| |
NEIGHBOURS: BANGLADESH
BSF Sounds Red Alert
On
hearing of the Pyrdiwah capture, BSF Director-General Gurbachan Jagat
issued an alert and ordered intensive patrolling. "If they could
suddenly get belligerent in Pyrdiwah, there was no way of ruling out similar
incidents elsewhere," he said. Patrols were asked to go out along
the zero line that divides the two countries, for unlike in Kashmir where
each battalion is responsible for a 30 km stretch, in the North-east,
each battalion has to cover 90 km and thus there is a gap of 7-9 km between
posts.
|

|
|
|
SAFE AND SOUND: A BSF jawan after he was
handed over to Indian authorities by the BDR
|
|
Patrols were out after the red alert but at Mankachar
in Assam, over 200 km away from Pyrdiwah, the BSF had other ideas. A party
of 50-60 men drawn from 118 Battalion and led by Deputy Commandant B.R.
Mondol was making an attempt to capture a post well into Bangladesh territory.
It is still not clear whether Mondol was acting on his own or whether
there were secret orders from BSF headquarters clearing the capture of
a post to be used as a bargaining chip to regain Pyrdiwah. Officially,
Jagat denies that such an order was passed and maintains it was a decision
made by the local commander. "I asked for intensive patrolling,"
he says, adding, "Crossing the fence was not part of the brief."
The operation, however, was ill conceived in more ways than one.
To begin with, the choice of the post was horribly
wrong. Unlike Pyrdiwah, which is an adverse possession-a village inhabited
by Indians but one that actually belongs to Bangladesh (till the border
agreement is ratified and the populations exchanged)-Boraibari bordering
Assam lies across a fence. Also, unlike Pyrdiwah, which is neither fenced
nor has any pillars to clearly demarcate it, Boraibari is a large village
with a population of at least 1,000. Its population has also largely been
hostile to India because, as one senior official admitted, "We have
often fired at them for entering our territory to cut trees." The
issue of the BSF firing on civilians has often figured in the bi-annual
meetings between the BSF and BDR chiefs. Former BSF chief E.N. Ram Mohan
was even described as a "trigger happy chief" by Indian diplomats
stationed in Dhaka, for the high commissioner there often got called to
the Bangladesh foreign office over BSF firing on civilians.
Splitting the BSF party into three groups, Mondol
led one comprising 16 men. Their aim-to cross the Boraibari village and
occupy the BDR post. This was error number one, for unlike the Pyrdiwah
post which is located on an adverse possession, the BDR post is on Bangladeshi
land. The BSF would thus be violating Bangladesh's sovereignty if they
took it and the BDR had the right to retaliate with force if necessary.
Besides, Mondol had neither the numerical strength nor the fire power
or the communication back-up that is crucial to counter-attacks. Mondol
and party walked through a gate along the fence and took a nullah to reach
Boraibari. They were totally unprepared for what followed.
Discovered by civilians, Mondol and his men
heard a loud voice over the megaphone at the local mosque appealing to
all villagers to gather because they were under attack from the BSF. According
to the official version, before they knew it, the BSF party had been surrounded
and dispossessed of weapons and wireless sets. Dragged by civilians and
handed over to the BDR, Mondol's was among the 15 bodies that came back
in wooden boxes, mutilated and shot at point-blank range. There is even
evidence that Mondol may have been shot dead a day after he was captured.
So why did the BSF party not fire in self defence?
"Probably because they are trained not to fire at civilians,"
says Jagat. But the rule changes if there is a life-endangering situation
like the one in which the BSF men found themselves. Why did the party
not try and send out a wireless message to warn their seniors? "Mondol
probably felt that being a Bengali, he could handle it himself,"
says a BSF officer. There is a third explanation-they were caught in foreign
territory and had no business to be there. A more uncharitable theory
is that the BSF men were busy pillaging the village when the BDR struck.
|
|
|
| TAKING PRECAUTIONS: Patrolling
has been intensified on both sides of the Indo-Bangladesh border after
the incidents |
India began moving only after the BDR announced
the killing of the 16 BSF personnel in the Boraibari encounter on April
18. Foreign Secretary Chokila Iyer summoned the Bangladesh High Commissioner
Mustafa Farooq Mohammed to South Block. Iyer, handling the first major
diplomatic crisis since her appointment earlier this year, said the "unprovoked
and unwarranted" intrusion by the BDR was unacceptable. She apparently
told the high commissioner in no uncertain terms that in case status quo
ante was not restored in Pyrdiwah and cross-border firing not stopped,
Delhi would not be responsible if the situation got out of hand. Around
midnight, Iyer received a call from Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Syed
Muazzam Ali, saying that orders had been issued to restore status quo
ante as well as for immediate withdrawal from Pyrdiwah. The BDR withdrew
from Pyrdiwah by the night of April 19.
Although the BDR handed over the 16 bodies to
the BSF on April 20, Prime Minister Vajpayee could convey "India's
deep sense of hurt and anguish" over the mutilation of bodies to
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed only two days later. The conversation
took place hours after Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh expressed similar
sentiments to his Bangladeshi counterpart Abdus Samad Azad.
If India's initial response to the BDR's misadventure
was muted it was because the flare up came at a time when India was looking
towards fulfilment of its pending agenda to promote security and economic
interests in Bangladesh and beyond. With a friendly Sheikh Hasina-led
Awami League Government in Dhaka, Indians were visualising some bilateral
benefits that would make its north-eastern region more secure. Delhi is
keen to get transit rights through Bangladesh in order to reduce the vulnerability
of the Siliguri corridor. It wants access to natural gas in Bangladesh
(some 428 billion cu m of it) in order to feed its energy hungry markets
but cannot do so given the political situation in Dhaka. In fact, Bangladesh
is central to India's theme to draw closer physical linkages with south-east
Asia.
However, the "unwarranted" intrusion
by the BDR has severely jolted the Indian plans and could derail Delhi's
strategic interests. The anti-India sentiment currently raging in Bangladesh
may give a leading edge in the forthcoming elections to Khaleda Zia's
Bangladesh National Party, which has strong fundamentalist overtones (see
box). The Indian reaction to Pyrdiwah appears to have gauged the extent
of its negative impact on Delhi's relationship with Dhaka. The Government
knew that if not handled properly, the border crisis had the potential
to reopen the eastern front, thus nullifying the prime objective of the
1971 conflict. Also, as G. Parthasarthy, former Indian high commissioner
to Pakistan, says, "It could be Pakistan's plan to open another front
on India's eastern sector in order to divert Indian troops from Kashmir
where the passes will be opening shortly." While hasty action could
have regrettable fallouts, Delhi's reaction to the Boraibari massacre
has come in for criticism. In the coming months it will have to justify
its restraint as more uncomfortable truths pour out.
With Ruben Banerjee and Almas
Zakiuddin in Dhaka
|
|