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COVER STORY: INDO-PAK SPECIAL

WASHINGTON'S MODEST EXPECTATIONS

By Stephen Cohen

Musharraf and Vajpayee may not change fundamental positions on the Kashmir issue but they will certainly take steps to reduce friction along the Line of Control, ease the plight of the Kashmiris, even resurrect or expand several earlier pacts like the Siachen Agreement

India and Pakistan have powerful incentives to hold this summit, but are not under any compulsion to do more than nibble at the margins of Kashmir, the biggest-but not the only-problem that divides them. Most Indian leaders understand that the Kashmir issue has done great damage to India domestically and strategically. They want to discuss grand strategy and economic development with the world, not the latest atrocity in Srinagar. This compulsion is so great that the Indian leadership is willing to engage the Pakistan Army directly, rather than wait for a pliable civilian regime. The big question is whether Atal Bihari Vajpayee can offer Pervez Musharraf anything more than a brief moment in the limelight, thus starting the process of reciprocal concessions that are at the heart of a genuine peace process.

Musharraf is eager to go to Agra. Pakistan is in danger of becoming an international pariah and his legitimacy at home and abroad may be questioned. Until he can manage elections in 2002, Musharraf must show that he is the rightful leader of Pakistan by pursuing statesmanlike policies. Thus, a rising India and a shaky Pakistan must talk-or at least appear to talk. A successful summit could lead to the lifting of some sanctions.

Hawks in both nations disapprove. They believe that the best time to kick a man is when he is down. But Musharraf has realised that being tough has not benefited Pakistan, and a softer line has to be tried. If India does not reciprocate, then expanded support for the militants (or even another Kargil) will become a live option. US officials have urged renewed dialogue for several years. The possibility that Washington might actively engage itself in the region provided an incentive for India to move sooner rather than later, buying time with this pre-emptive diplomatic strike. The policy review under way in Washington is unlikely to recommend changing the hands-off (and pro-Indian) Clinton policy as long as there is progress in the Indo-Pak dialogue.

What does US expect from the summit? Assuming neither side commits a misstep, these are the possibilities:

Musharraf and Vajpayee will not change fundamental positions on Kashmir but they will agree to further talks. Since Indians believe Pakistan's weakness brought Musharraf to the summit and Pakistanis believe that pressure on India made Vajpayee invite the President, there is no basis for a long-term negotiation that is not shadowed by the threat of force.

The two will take steps to ease the plight of the Kashmiris, including another cease-fire, more movement of Kashmiris across the loc, reduced flow of weapons and extremists from Pakistan and softening of the Indian forces.

The problem lies in verifying that such steps have been taken. An independent, non-governmental citizen's commission, possibly including foreigners, should be set up to assure both sides that agreements reached are being implemented.

There is likely to be agreement on several confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the area of nuclear policy. Whether these CBMs are faithfully implemented is another matter. The US has some ideas how they might be verified and US officials will be standing nearby with suggestions.

Musharraf and Vajpayee will resurrect or expand several earlier agreements. The Siachen Agreement, sabotaged by Rajiv Gandhi in 1989, could be revived and would be a template for reduction in forces all along the loc. There are other unimplemented agreements concerning trade, exchange of scholars, and free movement between the two countries and some of these might be operationalised. However, special interest groups are likely to stymie their implementation.

From Washington's perspective the summit announcement came as a welcome surprise, but there are few expectations of a breakthrough. Should the dialogue falter, there will be a more activist American role in the region, a step that would be welcomed by Pakistan but not India. Ironically, this may be the most important incentive for a more forthcoming Indian policy.

(The author is senior fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Programme, Brookings Institution, Washington DC)

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