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COVER STORY: DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT
Procedural Flaws
The system to procure
such equipment was then twisted. In normal course, the Planning and Perspective
Directorates in each of the forces kicked off the process by assessing
needs and then working out a qualitative requirement (QR) or specifications
about the performance of equipment being purchased. These then followed
a tedious procedure of routing through the WED and finally the MOD (see
box). While it looks good on paper, in practice, as a retired lieutenant-general
who was master general for the ordnance reveals, it can be easily manipulated.
He says, "The aim is to delay the exercise and get vendors of equipment
come to them with lollies for clearing orders." With single vendors
like Russia who earlier used to sell defence equipment to India on favourable
rupee terms, however, it was far more difficult to make cuts.
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FERNANDES' HAUNT: As defense minister he undertook
18 trips to Siachen |
The extent of official corruption is not, as
Fernandes would like India and the world to believe, confined to just
a few "black sheep". The Tehelka revelations establish that
they are part of a brazen chain that starts at the bottom (section officers)
and goes up to the top. For instance, Major-General Choudhary's post of
additional director-general in the WED is a highly sensitive one. Says
General Shankar Roychowdhary, Rajya Sabha member and former army chief
who retired in 1997: "Only officers with unimpeachable integrity
are selected for this post, after a careful scrutiny of their track record
and professional competence." And yet...
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He built a rapport
with jawans but the brass was unhappy over pace of reforms.
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The scandal comes just when the MOD was planning
to implement major reforms in its procurement procedures. Much of it had
to do with bringing greater cohesion and speeding up the process rather
than cleansing it. A separate purchase wing was to be set up in the MOD
headed by a special secretary. The Weapons Equipment Directorate of the
three forces would report to him instead of their respective chiefs and
all the existing units would be transferred to the new wing. These changes
were expected to bring about a greater accountability. What was also needed
was much more transparency. Admiral Bhagwat believes that among the primary
faults in acquisition of defence hardware is the veil of secrecy in which
they are cloaked. Even the price break-up of deals could be made public.
"It is only the negotiating strategy and tactical deployment of weapons-where
and how I plan to use my ships-which is to be kept secret," says
Bhagwat.
Others agree. Says Lt-General N.S. Malik, a former
deputy chief of army staff: "The whole system continues to be murky
and despite Fernandes' efforts, hasn't changed." He believes that
merely banning agents is not a solution and points out that they do play
an important role in identifying equipment. If rules are strict and everything
is out in the open then the chances of misuse are minimised.
Others suggest the British model where the purchasing
authority is outside the MOD. Senior officials in the ministry talk of
involving the CVC and CAG in concurrent audit of all ongoing deals rather
than investigating deals once these are struck. Former naval chief Admiral
Jayant Nadkarni believes the scandal to be a godsend opportunity to cleanse
the system of defence procurement. Now all it needs is a determined government
to make the decisive changes. Does Vajpayee still have it in him?
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