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COVER STORY: INDO-PAK SUMMIT
HIT AND RUN
The talks almost produced an Agra Accord but the positions
of Delhi and Islamabad are still wildly incompatible
By Prabhu Chawla, Raj Chengappa and Shishir
Gupta
One
of the first things a commando learns in military school is that a battle
never follows a script. Audacious dare-devilry must inevitably be accompanied
by constant improvisation. The greater the surprise the more the chances
of success. These are lessons General Pervez Musharraf, regarded in Pakistan
Army circles as an exemplary commando, learnt on the job. Blessed with
a great tactical sense that incorporated all the elements of psychological
warfare, he arrived in Agra on the morning of July 15 aware that his hosts
were in a state of nervous anxiety. Used to the staid ways of conventional
diplomacy, they were puzzled by the outlandish ways of the Pakistani President.
Outraged by his insistence on blessing the Hurriyat Conference, bemused
by his request to combine a visit to his old home in Delhi's Daryaganj
with a visit to the congested Jama Masjid, impressed by his pre-visit
courting of the media, they didn't quite know what to make of the man.
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JUST A HANDSHAKE: Musharraf and Vajpayee meet at Rashtrapati Bhavan
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Musharraf wasn't overwhelmed by the same degree
of confusion. He didn't come with a script but he was reasonably clear
about his objectives: use the "unstructured" agenda of the Agra
Summit to plead, cajole and hector Prime Minister A.B.Vajpayee into conceding
the primacy of Kashmir in Indo-Pak relations, and bulldoze an Agra Accord-which
could be distinguished from the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.
When he received Vajpayee's invitation on May 23, Musharraf was just a
Chief Executive desperate for legitimacy. He aimed to return to Pakistan
not merely as the unchallenged President but a statesman-the man who had
broken a 53-year-old stalemate and come one step closer to avenging Pakistan's
1971 humiliation.
It didn't quite happen that way. At 11.10 p.m.
on July 16, more than eight hours after his scheduled departure, it was
a "reflective" Musharraf who stepped into a waiting limousine
at Jaypee Palace hotel to be driven to Agra airport. There were no public
farewells, not even the customary handshake with Vajpayee for the cameras.
The Indian prime minister didn't even see his guest off to the car. Curtly
denied the permission for a press conference-a request made and turned
down even before the visit was under way-he left in the cover of darkness,
the unsigned Agra Accord in his jacket pocket. "Koshish jari rahegi
(I will continue trying)," he told Digvijay Singh, the minister in
waiting.
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COMMANDO'S MIND: His agenda was clear: Kashmir or nothing. India
initially thought he was posturing.
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"US pressurised
India to issue invitation for a dialogue."
June 26, to Pakistani Editors, later retracted
"Simla and
Lahore avoided the main issue of Kashmir."
July 13, to Gulf News, later denied
"India should
join hands in resolving the Kashmir dispute."
July 14, statement at Palam Airport
"Non-violence
and peace needed for better ties."
July 14, visitor's book at Rajghat
"Moral, diplomatic
support for Kashmir will continue."
July 14, at the Hurriyat meeting
"I am upset
but optimistic about the talks with India."
July 18, cabinet meeting at Islamabad
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Yet it could just as easily have been a different
story. A story whose ending would have resulted in Musharraf making major,
but not spectacular, gains and Vajpayee having to explain why he allowed
the General's cowboy diplomacy to make headway. Unfortunately for Pakistan,
Musharraf the commando went for broke and returned not only empty-handed
but with a terse Indian response that as far as it was concerned, the
inconclusive summit was a non-event. "We will have to begin again
on the basis of existing agreements-Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration,"
said the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson, just a day after
her minister Jaswant Singh told a press conference in Agra, "We will
pick up the threads from the visit of the President of Pakistan."
Not that Musharraf ever expected the past to
be instantly disowned. Agra, he had calculated, would be his finest hour,
his victory over what he thought was a dispirited India led by a man who
was anxious to make peace at any cost, if only to upstage hardliners in
his Government. "It was due to destiny that I am here sitting in
front of you in Agra to resolve our problems," he told Vajpayee at
his first one-on-one meeting at 11.20 a.m. on July 15. "Let us solve
this problem (Kashmir) first and we can go on to others later."
Vajpayee had been thoroughly briefed on what
Jaswant would later call Pakistan's "unifocal" approach. Speaking
in Hindi-just as Musharraf had initially wanted-he told the General, "We
are willing to discuss everything including Kashmir but let us begin from
where we ended: Lahore. Terrorism is very much alive. Kashmir cannot be
resolved unless we stop cross-border terrorism." Vajpayee went on
for another seven minutes, stressing the need for a composite dialogue
on each of the eight subjects identified by the foreign secretaries in
New York in September 1998.
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