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COVER STORY: INDO-PAK
SUMMIT
A Poor Start
Musharraf would
have none of it. He stuck to his Kashmir gun and for 40 minutes it was
a see-saw exchange between Kashmir and terrorism, with both leaders prefacing
their remarks with a desire to open the proverbial new chapter in bilateral
relations. It was not an encouraging beginning.
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DRESS DIPLOMACY: Musharraf
was by turns presidential, casually elegant and the smartly turned
out soldier ready for tough negotiations
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SARTORIAL
STATEMENT: Musharraf's clothes ranged from a formal sherwani, smart
suits for meetings and casuals for a visit to his ancestral house
and also for the official talks |
Nor was there any meeting of minds at the one
and only delegation-level talks that began at 1.20 p.m. around a large
rectangular table in the conference hall of Jaypee Palace hotel. In his
introductory remarks, Vajpayee again spelt out the case for a composite
dialogue and Musharraf-speaking in English-retorted with a plea to thrash
out Kashmir first. Then it was Home Minister L.K. Advani's turn.
Advani had already engaged Musharraf in a strange
exchange when they first met on the morning of July 14. First they exchanged
notes about their old school, St Patrick's, Karachi. When Musharraf invited
him to visit Karachi again-Advani's previous visit was in 1978-the home
minister told him there were some difficulties, notably the law and order
problem there. "I was in Turkey recently and signed an extradition
treaty. Not that there are too many Turkish criminals here or our criminals
there. But such a treaty creates an atmosphere of goodwill," Advani
told Musharraf. The General, on his part, instantly agreed it was a great
idea. Whereupon Advani piped in that there were people wanted in India
who were being sheltered in Karachi, "Like Dawood." "You
are being tactical," shot back Musharraf, confirming his worst fears
of the man a Pakistan newspaper described as the BJP's "pitbull".
As a delegate Advani was less tangential. He
made an appeal to Musharraf to recognise the extent of public concern
in India over terrorism. This cross-border terrorism, he said, was at
the root of Indo-Pak tensions. At this point Jaswant intervened by stressing
the importance of peace in the region.
It was a dialogue of the deaf. Musharraf played
his Kashmir song all over again, adding a new point-that Kashmir could
not be resolved unless the "wishes of the Kashmiri people" were
also factored in. When the two sides broke up for a four-course lunch
at 2.30 p.m., the conversation centred on Agra's monuments. Armed with
the irreconcilable opening statements of Vajpayee and Musharraf, diplomats
of both countries set about the impossible task of drafting a joint statement.
Outside, in the news-starved lobby of the Mughal Sheraton the whisper
was about an emerging personal chemistry between the leaders.
Fact and fiction were so indistinguishable that
Minister of Information and Broadcasting Sushma Swaraj told the media
the talks were going on well and the two sides were discussing common
concerns like terrorism and nuclear confidence-building measures. She
was mum on Kashmir.
In charge of the media bandobast but barred
from the conference venue, Swaraj confused her role as facilitator with
that of spokesperson, forgetting that diplomacy has a different set of
rules. Basing her information on low-level sources in the Prime Minister's
Office, she shot off her soundbites and gave Pakistan a handle to go on
the offensive.
| WHAT
PAKISTAN WANTED |
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WHY
INDIA
SAID NO |
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Link settlement of the Kashmir dispute with
progress on normalisation of bilateral ties.
Any settlement should be in keeping with
the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
The centrality of the Kashmir issue must
be established in all future talks.
Though the summit was inconclusive the
Agra talks can be the basis of future negotiations.
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Goes against India's stand that relations should not be held hostage
to the Kashmir issue.
It is only a ploy to bring tripartite dialogue through the back
door. No way can we accept it.
Not unless Pakistan agrees to give ending cross-border terrorism
equal importance.
Sorry. What was offered at Agra was a package deal that was either
fully in or out.
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Not that Pakistan reacted immediately. Having
been charmed by the Taj Mahal where he posed for photographs with his
wife Sehba and put off by an impertinent question about the condition
of Mohajirs in Pakistan, Musharraf calculated that the second one-on-one
he requested with Vajpayee before the Uttar Pradesh Governor's banquet
would be crucial. With careful premeditation, he walked into the summit
room and, after a few pleasantries, thrust a two-page document before
the prime minister. It was his draft for an accord.
Vajpayee was stumped-such documents are not
usually discussed at one-on-one meetings-but he was too old a hand to
fall for the ambush. He noted the crucial sentence: "The process
of normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations is dependent upon the solution
of the Kashmir dispute." It was Pakistan's maximalist position and
had no mention of either Simla or Lahore. After all, how could Musharraf
endorse agreements signed by either a man whose daughter was contesting
his legitimacy or another man who he had overthrown and exiled to Saudi
Arabia?
Vajpayee made his misgivings quite clear but
suggested the matter be referred to officials for deliberation. He made
it clear he was bound by the Indian Constitution that defined Jammu and
Kashmir as an integral part of India. Musharraf countered he was a reasonable
man and was willing to redefine "dispute" as an "issue".
Vajpayee stuck to his unwillingness to discuss the fine print. It was
at this juncture that a note from Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar was brought
in for Musharraf. It drew the President's attention to Swaraj's remarks.
The implication: India was up to its old tricks again. Musharraf raised
this issue with Vajpayee at dinner.
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