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COVER STORY: INDO-PAK SPECIAL
Modest Recipe For Disengagement
The Indian Army
has already conveyed to the Government its willingness to consider troops
reduction to pre-Kargil levels in Kashmir if Pakistan stops infiltration.
It is also open to the idea of creating other border crossings along the
lines of Attari and Wagah. But it insists on linking any disengagement
on the Saltoro ridge overlooking the Siachen glacier with Musharraf's
ability to contain the jehadis.
India has a modest recipe for disengagement in
Siachen. According to sources, it will press for a cease-fire on the actual
ground position line (AGPL). The AGPL will be mapped with grid references
up to six digits to avoid confusion. Consequently, there will be joint
monitoring and patrolling of the Saltoro ridge. As Indian troops are deployed
on Indira Col near the Shaksgam Valley that was ceded by Pakistan to China,
the army is loath to abandon this advantage. The Saltoro ridge is a wedge
between the northern areas of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the
Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin. Hence disengagement on Siachen can be possible
only if there is complete trust between Delhi and Islamabad.
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FIRE POWER: Vajpayee at Pokhran in May 1998
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The two sides will also talk nuclear risk reduction
measures. Here too, any progress will depend on Musharraf's willingness
to delink the issue from Kashmir. But since Musharraf knows that the West
will keep honing in on South Asia for as long as it perceives the region
to be a "nuclear flashpoint", delinking the two would hardly
be high on his agenda. He may, at best, pay lip service to the Memorandum
of Understanding signed by the two foreign secretaries in Lahore in 1998.
Pakistan has not accepted the no-first-use offer
made by India in 1998 due to asymmetry in the conventional forces of the
two countries. Instead, Islamabad has been offering a no-war pact to neutralise
India's conventional superiority. In the absence of any real meeting ground,
a token agreement may be reached on upgrading the existing communication
links between the nuclear centres of the two countries. The hotline may
be upgraded from the present director-general military operations level
to that of vice-chief of army staff.
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EXPECTATIONS
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Pakistan wants India to sign a no-war pact.
India would like Pakistan to agree to a no-first-use pact. Both
sides should exercise nuclear restraint.
Pakistan wants India to clearly define its nuclear chain of command
and control structure.
India hopes that the present communication link between the DGMOs
will be upgraded to avoid risk of accidental or unauthorised use
of nuclear weapons.
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LIKELY OUTCOME
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The two sides agree to implement
the peace and security protocol signed at Lahore.
The communication link is upgraded to the level of vice chiefs
of army staff.
The worst case scenario could lead to little or no progress, for
Pakistan may link nuclear CBMs to the Kashmir imbroglio.
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Unlike Musharraf, Delhi would rather talk business.
India has granted the most favoured nation (MFN) status to Pakistan. But
this gesture has not been reciprocated. India could ideally wait till
2003 when WTO commitments will force Pakistan to grant it the MFN status.
But it would like to secure interim concessions in the hope that trade
will create a substantial constituency in Pakistan with a vested interest
in healthy bilateral relations. Pakistan is aware of this happening, which
is why it links normalisation of trade to the Kashmir issue. The exception
is the proposed Indo-Iran overland gas pipeline that not only gives Pakistan
monetary benefits but accords it a strategic control over India's energy
supplies.
Musharraf's Kashmir pre-condition will clearly
weigh heavily on the summit. His political future-particularly his ability
to control the jehadis- hinges substantially on his success in showing
gains in Kashmir. With the economy in a shambles and international pressure
mounting on Pakistan, Mission Kashmir is Musharraf's way of emerging from
a difficult situation unscathed.
For Musharraf, even modest steps on Kashmir
will do. Reshaping the agenda is a long haul and gains in Agra will be
the thin end of the wedge. Having failed to secure Kashmir militarily,
Pakistan has changed tack. Musharraf has merely repackaged an old objective
with great skill and clarity. Tragically, the Indian response has been
inadequate.
Full text of all stories at www.thenewspapertoday.com
Also: 'Talks by the Taj': Follow exclusive, interactive news and views
of the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit at www.thenewspapertoday.com
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