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STATES: JAMMU & KASHMIR
The New Targets
Militants are now attacking the police in a bid
to demoralise them and dry up the intelligence network.
By Surinder Singh Oberoi
Let there be a
major earthquake in Kashmir so that we all die in peace ... never to see
these miseries again. Never to see our loved ones die one by one,"
weeps Ghulam Hassan Wani, brother-in-law of constable Abdul Majid, a policeman
who was killed in a bomb blast last month. "I don't want to serve
in the police anymore ... I am seriously thinking of quitting and leaving
the Valley for ever," adds Ghulam Hassan, another of Majid's close
relatives.
Majid and six others were killed in an ambush
only a day after the militants assured the local police through newspapers
that they would not be targeted. But like Majid's house, where his wife
has been widowed within four months of being married, there are close
to a hundred homes in the state mourning the loss of their kin-all drawn
from the local Jammu and Kashmir Police.
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| HIGH CASUALTIES: Policemen salute coffins of eight
colleagues killed by militants in an attack on February 9 |
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A terrified police force comprising 60,000 personnel
finds itself caught in Kashmir's war. Regarded with suspicion by the paramilitary
forces and the army, the policemen now find themselves at the receiving
end of a renewed cycle of militancy. So, it's not just themselves but
their families-who number a sizeable three lakh-that they are worried
about as they struggle to fight the militants and falling morale.
Since January 1, 31 police personnel, including
two officers, have been killed and more than three dozen injured in militant
attacks. Concedes a senior officer: "The militants seem to be succeeding
in their mission because they are quite clearly on a terrorise-the-force
crusade.'' State police chief Ashok Suri says, "We are being attacked
because the force has become active in anti-insurgency operations."
The increase in the number of attacks against
the police is, in fact, quite similar to the situation in the early 1990s
when the gun first came into circulation in Kashmir. Then, the killing
of police personnel served as a warning to the locals to keep out of the
fight and to hamper counter-insurgency operations launched by the paramilitary
forces and the army. For any such operation then local inputs were vital,
as the paramilitary forces-which were flown into the Valley-were not familiar
with either the terrain, the people or the language. Sections of the police
were also sympathetic to the slogan for azadi - freedom - which had fired
the imagination of the Kashmiris. In 1990, in fact, several police personnel
deserted the force to set up their own militant group called the "Jehadi
Commandos". Now once again, after almost a decade, the police are
being targeted in a systematic manner forcing many to contemplate either
getting a transfer to a safer zone or taking premature retirement. What
puzzles them is that while the militant groups continue to reassure them
through the newspapers, they continue killing them as well. The militants
claim that they will only target the Special Operations Group (SOG)-a
unit culled from the local police in 1994 to conduct special operations,
as the name suggests-but the recent attacks show that the entire force
is under attack.
BIG STRIKES
The state's 60,000 policemen are caught in a difficult
situation: If they continue with counter-insurgency operations,
they expose themselves and their families to attacks. If they
don't, they run the risk of being dubbed as sympathisers by the
Central security agencies.
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# Feb 9: An LeT suicide squad storms Srinagar police control room
killing eight policemen.
# Feb 23: Militants fire grenades at a patrol party in Kokernag,
Anantnag, in broad daylight killing six.
# March 2: Militants fire rockets at a police vehicle in Rajouri,
killing 17 policemen.
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The sheer terror that has gripped the force is
apparent from a letter written to the Lashkar-e-Toiba and published in
the local daily Alsafa. Bearing the name of special constable Mir Ghulam
Mohammed, the letter says, "Our kith and kin have also made sacrifices
for the ongoing movement in Kashmir. In the past 12 years the Kashmir
Police have only lifted dead bodies and informed the next of kin that
someone in their family is dead." It continues, "In spite of
wearing police uniforms and taking the oath of allegiance to and pay from
the government, we have not been sincere in our duties for which God will
ask for answers in the next world." It tapers off with the cryptic,
"Please allow us to be where we are. We might have done some wrongs
but we can't be ... " The letter appeared in the paper a day after
the attack on the heavily-guarded police control room on February 9 in
which nine policemen were killed.
A hint of why the police are being attacked
is contained in the statements of Lashkar's spokesperson Abu Osama, who
told INDIA TODAY that "the attack was against the SOG which is involved
in the custodial killings of innocent Kashmiris". He also added,
"Kashmiri police officers are our brothers but they should not act
as a barrier to our ongoing movement and act as agents of the government
of India."
Police intelligence sources suggest that since
the cease-fire announced on November 24, at least 50 police informers
have been gunned down by the militants. This has led to a reduced inflow
of information to the police. The militants' aim, quite clearly, is to
continue the attacks against the police and thus ensure that intelligence
inputs dry up. They want to see the local police become defunct. Especially
because in the post-cease-fire phase the militants have moved into urban
areas from the mountain reaches and do not want their locations targeted.
The first to find out about their movements are the locals; hence the
terror campaign.
In a cleverly aimed strategy, the militants-by
making suicide missions their main battle technique-are also trying to
tell the local Kashmiris that Central troops remain their main enemy.
Says a senior officer: "By dying in suicide attacks and not interfering
with the social fabric they are once again trying to gain logistical support
from the masses. They are sending the signal that they have learnt from
their past mistakes and are also not extorting the local population now."
Similarly, by attacking the police, they hope that police families will
put pressure on them not to go after the mujahids. It's a tough choice
for the police: if they continue their operations, they expose themselves
and their families to risk. And if they are demoralised into inaction,
they are branded as sympathisers.
It is a crucial time for the police force for,
as Suri says, "The cease-fire has made the force a soft target."
Though combat operations are on the backfoot as far as the army and the
BSF go, the police continue their anti-insurgency operations because these
are the orders they have received from state Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah.
"I've told the police to go after them as I have no more room for
them in jails," Abdullah had publicly announced. The post-cease-fire
phase has also put the focus on the local force because it is bearing
the brunt of the militants' renewed violence.
The increased attacks against the police is
already forcing a re-think amongst their ranks and Suri has an uphill
task ahead of him for he has to prevent a repeat of 1990. It took many
years and many police chiefs to convert the police into a fighting unit.
Further killings will only deepen the widespread demoralisation and once
that sets in completely, it will create difficulties for not just the
police brass but the entire security grid. For the police forms a vital
component in any counter-insurgency operation, regardless of whether it
is the army or the BSF that is setting out for such a task. The militants,
who have gained a lot through the cease-fire by attacking informers and
moving into urban pockets, may notch another victory if serious attempts
are not made to defeat their plans of converting the police into a non-fighting
one.
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