America's General
Pakistan takes its most crucial decision since the 1971 war — to side with the US against the Taliban. The clerics may protest, but Musharraf has few options.

ECONOMIC IMPACT
Where Are We Going?
Fear and uncertainty stalk the Indian economy as early damages begin to show.

Ready For Battle
Where will the US strike, with what and how? A report on the military options before the global coalition that the Americans are building against terrorism.

Shifting Stance
Indian foreign policy is in a flux following the terrorist strikes in the US, metamorphosing in tandem with the tectonic shift in the geopolitical landscape of the world.

Menace In The Mind
People like bin Laden are not so much politicising religion as religionising politics.

COVER STORY: OSAMA BIN LADEN

Transnational Operations

Bin Laden started out as a vocal dissident opposing the Saudi royal regime who he called corrupt, venal, autocratic and un-Islamic. There are many, both within and outside the state, who share his views. Many of them are wealthy. Some are minor royalty themselves, others are members of his own family. Their money is added to the increasing amount that is gathered in mosques and by Islamic charities throughout the world. Hidden in front companies and in bank accounts all over the globe, it is difficult to trace but relatively easy to access. Significantly, there is no evidence of any state sponsorship.

	FORCES OF FAITH: Osama's 2,000-strong troops are well-equipped and disciplined
	Bin Laden bought off opposing commanders, helping the Taliban advance on Kabul.

Bin Laden has hated Saddam since the invasion of Kuwait and, despite indications of some kind of rapprochement, hostility still exists. And though the New York trial on the east African embassy bombings revealed that formally the group is open to collaboration with Shia Muslims (bin Laden and the bulk of his followers are Sunnis), the strong historical enmity makes alliances with Teheran or its sponsored terror groups unlikely.

Bin Laden operates transnationally, and nation states do not particularly interest him unless they are seen to be oppressing Muslims. The New York trials revealed that large sums of money (as much as $100,000 in one instance) were doled out to Islamic groups in Eritrea, Chechnya and elsewhere. Some went for genuine relief of suffering Muslims-in Sudan, for example. Others for more violent purposes. And it is worth remembering that even as recently as 1995, bin Laden was running a series of import-export companies in Sudan, shifting sesame and other products out and cars and bicycles in. "A man who had no need of cash wouldn't have bothered setting up all these two-bit enterprises," said one security source.

But Al Qaida's greatest strength is not its wealth but its utterly unprecedented structure. There is no formal hierarchy beyond the four committees (operations, media, funding and administration) that bin Laden established. There are no lieutenants or generals or defined operational cells. Yet there is the sort of obedience and discipline that is found in regular armies. "Because of the respect in which he is held and the aura that he has now, he doesn't give orders. He doesn't need to," says a British security expert. "It's a completely new phenomenon. You could call it disorganised-organised terrorism."

Much of what is known about Al Qaida was unearthed during the FBI investigation into the east African bombings-a similar, if a smaller, exercise to that being conducted in America now. The story of Mohammed Rasheed Al-Owhali reveals an enormous amount about bin Laden's operations and how hard it is to link him directly to any attack.

Al-Owhali was one of the men who delivered the car bomb in Nairobi. He was meant to die in the blast but walked away and, thus, survived. He told investigators how in 1996, he had left his native Saudi Arabia to fight in the jehad. He could not get to Bosnia or Chechnya, so he headed for Pakistan and wound up in a camp in Afghanistan run by an Islamic group. As a prize for doing well at his basic military training, he was given an audience with bin Laden. It was the only time he met him. Following his basic training he was selected by an Al Qaida aide for specialised training in terrorist techniques. In between training, he fought for the Taliban. Finally, in 1998, he was given a mission and was sent to Kenya where Al Qaida had set up a cell during bin Laden's stay in Sudan from 1992 to 1996. The cell was directed by another Al Qaida operative who left the country the day before the attack

Thus, the only recognisable role played by bin Laden was inspirational and in terms of training. The same pattern was followed by the Canada cell-that produced Ahmed Ressam who was arrested carrying a bomb to blow up Los Angeles airport-and the cell in Jordan that had planned an attack on a 400-room hotel packed with pilgrims at the turn of the millennium.

"Basically you are looking at a global mass movement that involves tens of thousands of people some of whom are prepared to seek training and then act when bin Laden indicates the time is right. They are self-motivated. That makes fingering bin Laden very hard," an FBI investigator says.

It also means that bin Laden does not himself need to stockpile munitions or equipment, other than for arming his 055 brigade. He can maintain his own security by restricting his immediate entourage, making the organisation mobile and very hard to penetrate. Though he has expressed an interest in obtaining chemical and nuclear weapons-and has at least once tried to buy enriched uranium-the actual possession of terrorist hardware is not essential for him.

That also defines bin Laden's future strategy. Many believe his plan is to continue to attack the West and provoke greater and greater retaliation with the final aim of sparking a global war. There are Al Qaida cells and supporters in 34 countries-including India-according to a recent western intelligence report. It is now a race to see who can strike first: the killers or those trying to stop them.

The author is the Chief Reporter of The Observer, London, and was its South Asia correspondent from 1998 to 2000.

Constant suspicion, poverty, ill-health and lack of work dog Afghan asylum seekers in India. INDIA TODAY's Principal Correspondent Anna M.M. Vetticad meets some of them.
Living On The Edge