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COVER STORY: INDO-PAK
SPECIAL
MUSHARRAF LACKS LEGITIMACY
By Benazir Bhutto
 For
India, the General who would be President—never mind the Constitution—is
a guest of compulsions. Caught between internal turmoil and international
expectations, it is unlikely that his much-hyped meet with Vajpayee will
yield anything more than old agreements in new packages.
On June 20, 2001,
Pakistan's 1999 coup leader, General Pervez Musharraf, declared himself
the President, the fourth military commander to march into the presidency
with his boots and guns. Since he made little secret of his ambition,
the assumption of office was expected.
With more than half a million men under arms
to back his self-declaration, General Musharraf casually changed from
khaki to mufti. But conscious that his power flows from his military post,
the General retained the chief of army staff tag. Never mind that the
Constitution says the presidents must be elected by Parliament. The Constitution,
as an earlier general-president said, "is a booklet of 12 pages that
can be torn".
In countries where constitutions are the basic
law, the Musharraf presidency was greeted with shock. America, Britain,
the European Union were quick to express their dismay. Even the Chinese
endorsement was missing. The only country that welcomed the oath-taking
was old foe India, which must have its reasons for doing so. Pakistan's
two largest political parties and their allies were quick to denounce
the move as "anti-democratic and unconstitutional". The General
ignored them.
It was hoped that General Musharraf would be
different from his predecessors. But in 20 months he has made wrong moves
at wrong times and reached wrong conclusions based on wrong advice. Each
politically motivated action of his lost him support when the platform
for gaining it was available. It was obvious that the protocol of his
coming India visit bothered Musharraf. Here was a general who sent 3,000
Pakistani soldiers to their martyrdom in Kargil. More often than not-post-mortems
showed grass in empty bellies-they died of hunger rather than cold.
Then there was the Indian premier's visit to
Lahore in 1999. Musharraf, then army chief, along with the other service
chiefs, was conspicuous by his absence. The Musharraf who refused to salute
(Indian prime minister) Vajpayee on home ground was faced with the dilemma
of saluting him on Indian territory. Swearing himself in as President
earlier than planned was Musharraf's answer to the awkward salute. Protocol
could rank him higher than the Indian premier. Now the President of India
will lay out the red welcoming carpet for the Kargil architect.
There are four options that the General has
to acquire legitimacy. First, an extension from the Supreme Court for
the allocated term. But this will stir up misgivings in the international
community. Second, a manipulated referendum, but it is a double-edged
sword. The people could boycott, making it difficult to fill the ballot
boxes. Third, election through local councillors, but that too is double
edged. Strong-arm tactics could backfire. Fourth, an understanding with
the opposition alliance. Since the last option causes military hearts
to verge on near fatal attacks, that leaves three substantive options,
none of which is tidy. Excluded political parties will resist them, making
the international strategic factors critical. Ironically, such external
support now hinges on the benevolence that nemesis Vajpayee is willing
to bestow.
Clearly, reducing tensions between nuclear-armed
India and Pakistan is the unanimous strategic compulsion of the international
community. The question being asked is whether Vajpayee can do business
with Musharraf. Delhi is playing on the local boy comes home theme. The
Indian home in Delhi where a two-year-old Musharraf played before the
family migrated to Pakistan is being done up. And as the Clinton visit
showed, Indians know how to wine and dine a dignitary. That can be intoxicating.
The downside is that any agreement between the
two will be disputed. Musharraf goes to Delhi without the support of the
people. He is not on speaking terms with his elected predecessors. Besides,
much as Musharraf may wish to win the Nobel Peace Prize, it is poor compensation
for the rest of the Pakistani Army. And he knows it. Lacking legitimacy
and representation, it is unlikely that Musharraf can do more than regurgitate
old agreements on nuclear confidence, trade and gas pipelines.
(The author is a former prime minister of Pakistan)
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