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COVER STORY: THE STOCK SCAM; MODUS OPERANDI
Lack Of Uniformity
While SEBI and the
stock exchanges look at individual broker positions in each exchange and
scrip, the truth is that punters operate independently and a band of followers
apes their actions, shifting positions across 23 exchanges, helped by
the lack of uniform settlement. Says L.C. Gupta, former member of the
SEBI Board: "This could have been prevented had SEBI initiated basic
reforms like rolling settlement and adoption of a uniform settlement.
Former SEBI chief G.V. Ramakrishna believes scams occur because of the
absence of real-time, online surveillance. The surveillance, he says,
should be both broker and scrip-specific, even if it is limited to only
the top 10 scrips and 10 brokers. "It is important that the market
knows they are being watched and that you will come down heavily."
Clearly this wasn't done. Even today, bull operators can ramp-up scrips
without ringing any alarms in the regulatory mechanism. Very simply the
hounds in the market had outpaced the regulators.
Helping the hounds along the way were banks-private
and cooperative- who lent money and wrote out guarantees to brokers. The
RBI wasn't too concerned either, even though three private-sector banks
had an exposure 10 times that of nationalised banks. While the nationalised
banks had learnt their lessons in 1992, the parvenus had not. It didn't
matter to banks that the guarantees were partially backed by stocks whose
value could plunge anytime. Just as it didn't matter to Global Trust Bank
(GTB) that it was extending credit to Parekh who held a substantial stake
in the bank. Somaiya believes that the "probe into who rigged the
GTB shares prior to its merger with UTI Bank may provide a clue to the
quid pro quo".
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SCAMS GALORE
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STOCKS AND SECURITIES: The market crashed in 1992 after
Harshad Mehta used bankers' receipts to siphon off funds (Rs 4,100
crore) from banks and ramp up shares.
PLANTATION COMPANIES: 653 plantation firms managed to convince
investors that money grew on trees and walked away with
Rs 2,563 crore between 1995 and 1999.
NON-BANKING FINANCE COMPANIES: An A+ rating, an MF and
a bank licence--C.R. Bhansali pulled it off despite a dubious record.
By the time the bubble burst in 1997, investors had lost Rs 1,031
crore. The CRB scam also awakened the RBI to the horror of NBFCS
and their unrealistic deposits.
BIG BULL AGAIN: Mehta strikes again in 1998, ramping up
BPL and other shares.
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But the March 2 and March 12 slumps forced the
RBI to sit up and rap the errant banks sharply. GTB was forced to call
in its funds, so were the other banks. A former SEBI official points out
that it isn't just banks. "In the case of many rigged scrips the
funding came through a web of financial companies belonging to the promoters,"
he says. "Some organised private placements to rig shares. It would
be illustrative to see what HFCL did with the Rs 1,000-odd crore it raised
from Kerry Packer. The Income Tax Department could probe the end use."
Funding though isn't always domestic.
A senior RBI official points out that many FIIs
are now playing broker to corporates ramping up or hammering shares. The
route is either through participatory notes wherein an NRI or OCB can
deposit a sum and invest in shares through the FII or through sub-accounts.
"Clearly many are simply fronting for corporates, for a fee."
What's more they seem to be actively involved in speculative runs, though
they are supposed to take a long-term view.
The regulators suspected this all along but
nobody wanted to rock the boat. Neither SEBI nor the RBI, burdened by
the double role of being owner and regulator of banks. While SEBI doesn't
carry such baggage, it has often complained of lack of teeth. Mehta's
critics don't quite agree it is an issue of power. Says a merchant banker:
"Why aren't they doing what is in their power? Nothing moves in SEBI
without a committee." Like the Finance Ministry, it is also obsessed
with volumes and turnover. Says Gupta: "SEBI seems to be taking pride
in large volumes even if delivery is minimal. High volumes breed speculation
and invariably lead to manipulation. Unless we understand this, we cannot
expect a safe market."
Again for some strange reason, neither the Finance
Ministry nor the regulators are overly worried about safety when the market
is rising. Since January 2000, the Sensex shot up twice by over 300 points
and thrice by over 200 points. No alarms were raised. It has slid 13 times
by over 200 points during the same period without any ruckus. If it hadn't
been for the budget, the March 2 slide of 176 points would have gone largely
unnoticed. In that sense, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha has delivered
a truly investor-friendly budget or the scam would have continued.
Yet, despite a series of scams, the regulator
wakes up only when one actually takes place. In the past three weeks,
SEBI has done more cleansing than it did in a year. Says Prithvi Haldea
of Prime Database: "It is unfortunate that we require scams to take
corrective action. We continue to be in a reactive mode, not proactive
mode. What's more with the number of scams rising, earlier ones get swept
under. There is no follow-up and no exemplary action."
It would interest the regulators to know that
the name Gekko was inspired by the lizard that feeds on insects and sheds
its tail when trapped. This time round perhaps the regulators could try
and trap more than just the tail. For, as Vimal Bhandari, executive director,
IL&FS, says, "Nobody has the right to dent the robustness of
the market. Wrongdoing, if unpunished, creates cynicism." Something
India can ill-afford if it wants to grow at 9 per cent.
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