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DEFENCE: DRDO
Delay In Developing MBRL Raised Kargil Causalities
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ANTI-TANK MISSILE
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COST: Part of the
Rs 800-crore
integrated missile programme
Delay: Eight years
Nag, a top attack, fire and forget anti-tank guided missile. The
DRDO is developing two versions, one for the army, the other for
the air force. Despite a test fire at the Interim Test Range, Chandipur-at-Sea
in 1998, it is non-functional.
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Army officers believe
that they would have suffered fewer casualties during the Kargil war had
the DRDO delivered on its promise, for an MBRL would have pulverised an
area of 500 m in no time. But during the Kargil war the Pinaka was found
wanting on many fronts-the development and selection of the launcher vehicle
for the system was incomplete and the combined vehicle took up to 40 minutes
to load instead of the designed four to five minutes. In addition, as
against the requirement of eight types of warheads, the DRDO's Armament
Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) had only developed three.
"Technology is unkind and uncompromising.
Most of our products are being conceptualised for the first time. It's
not like we are trying to duplicate a television,'' says Aatre in his
defence, even as his counterparts in the forces argue that for them it
is a question of life and limb in a situation where time is a vital ally.
"Ultimately, our lives depend on the superiority and sturdiness of
our weapons systems,'' says a senior air-force officer, expressing strong
concern at the delay in the delivery of indigenously built missiles like
the Trishul and Akash scheduled to be replaced by the Russian-supplied
OSA-AK and Kvadrat systems. Basic surface to air missiles-which Pakistani
soldiers used to down Indian Air Force planes during the Kargil war-are
designed to be fired from batteries or tracked vehicles and can down an
aircraft from a distance of up to 25 km. Once again, there has been a
huge delay on DRDO's part.
The same is true of the
Nag, scheduled for use in 1992. Part of the Integrated Guided Missiles
Development Programme announced in 1983, work on the Nag, a top attack,
fire and forget anti-tank guided missile, started in 1988. The DRDO is
developing two versions-one for the army which can be mounted on an infantry
combat vehicle and a helicopter-launched version for the air force. Flight
trials of both were conducted and the Nag was to be sent to the forces
for user trials in 1998 after a test fire from the Interim Test Range
at Chandipur-on-Sea in July the same year. Since then, the Nag has been
tested several times and even been displayed at the Defence Expo. however,
due to problems with its guidance system, it has not been handed over
to the armed forces. The army needs 500 such missiles, the air force 100.
Moreover, during the Kargil war, the Nag was sorely missed and had to
be replaced by Milans, weapons which failed to achieve the desired results
because the warheads had expired.
Despite the complaints,
DRDO has its own problems to contend with. Apart from the fact that it
is conceptualising complex weapon systems, several projects are electronically
oriented and Aatre says that India's electronic infrastructure is still
woefully insufficient. The sanctions that followed the nuclear tests at
Pokhran in 1998 is another reason the DRDO cites as a cause of delays.
But this doesn't explain the BFSR, the MBRL or the Nag fiascos. The excuse
is also not applicable to rifles, another critical necessity for close
combat. Again, if the DRDO had stuck to its 1992 deadline, by which it
had promised to deliver the INSAS 5.56 mm assault rifles, infantry units
would have been well trained in their use.
The ARDE started work on
this gas-operated selective-fire weapon system in the 1980s when the army
wanted to replace the 7.62 mm self-loading rifle (SLR). The DRDO developed
the first prototype in 1986 which was much lighter at 4.2 kg than the
SLR at 5.7 kg. The world's biggest programme with a projected production
run of 1.2 million weapons and an estimated cost of Rs 3,000 crore (including
Rs 10 crore cost of development) would have given the DRDO a lot to be
proud of. Instead, its production delays mired the organisation in controversy.
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INSAS RIFLE
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COST: Rs 10 crore
Delay: Seven years
'This gas-operated selective fire weapons system was meant to replace
the 7.62 mm self-loading rifle (SLR), in use for 30 years. The first
prototype, developed in 1986, weighed 4.2 kg, much lighter than
the SLR at 5.7 kg.
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Defence production, however, is an intricate
task and, as K. Subrahmanyam, senior defence analyst, points out, "The
Defence ministry needs a better procurement policy. How do you expect
a bureaucrat who was earlier a transport secretary to understand the intricacies
of defence?" Subrahmanyam suggests-as he did to the government when
he was secretary, defence production-that DRDO should handle only those
projects necessitating completion in seven to 10 years.
The DRDO is now redefining
its agenda. It is currently involved in different work, including the
production of mosquito repellent for troops and gloves for soldiers in
Siachen. Sources in DRDO reveal that they have put forward a proposal
recommending that the organisation concentrate on armaments, missiles
and aeronautics. Not a bad idea, for unless the DRDO pulls up its socks,
it will be difficult for them to defend themselves and for the armed forces
to defend the country.
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