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NATION,
KASHMIR
Peace Takes a
Knock...
The
Hizb has resumed battle, the killings continue and the Hurriyat is in
a quandary but the Government feels these are temporary roadblocks to
peace
By
Ramesh Vinayak
In
the end, the optimism proved both ill-founded and grossly immature. Despite
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee throwing a lifeline to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
that it could raise demands outside the Constitution even if the Government
was committed to a solution within it, the cease-fire ended at 5 p.m.
on August 8. In the full gaze of TV cameras, the Hizb's supreme commander
Syed Salahuddin announced in Islamabad that his group was resuming operations.
The reason: India wouldn't budge from its opposition to a tripartite discussion
that also included Pakistan. Bringing Pakistan into the ring was not a
demand that featured in Hizb's Kashmir commander Abdul Majeed Dar's July
24 initial offer of a three-month cease-fire.
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| Azhar
Masood (right) |
Not surprisingly,
the cabinet meeting that evening put the blame squarely on Pakistan's
shoulders. The next day in the Lok Sabha, Home Minister L.K. Advani added
the All Party Hurriyat Conference to the list of the guilty, said the
Government was keeping the door open for dialogue and declared that the
future Kashmir policy would be based on "firmness and flexibility".
It was an anti-climax to a fortnight that began with dizzying, if unrealistic,
expectations.
For the
people of the Valley whose growing exasperation with violence had triggered
the Hizb initiative in the first place, the disappointment was more palpable.
But it was also tinged with nervousness since it seemed inevitable that
the militant groups -- particularly the Hizb -- would go out of their
way to demonstrate they were back in business. In Ganderbal, outside Srinagar,
local Hizb commander Sajid Khan hacked into the police wireless network
and issued an unusual threat to the superintendent of police: "Aapko
jaldi tohfa bhejenge (soon we will send a gift to you)."
The threat
materialised the next day as a powerful car bomb went off on Srinagar's
Residency Road, killing 10 policemen and two others, including The Hindustan
Times photographer Pradip Kumar Bhatia. "We are prepared for the
worst," said state Governor G.C. Saxena, adding these would be isolated
incidents since the security forces were in command of the situation.
Saxena based
his assessment on the fact that a fortnight's cease-fire was too short
a time for the beleaguered Hizb to regroup its forces effectively. Officials
in Srinagar reckon that Hizb's operations would be symbolic and an attempt
to re-establish its jehadi credentials with other militant groups. The
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) -- the two front-ranking
outfits dominated and led by foreign mercenaries -- had denounced the
Hizb's cease-fire as a "betrayal of jehad" and unleashed a blood-letting
spree (100 killings in a day) on August 1 to derail the peace initiative.
Ironically,
the massacres -- a result of the army lowering its guard for five days
after it declared reciprocal cease-fire -- served to spur the security
agencies to accelerate their operations. "We are back into seek-and-destroy
mode," says IG, BSF (Kashmir) K. Vijay Kumar.
It was not
only arm twisting by Pakistan -- though an overriding factor -- that led
the Hizb to renege on the cease-fire. Wireless intercepts of messages
between its Valley-based commanders indicate that the group was in real
danger of losing its cadres opposed to the cease-fire to other hardline
groups. In Lolab valley, one of the Hizb strongholds in Kupwara, at least
50 of 300-odd Hizb militants defected to the let shortly after July 24.
Though the modalities of the cease-fire were far from being clinched,
a split in the Hizb seemed imminent, a process encouraged by Pakistan.
Despite
giving the Hizb's initiative an initial green signal because it felt India
would never accept it, Islamabad did a volte face once it was clear that
Dar had made headway in his preliminary talks with Delhi. Dar was instructed
by the ISI on July 23 not to proceed with the cease-fire. When he refused,
it became clear to Pakistan that local commanders were no longer under
its influence. That was the point when pressure was put on Salahuddin
and the Hurriyat to make the cease-fire unworkable.
For the
Hizb, the unkindest blow was delivered by the Hurriyat. Worried at the
prospect of Dar hogging the limelight at a time when its leaders were
hopeful of entering into direct negotiations with Delhi, the pro-Pakistani
section of the body, notably chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat and former chairman
Syed Ali Shah Geelani, did their utmost to undermine the cease-fire. In
fact, Hizb's pointman Fazal-ul-Haq Qureshi spent more time pleading with
the Hurriyat not to play spoiler than in negotiating the cease-fire. Says
CPI(M) leader Yousaf Tarigami: "The Hurriyat's fatwa against the
ceasefire lent weight to Pakistan's pressure on the Hizb to back off."
