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NEIGHBOURS: INDO-PAK TALKS
Beyond Agra
India indicates that the onus for any forward movement
in New York is on Pakistan
It was 5.30 p.m.
on Wednesday in Islamabad last week when Indian High Commissioner Vijay
Nambiar called on Pakistan Foreign Secretary Inam-ul-Haque to convey Delhi's
message regarding the September 25 Indo-Pak summit in New York. India
wants to know Pakistan's "true intentions", he told Haque without
pulling any punches, before the meeting between Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee and President General Pervez Musharraf on the sidelines of the
UN General Assembly.
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"There was no progress
on Kashmir dispute under the Simla Agreement. Pakistan will take
up the matter at a time when the situation is more favourable."
President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Rawalpindi, August
17, 1976
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Nambiar's plainspeak was prompted by the annoyance
of Indian political leadership at Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar's
remarks on Kashmir at the UN Racism conference in Durban, and Musharraf's
intention of raising the "core issue" in New York. Pakistan's
strident remarks and its "unifocal" approach to the summit were
discussed at a meeting between Vajpayee, External Affairs Minister Jaswant
Singh and National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra. In fact, Delhi was
so upset over Pakistan's attitude that the request of its High Commissioner
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi for a meeting with Indian Foreign Secretary Chokila
Iyer to discuss the summit's modalities was pushed to the backburner.
The Government wanted Nambiar to first get a clear picture of the Pakistani
mindset and whether or not it was prepared to discuss a structured agenda
at the summit.
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"We must first pay
heed to problems which offer chances of easier solutions and leave
knotty problems like Kashmir for a later date."
President General Zia-ul-Haq, Delhi, December 17,
1985
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Haque reiterated before Nambiar that Islamabad
wanted to discuss all outstanding issues with India but the focus should
remain on Kashmir. The next day Qazi called Secretary (West) R.S. Kalha
at the Ministry of External Affairs and submitted various time schedules
for the summit. But there was no response from Islamabad on its readiness
for a structured agenda.
While the diplomatic sparring is expected to
continue, both India and Pakistan are virtually committed to meeting in
the US. The two leaders, perhaps, would not like to be frowned upon by
the international
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"Through
the process of confidence-building measures we will move towards more
intractable issues by resolving the less intractable issues first."
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Islamabad,
December 31, 1988 |
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community by not meeting. In fact, Vajpayee spoke
of "continuing the peace process set into motion at Agra" a
day after the war of words with Islamabad. But the main question is whether
the summit will be productive given Islamabad's "preoccupation"
with the Kashmir issue.
Haunted by memories of Agra, Delhi has no desire
to strengthen Musharraf's political roots by allowing him to hold the
New York meeting hostage to the K-word. The Indian perception is that
Pakistan is "calibrating violence in Kashmir to the negotiating process".
The massacres in Doda and Jammu after the Agra Summit are cited as cases
in point. While Delhi is willing to discuss Kashmir on a priority and
at a political level, it has no intention of linking the normalisation
of bilateral relations solely to this thorny issue.
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"Let's not
have any illusion that the main issue confronting us is Kashmir.
That is the reality on ground whether we like it or not."
President General Pervez Musharraf, Agra, August 16, 2001
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Pakistan, on its part, has accused India of associating
Islam with terrorism and has ruled out any joint statement or declaration
after the summit. It has also made it clear that Musharraf would raise
the Kashmir issue at the UN. As Musharraf is scheduled to speak a day
before the summit, any adverse remark would wreck the talks.
Given the circumstances, Delhi is expecting
"minimal" outcome from the summit. Vajpayee and Musharraf are
expected to take stock of the situation post-Agra and give broad directions
to push the dialogue forward. A meeting of the two foreign ministers at
a later date in Pakistan may be the most likely outcome. Keen to avoid
a deadlock both sides may report an incremental forward movement. With
India putting the onus of future talks on Pakistan, it is up to Musharraf
to cross the Kashmir hurdle.
Shishir Gupta
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