can Musharraf afford to antagonise domestic opinion and powerful sections of the armed forces to be in Washington's good books? Very unlikely. Musharraf can make the right noises periodically but taking on India in Kashmir has become so central to Pakistan's existence that it is unlikely he will be allowed to resile from the existing position. The jehad in Kashmir was a child of the Pakistani military; today that child is in a position to devour its parent.

As the August 1 massacres demonstrated, it will take more than the Hizbul for the guns to fall silent in the Valley. While pursuing a political path, Delhi cannot ignore the military dimensions of the Kashmir conflict.

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