What made
Qureshi's position more untenable was the Home Ministry's refusal to consider
the 12 demands -- the so-called confidence-building measures -- it put
forward in its only official interface with Delhi. The demands included
the removal of bunkers, release of political and militant prisoners, repeal
of the Special Powers Act and reduction of security forces. Union Home
Secretary Kamal Pandey blandly told the Hizb these demands could be discussed
only as part of a political dialogue. Clearly, declaring cease-fire proved
easier for the Hizb than negotiating it.
Yet, despite
the scepticism the Hizb's cease-fire offer generated in the separatist
camp, it is significant that no one in the Valley charged the group with
treachery, an accusation hurled at the then powerful and pro-azadi Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front when it declared a unilateral cease-fire
in 1994.
Perhaps
it ended too soon for charges to be traded. The premature breakdown of
the cease-fire pre-empted a formal wedge between the Hizb and foreign
mercenaries -- something that some officials in Kashmir hoped for. Even
after Salahuddin pulled the plug from Islamabad, intelligence agencies
were hoping that a section of its cadres led by chief commander Dar, who
was the main architect of the cease-fire, would break away. Chances of
such eventuality, however, look slim given the fierce loyalty that the
Hizb's middle rung commanders owe to Salahuddin.
A militant
with a political bent of mind, Dar was mild in his criticism of Delhi
compared to Salahuddin's fierce outburst after the cease-fire collapsed.
The possibility of Dar staking his future on his aborted initiative is
slim given the risk of isolation he faces. Many in Srinagar believe Dar's
game plan was to come overground like Yaseen Malik and Shabir Shah and
begin a political career.
No wonder
Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah was quick to offer a lifeline to Dar, saying
political space could well be created for those willing to come over ground
-- like other militant leaders who shunned the gun to become MLAs and
MLCs. However, knowing the Hizb's terror tactics, Dar is unlikely to bite
the bait. "For Dar, the risks at present far outweigh the advantages
of charting a separate course," says an intelligence official. Dar's
option, add observers, is to buy time and gather support within the Hizb
for a renewed dialogue.
On the face
of it, there are no signs of a rift between Salahuddin and Dar. But the
latest developments have not only driven a wedge between the dominant
Kashmiri militant outfit and the Hurriyat but also deepened ideological
fissures within the separatist conglomerate. So far an armed front of
the Jamait-e-Islami, a Hurriyat constituent, the Hizb has now emerged
as a player in its own right and a rival to the Hurriyat. Its peace initiative
touched a popular chord in Kashmir, and the Hurriyat may have a lot of
explaining for not giving it a chance. "It's the Hurriyat's negative
attitude that made mince meat of the Hizb initiative," says prominent
separatist leader Shabir Shah. No wonder, the Hurriyat chose to keep uncharacteristically
mum after a stormy meeting of its executive council last Wednesday. The
Jamait, dominated by moderate separatists, was openly critical of the
Hurriyat's "negative approach" towards the Hizb initiative.
The Hurriyat's cussedness may have left the political separatists with
no card to play with Delhi, apart from undermining the possibility of
its own dialogue with the Government. As Bhat admits, "There are
now more road blocks on the way to dialogue." In fact, by doggedly
sticking to a "no-dialogue-without-Pakistan" stance -- aimed
at sabotaging the Hizb move -- the Hurriyat has left itself with no room
for manoeuvre. It has, in effect, even blocked its back channel communication
with the Centre. If it reviews its intransigence, it will bare itself
to angry Hizb retribution.
The Hizb's
avowed commitment to jehad notwithstanding, what has not been lost on
the violence-weary Kashmiris is the evidence of some rethinking in the
ranks of dreaded militant outfits that evokes a degree of both fear and
sympathy. Most Kashmiri observers are counting on the impact that the
Hizb's peace option has made on the public mind. The cease-fire may be
in ruins, but it did leave behind a few building blocks for a future peace
initiative. Delhi says that it is still in touch with militant groups
and that the present dislocation is just a temporary road block in a process
that will in time acquire a momentum of its own. As of now, there is no
evidence for such optimism. But there was no early warning of Dar's July
24 offer either.
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