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BUSINESS: CALCUTTA STOCK EXCHANGE
Departure From The Trend
The CSE stands in
a paradoxical isolation from this established market practice. Thanks
to the centuries-old practice of the city's Marwari finance capital, BADLA
financing is almost entirely dependent on an unofficial lending system.
It provides finance, now at 32 per cent annually, for the speculators
to carry forward their bookings from one settlement week to another. The
official rate (11 per cent) is shown on the ''dabba'' (the computerised
system) while the unofficial part (''dabba se bahar'') is left to the
glue of honour that binds the lender and the borrower. The Bankas met
with a tragic end probably because of an exorbitant commitment beyond
the dabba. Admits CSE President Kamal Parekh: ''The unofficial BADLA rate
has overshadowed the official. It is a fact of life.''
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"DOE JONES"
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DINESH
K. SINGHANIA
Member broker, CSE
Responsible for a payment
crisis
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The CSE has experienced default problems earlier
also, particularly during the 1992 securities scam triggered by Harshad
Mehta, which involved nearly a fifth of the exchange's 500-odd broker
members. The current problem is somewhat different. It began in January,
when Mumbai's bull operator Ketan Parekh, cornered by the free fall in
the prices of his favoured new-economy stocks, shifted a chunk of his
holdings in HFCL to his ''friends'' in Kolkata. The biggest among Parekh's
eastern allies, Dinesh K. Singhania, a second-generation stockbroker,
acquired a little over a million HFCL shares through his various firms,
with names as striking as Doe Jones Investment and Tripoli Consultancy.
Parekh's other frontman, Ashok Poddar, also agreed to carry a large part
(about five lakh) of his HFCL holdings in the names of himself and his
family members like Prema Poddar and Rajkumar Poddar.
There was yet another set of problems with DSQ
Software, whose promoter Dinesh Dalmia had lent Rs 208 crore to stockbrokers
and sister companies primarily to ramp up the price of the scrip. As its
price dropped within a year from Rs 2,000 to about Rs 380 in January,
Harish Chandra Biyani, a CSE broker, came to Dalmia's rescue by holding
a large number of the beleagured shares. A SEBI team stationed in Kolkata
calculated Biyani's exposure to the DSQ Software scrip alone at about
Rs 70 crore.
With the markets witnessing unprecedented selling
pressure on both HFCL and DSQ Software counters, notably from March 2
(after a sudden spurt on March 1, the day after the budget), Parekh's
Kolkata friends could not bear the heavy cross any longer. Brokers failed
to honour the BADLA commitments and more than 50 CSE trading terminals
were disconnected by March 8, the pay-in day after the March 1 buying
binge.
Things had become worse by March 15, the next
pay-in day, despite a SEBI ban on short sales (offering to sell at today's
price in the hope that the price would fall tomorrow). Angry sub-brokers
laid siege to the CSE building, filling the corridor outside the executive
offices with the very Bengali war-cry for paralysing work: Cholbe na,
Cholbe na. Outside the building, there was no way that they could trace
Singhania, Poddar or Biyani. One of them had reportedly been admitted
to Belle Vue Hospital, but the hospital authorities had no clue about
it. The others had ''gone to Mumbai'', their family members said.
The CSE somehow managed to ride out the pay-in
problems on March 15 and 22 as the SEBI team coerced private financiers
to release cash, to the extent of protecting the outstanding positions.
The overhang of the unofficial debt, though, persists. The sources of
such debt are bizarre. One of them is a well-known jute baron who invests
a part of his huge cash flow from forward trading in raw jute in the capital
market, notably in acquisition operations. Another financier runs a chain
of confectioneries, with most of the daily cash income unaccounted for
and, thus, free to be diverted to stock-market adventures.
Though Parekh issued show-cause notices against
Singhania, Poddar and Biyani last week, CSE faces endemic problems with
speculation driven by No. 2 accounts or, to put it more simply, black
money. It is different from Mumbai, where relatively transparent corporate
funds are in use for speculation. If Kolkata continues to play the ''rogue
exchange'', it will soon become the paradise for speculation based on
dubious leveraging.
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