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THE GENESIS
OF DEFEAT
"How
many Hindus have you killed?"
 It
was a process euphemistically called "being sent to Bangladesh".
The killing and torture of respectable citizens of East Pakistan incensed
an already hostile people. A host of army officers who were ordered to
-- and carried out -- these atrocities, provided details to the commission.
"Brigadier Arbab told me to destroy all houses in Joydepur. To a
great extent I executed this order," said Lt-Colonel Aziz Ahmad Khan,
then commanding officer (CO) of 8 Baluch in his deposition. "General
Niazi asked as to how many Hindus we had killed. In May, there was an
order in writing to kill Hindus. "According to Brigadier Iqbalur
Rehman Shariff, GSO Division-I, Lt-General Gul Hasan (later army chief)
while visiting troops in East Pakistan used to routinely ask, "How
many Bengalis have you shot?"
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The
Charges and the
Verdicts
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The
commission charged Pakistan's top generals with abuse of power,
atrocities, moral turpitude and cowardice. "Firm and proper
action would not only satisfy the nation's demand for punishment
where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future recurrence
of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war."
Generals
Yahya Khan and Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt-General Gul Hassan, Major-Generals
Umar and Mitha
THE CHARGES:
»Tried
to influence political parties by threats and bribes.
»Criminal neglect of duty.
»Precipitating civil
disobedience, armed revolt and surrender.
THE VERDICT:
Public trial for criminal conspiracy
Major-General
M. Rahim Khan, former GOC, 39 Division, Chandpur
THE CHARGES:
»Desertion.
»Insisted
on moving by day fearing the Mukti Bahini, thus causing death of
14 naval ratings.
»Spreading
despondency and alarm in Dacca.
THE VERDICT:
Court martial
Brigadier
Jehanzeb Arbab, former CO, 57 Brigade
THE CHARGE:
»Indulging
in large-scale looting in East Pakistan, including theft of Rs 1.35
crore from the National Bank Treasury in Sirajganj.
THE VERDICT: A
thorough inquiry and suitable action
Major-General
Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC, 36 Division, Dacca
THE CHARGES:
»Neglect
of duty and lack of courage.
»Financial
irregularities involving Rs 50,000.
THE VERDICT: Court
martial
Major-General
Abid Zahid, former GOC, 15 Division
THE CHARGES:
»Surrender
of 98 villages in Phuklian salient in Sialkot district without a
fight.
»Failing
to inform GHQ of the loss.
THE VERDICT: Public
trial for criminal conspiracy
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The report
said a high-powered inquiry was needed to inquire into "persistent
allegations of atrocities said to have been committed by the Pakistan
Army in East Pakistan during its operations from March to December 1971".
It further said that those responsible must be tried; they had "brought
a bad name for the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local
population by their wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people".
Although
the commission dismissed the official claim of the Bangladesh government
that three million people were killed in 1971 as "fantastic and fanciful",
it did take into account certain concrete allegations. Like the claim
of Lt-Colonel
Mansoorul Huq that 17 Bengali army officers and 953 soldiers were executed
in Comilla Cantonment on the night of 27-28 March "by a flick of
one officer's finger". The accusing finger is pointed at Lt-General
Yakub Khan, co, 53rd Field Regiment. However, on the emotive issue of
the massacre of Bengali intellectuals on the night of December 9-10, the
commission found "no evidence yet" to indict anyone.
Particularly
intriguing was the commission's clean chit to Major-General Farman Ali,
the political adviser to the East Pakistan governor. Ali was named by
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as a "war criminal" and accused by Niazi
of misappropriating funds and negotiating secretly with the Indian Army.
The commission felt the claims were baseless and described Ali as an "intelligent,
well-intentioned and sincere" officer.
The bulk
of the blame falls on the ham-handed incompetence of Pakistani officers
and the role they played in alienating East Pakistan from the rest of
the country. Not surprisingly, given his proximity to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's
government, Lt-General Tikka Khan was exonerated by the commission of
charges of excesses during the crackdown of March 25. "It is in evidence
that Lt-General Tikka Khan was always willing to redress grievances and
take disciplinary action whenever complaints of excesses were brought
to his notice." The generosity was, however, not extended to Niazi.
"(T)here is some evidence to suggest that the words and actions of
Lt-General Niazi were calculated to encourage the killings and rape."
The overall
effect of licentiousness at the top, says the report, was devastating.
Basing its conclusions on the depositions of those who served in East
Pakistan, the commission referred to "a general feeling among the
troops, including their officers, that they were entitled to take whatever
they wanted from wherever they liked. "It spoke of the "recovery
of looted material which included TV sets, refrigerators, typewriters,
watches, gold, air-conditioners ..."
Much to
the embarrassment of the Bhutto government which appointed it and the
military establishment, the Commission took a long-term view of the army's
recklessness. It all began, officers told the commission, from the time
the army took upon itself civilian responsibilities.
"The
foundation of the defeat was laid way back in 1958 when the armed forces
took over the country," said Rear Admiral M. Sharif, then the flag
officer commanding the Pakistan Navy off East Pakistan, in his deposition.
"While learning the art of politics in this newly assigned role to
themselves, they gradually abandoned their primary function of the art
of soldering; they also started amassing wealth and usurping status for
themselves." The commission charged various senior officers with
misappropriating "secret funds" and even looting banks.
The commission
concluded that the "highly corrupting influence" of power seriously
affected its professionalism and quality of training. The report laconically
noted that "the officers could not impart (training) to their units
for the obvious reason that they did not have enough time available for
this purpose, and many of them also lost the inclination to do so".
No wonder
its ham-handed attempt at democracy came to nought. A so-called civilian
administration, with A.M. Malik as governor, took over from military administrators
in East Pakistan in September 1971, but as Mohammed Ashraf, former additional
deputy commissioner, Dacca, deposed: "The installation of a civilian
governor ... was merely to hoodwink public opinion at home and abroad."
This was
the time -- between May and September -- Pakistan lost its chance of a
political settlement. The report says there was reasonable normalcy in
East Pakistan after military intervention and though the countryside was
aflame with rebellion, order was restored in most urban areas. "However,
no effort was made during these months to start a political dialogue with
the elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan. Instead fraudulent
and useless measures were adopted." At the end of a season of torture
and killings in 1971, Hindus and Awami League leaders joined a large-scale
exodus to India.
"Precious
months were thus wasted, during which the Indians mounted their training
programme for the Mukti Bahini and started guerrilla raids into Pakistan
territory," the report noted. Then a set of farcical by-elections
-- a Pakistani major-general selected the candidates -- to replace dismissed
Awami League representatives. The commission said Yahya Khan's "culpable
failure" at a political settlement with the Awami League during the
crucial months preceding the war "completely alienated the sympathies"
of the East Pakistanis.
Top
The
Untold Story Of 1971
The
Loss of Character
Bravado
and Capitulation
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Don't
ask for more funds, demand the right to collect, INDIA TODAY Associate
Editor V. Shankar Aiyar writes to Chandrababu Naidu in 
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