|
BRAVADO
AND CAPITULATION
"Further
resistance is not humanly possible"
 |
| Pro-Pakistan
Razakars surrendered to Mukti Bahini |
After
dutifully examining the role India played in training the Mukti Bahini
and finally intervening directly, the commission came to a very stark
and unflattering conclusion: that the Pakistan Army capitulated without
much of a fight after digging its own grave. The commission felt the army
mishandled the situation from the outset.
"The
refusal of General Yahya Khan to negotiate with the Awami League becomes
all the more significant when we remember that two of its top leaders,
namely Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Dr Kamal Hussain, were in his custody
in West Pakistan and that almost all the friendly countries had advised
him to arrive at a political settlement in view of the looming Indian
threat of military action."
These two
"direct and devastating consequences", the report said, ensured
that the Pakistan Army "was obviously fighting a losing battle from
the very start".
The inevitability
of defeat became more obvious as the war began. As General Sam Manekshaw's
army stepped in during the winter of 1971 and made its final push to Dacca,
the corrupted superstructure of the Pakistan Army came crashing down.
The final days, observed the commission, were a litany of cowardice and
misleading signals to Dacca's unwilling defenders that help was on its
way from China and the US Seventh Fleet parked in the Bay of Bengal.
A series
of classified signals between the Pakistan government and Dacca's defenders
graphically indicate how in less than two months the army went from bluster
to hope of intervention from China and the US to a hasty, ignominious
surrender. Forgotten were the initial boasts of defending Dacca to the
"last man, last round".
"Reassure
that all ranks by grace of ALLAH are in high morale and fine shape and
imbued with the true spirit of extreme sacrifice to zealously defend the
priceless honour, integrity and solidarity of our beloved PAKISTAN (.),"
said a message from Niazi to the chief of staff in Rawalpindi on November
28, 1971. "Rededicating at this critical juncture of our history
I pledge on behalf of all ranks that we are at the highest STATE of readiness
to teach a lasting lesson to HINDUSTAN should they dare cast an evil eye
on our sacred soil in any manner, maybe through open aggression or otherwise
(.) trusting in GOD and your kind guidance, the impactful and glorious
history of our forefathers would INSHALLAH be fully revived, maintaining
highest traditions of our army in case such a GRAND opportunity afforded."
Such bombast evaporated rapidly. Instead repeated messages urged East
Pakistan to hold out somehow. On December 5, 1971, as the Indian Army
advanced on Dacca, a message from the chief of staff (G-0235) told Niazi,
that "the enemy will attempt to capture EAST PAKISTAN as swiftly
as possible and then shift maximum to face WEST PAKISTAN (.) this must
NOT be allowed to happen (.) losing of some territory is insignificant
every hope of Chinese activities very soon (.) good luck and keep up your
magnificent work against heavy odds (.) may Allah bless you".
The commission
said it could not help observing "that not only at this stage but
elsewhere the GHQ held out vague or even fraudulent promises of foreign
help". These promises multiplied as messages from Dacca became more
desperate.
Worse, Niazi
was falling apart. "He was in terrible shape, haggard, obviously
had no sleep," Major-General Farman Ali told the commission. "The
governor had hardly said a few words when General Niazi started crying
loudly. I had to send the bearer out. The governor got up from his chair,
patted him and said a few consoling words. I also added a few words saying
'your resources were limited. It is not your fault etc.'"
Finally
on December 7, with Dacca holding seven days of food stock, the governor
sent a message (A-6905) to the President saying it was imperative that
the "correct situation" be brought to his notice. After detailing
the severe shortage of resources, he said, "Millions of non-Bengalis
and loyal elements are awaiting death (.) No amount of lip sympathy or
even material help from world powers except direct physical intervention
will help (.) if any of our friends is expected to help that should have
an impact within the next 48 hours (.)." If not, the governor said,
please negotiate a "civilised and peaceful transfer". He concluded:
"Is it worth sacrificing so much when the end seems inevitable (.)."
But the
desperate fantasy of outside intervention continued. On December 11, 1971,
the chief of staff sent Niazi a signal saying, "The NEFA front has
been activated by the CHINESE although the INDIANS for obvious reasons
have not announced it (.)." He also said the US Seventh Fleet "will
be very soon in position". The commission was incredulous: "On
what basis the chief of staff was stating (this) we cannot even conjecture."
The next
day Niazi saw new hope and promised to turn Dacca into a "fortress
and fight it out till the end". He boated to reporters that Indian
tanks would first have to go over his chest. But in the next couple of
days, there were two unclassified messages -- they could easily be listened
to by India -- that the commission held as evidence of a surrender plan
and justification. One (G-1279) came from Niazi, talking of an Indian
threat of handing over prisoners to the "Mukti Fauj for butchery"
if the Pakistan Army did not surrender. The other (G-0013) was sent on
December 14, 1971, from the president to the governor and Niazi. It read:
"You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds (.) the
nation is proud of you and the world full of admiration (.) you have now
reached a stage where further resistance is no longer HUMANLY possible
nor will it serve any useful purpose(.)."
These, in
effect, said the commission, were indications to India that Pakistan was
ready to surrender. "We think it might well have prompted Manekshaw
to insist upon a surrender even though Niazi was only proposing a cease-fire."
Indeed, the word "surrender" was used by Manekshaw for the first
time only on December 15, 1971. The next day it was all over. The surrender
was signed, Pakistan was splintered, and a new nation was born.
Top
The
Untold Story Of 1971
The
Genesis of Defeat
The Loss Of Character
|
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Editor V. Shankar Aiyar writes to Chandrababu Naidu in 
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