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RIGHT
ANGLE
Responding
to a Gesture
A contrived
sense of alienation sustains the Muslim ghettos
By
Swapan Dasgupta
 Strange,
it would seem, are the ways of the certifying engineers of secularism.
At its National Council meet in Nagpur, new BJP President Bangaru Laxman
advises the party to shed a "pre-conceived approach" and "actively
work to bring more and more dynamic and socially respected Muslim activists
into our party". A long-overdue step you would imagine and one that
is imperative to the healthy functioning of our democracy. And how do
the secular fundamentalists respond? By instantly dismissing it as a sham
and a complete charade. Reactions not very dissimilar to the vicious communalist
outbursts that greeted the Congress' Muslim "mass contact" programme
in 1937.
To those
familiar with history, the analogy shouldn't seem far-fetched. In the
1937 elections to the newly established provincial assemblies, the Congress
won handsome victories in eight of the 11 provinces. It swept the general
seats but drew a near blank in the Muslim (reserved) constituencies-except
in the NWFP. To offset this imbalance, Jawaharlal Nehru initiated a "mass
contact" programme to attract Muslims to the Congress. The Muslim
League, whose separatist existence was threatened by this move, retaliated
viciously. It levelled grave charges of anti-Muslim bias against the Congress
ministries-citing the teaching of Hindi and the singing of Vande Mataram
as examples-and ended up in 1940 demanding Pakistan. This paid dividends.
In the 1946 election, the Muslim electorate throughout India voted unambiguously
for Pakistan, unmindful of the consequences.
Examine
today's situation. The 1999 Lok Sabha poll led to a conclusive victory
for the BJP-led NDA, the first clear mandate since 1984. Exit polls indicated
a swing (with regional variations) to the NDA among the middle classes,
youth, backward castes, Dalits and Adivasis. The only community that defied
the trend was Muslims, who swung to the Congress. Even non-Hindutva NDA
partners like the Samata, TDP, DMK and Trinamool Congress failed to secure
any significant Muslim support. The net result was that for the first
time since 1951-52, a government was elected minus the backing of India's
largest minority. Except in Kashmir, the Muslim electoral behaviour was
contrarian, despite Hindu nationalism being a non-issue. The Muslim voters
gambled heavily on Sonia Gandhi and lost.
Among other
things, the 1999 outcome demolished the dangerous and self-serving theory
of a Muslim veto-a theory that has its origins in the 1937 and 1946 elections
that led to Pakistan. But it has led to an unhealthy situation of Muslims
not having a stake in the power structure. Laxman's initiative must be
viewed in that context as an attempt to broaden the social base of the
ruling coalition. A legitimate political exercise.
Admittedly,
there is a deep-rooted Muslim aversion to the BJP. It is unrealistic to
expect it to disappear overnight. But it is possible to expect the community
to forge an expedient working relationship with the BJP centred on the
NDA manifesto. The BJP has made a gesture; it merits a degree of reciprocity.
It won't happen if the Muslim League's derision of nationalist Muslims
like Maulana Azad, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and R.A. Kidwai is mindlessly replicated
against the Bakhts and Naqvis. It won't also happen if the community retreats
into fundamentalist ghettos sustained by dubious foreign funding. History
should warn India's Muslims of the grim consequences of a contrived alienation,
fuelled by mullahs and modernists.
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The
Government should encash at least a part of its stake in LIC and GIC before
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in 
