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COVER STORY: INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
What Will They Talk?
In an attempt to regain the initiative, Vajpayee
does a major volte-face and invites Musharraf to Delhi for a summit even
as he calls off the floundering cease-fire in Kashmir. With little room
for manoeuvring the big question is:
By Raj Chengappa and Harinder Baweja with Asif Farooqi
in Islamabad
"Every one is telling me that I should
talk to Musharraf. How can I, when the bus from Lahore reached Kargil?
And what will we talk about? Will I say, 'How's the weather' or will I
ask, 'How are your wife and children'?"
—Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, September 2000
When he spoke those
words to a rapt and adoring audience of Americans of Indian origin in
Washington DC, the Indian prime minister was in top form. He was at the
end of what was undoubtedly a highly successful visit to the US where
President Bill Clinton and wife Hillary went out of their way to make
him feel welcome. Pakistan Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf, or Mr Kargil
as he was disparagingly referred too, was still an international pariah
and struggling to assert himself. Vajpayee could afford to mock the general's
frequent offer that he was willing to talk to India "any time, any
place and at any level". India's stand was tough: no dialogue was
possible till Pakistan ended cross-border terrorism.
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MUSHARRAF'S TACTICS
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# As Mr Kargil, seeks legitimacy from India
and help in his plan to become president of Pakistan.
# To show to the world that the Kashmir
dispute cannot be resolved without Pakistan.
# Needs to divert domestic attention from
Pakistan's growing economic problems.
# Needs international approval so that
he can seek more funds from the IMF to bail out the economy.
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Nine months later those words said in a lighter
vein have come to haunt Vajpayee. Last week, he took his biggest initiative
to resume a dialogue with Pakistan since his historic but shortlived Lahore
stratagem in February 1999 by inviting Musharraf to Delhi for summit-level
talks. His Government simultaneously announced that it was ending the
cease-fire that had been in force in Kashmir since November 2000. It was
an admission that the cease-fire gambit had failed or, as an official
puts it mildly, "an idea whose time had gone". And also that
India had climbed down from its position that it would not talk to Pakistan
until cross-border terrorism ended.
The contradiction was apparent and the criticism
came in thick and fast to what was seen as a volte-face in India's stated
position. S.K. Singh, former foreign secretary, dismissed the invitation
for talks as "a road to nowhere". His explanation: "Pakistan
has not changed, so why talk?" Air Chief Marshal S.K. Kaul, former
chief of air staff, caustically asks, "What was the idea of wasting
six months (in the cease-fire) and precious lives in Kashmir if Pakistan
was to be engaged in the first place?" And the advice of G. Parthasarthy,
former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan, is that "expectations
should be kept very low over the outcome of his visit".
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VAJPAYEE'S STRATEGY
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# With the cease-fire failing, wants to
retain the peace initiative and keep Pakistan guessing.
# Needs to draw attention away from perceived
domestic political problems dogging him.
# To silence international criticism that
India is dragging its feet on resumption of Indo-Pak dialogue.
# Wants to go down in history as the man
who was able to bring lasting peace between the two.
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Across the border too, Pakistan Foreign Minister
Abdul Sattar, though relieved by India's invitation, lost no time in pointing
out just how conflicting India's actions were. He told India Today, "We
are alarmed by the words being used to give the army a blank cheque to
continue state terrorism in the Valley while inviting us for a dialogue.
India is ending up taking one step forward and two steps backwards."
(see interview)
Uncomfortably for India, a section of opinion
makers in Pakistan perceive the invitation for talks as a sign of weakness
and a vindication of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir. The widely read Pakistani
daily The News said in its editorial, "By inviting Pakistan's military
ruler for talks, India has admitted, albeit implicitly, that it cannot
proceed an inch forward to resolve the Kashmir problem without involving
Pakistan."
Vajpayee's May 23 initiative appears impulsive-not
one that has come after months of strategising and calibration. Just that
morning, three senior ministers in Vajpayee's Cabinet-Home Minister L.K.
Advani, External Affairs and Defence Minister Jaswant Singh and Finance
Minister Yashwant Sinha-made public their recommendations for revamping
the national security at a joint press conference. The report rubbed in
the point that Pakistan's desire to talk to India "rings hollow"
against the backdrop of continuing support for militants from Islamabad.
Soon after releasing the report, Advani and Singh drove to the prime minister's
house for lunch. There were joined by Principal Secretary and National
Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. During lunch the four worried about how
to get out of the Government's floundering cease-fire initiative which
had so far been Vajpayee's biggest gamble in the Valley. The problem had
troubled them for over a month.
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