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THE
LOSS OF CHARACTER
"Lust
for wine, greed for houses"
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| Generals
Yahya Khan (extreme right) and Ayub Khan. |
The
Commission recommended that a coterie of generals -- General Yahya Khan,
General Abdul Hamid Khan, Lt-General S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt-General Gul
Hasan, Major-General Umar and Major-General Mitha -- be publicly tried
for criminal conspiracy because in agreement with one another they brought
about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement,
armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently to the surrender of
troops and the dismemberment of Pakistan.
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The
War Within
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Immorality.
Paan smuggling. Drunkenness. Bank Looting. Atrocities. The
Pakistan Army seemed out of control in the run up to the 1971 war
that created Bangladesh. And so the War Inquiry Commission recommended:
That
a high-powered Court of Commission be set up to investigate into
persistent allegations of atrocities and to hold trials of those
who indulged in these atrocities and brought a bad name to the Pakistan
Army ...
That
allegations of personal immorality, drunkenness and indulgence in
corrupt practices against General Yahya Khan, General Abdul Hamid
Khan and Major-General Kuda Dad Khan be properly investigated as
there is prima facie evidence to show their moral degeneration resulted
in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence.
That
it is necessary to investigate into the allegations that senior
army commanders grossly abused their official position and powers
under the martial law to acquire large allotments of land, and obtained
substantial house building loans on extremely generous terms from
certain banking institutions with which they deposited large amounts
from departmental funds entrusted to their care.
That
an investigation be conducted into the suspicion created in the
mind of the Commission, that there may be some complicity or collusion
between the Commander, Eastern Command and the Indian authorities."
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This "extensive
and prolonged involvement of the Pakistan Army in martial law duties and
civil administration," the commission concluded, "had a disastrous
effect on its professional and moral standards". Indeed, "vehement"
depositions from a large number of witnesses, including "highly placed
and responsible service officers" forced it to dwell at length on
the moral aspects of the causes of defeat in the war.
In an observation
that may sound ominous in the context of Pakistan today, the report observed:
"The process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the
armed forces was set in motion by their involvement in martial law duties
in 1958, that these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact intensified
when martial law was imposed ... once again in March 1969 by General Yahya
Khan."
"Due
to corruption arising out of the performance of martial law duties, lust
for wine and women, and greed for lands and houses, a large number of
senior army officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions,
had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence
necessary for taking the vital and critical decisions demanded of them
for the successful prosecution of the war," the commission observed.
The rot
began at the very top from the East Pakistan army's commander, Lt-General
A.A.K. Niazi, who the commission said acquired a "notorious reputation
for sexual immorality and indulgence in the smuggling of paan from
East to West Pakistan". The inevitable consequence was that "he
failed to inspire respect and confidence in the mind of his subordinates,
impaired his qualities of leadership and determination; and also encouraged
laxity in discipline and moral standards among the officers and men under
his command".
The commission
singled out Niazi for personifying the rot. Delving into his past record
as GOC Sialkot and GOC and martial law administrator Lahore, it noted
his connections with one Saeeda Bukhari of Gulberg, Lahore, who was running
a brothel under the name of Senorita Home. In Sialkot, Niazi was also
said to be friendly with Shamini Firdaus who was also running a brothel.
To these serious allegations, Niazi replied to the commission: "I
became very religious during the East Pakistan trouble. I was not so before."
Nor was
military debauchery confined to tension-ridden East Pakistan. The commission
felt that an inquiry was necessary to probe charges that Brigadier Hayatullah
"entertained" some women in his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector
of West Pakistan on the night of December 11-12, when the Indian Army
was shelling his positions.
According
to the commission, these perversions led to the army brass wilfully subverting
public life in Pakistan. "In furtherance of their common purpose
they did actually try to influence political parties by threats, inducements
and even bribes to support their designs, both for bringing about a particular
kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later persuading some
of the political parties and the elected members of the National Assembly
to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly scheduled to
be held at Dacca on March 3, 1971. They, furthermore, in agreement with
each other brought about a situation in East Pakistan which led to a civil
disobedience movement, armed revolt by the Awami League and subsequently
to the surrender of our troops in East Pakistan and the dismemberment
of Pakistan."
In short,
the commission blamed the dismemberment of Pakistan not on India which
merely took advantage of a situation, but squarely on the shoulders of
the army brass.
The report
then recommended a moral makeover for the Pakistan armed services:
- That
moral values are not allowed to be compromised by infamous behaviour,
particularly at higher levels.
- That
moral rectitude is given due weight along with professional qualities
in the matter of promotion to higher ranks.
- That
serious note should be taken of notorious sexual behaviour and other
corrupt practices.
- That
syllabi of academic studies at the military academies ... should include
courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious,
democratic and political institutions."
It would
be interesting to assess whether or not the spirit of the commission's
recommendations were implemented.
Top
The
Untold Story Of 1971
The
Genesis of Defeat
Bravado
and Capitulation
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