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COVER STORY: US RETALIATION
Readying For War
The American coalition in the fight against Osama
bin Laden has quite a few options available before it — but doesn't
quite know the one that will serve it best
—By W.P.S. Sidhu in New York
"The American people want action, and
they want it now."
—Bill Young, Republican Representative
from Florida
A week after the
dastardly terrorist strikes, tabloids in New York — taking a cue
from US President George W. Bush's quip about wanting Osama bin Laden
"dead or alive" — ran mock "Wanted" posters of
America's number one fugitive on their front pages. Like the kangaroo
courts of yore, public opinion had tried, condemned and convicted their
man in absentia. All that was left was for the posse to lynch him.
Leading this posse is a reluctant sheriff who,
despite his populist sound bites, realises that while prompt action is
likely to assuage the American imperative for instant gratification, it
is unlikely to achieve the purpose of delivering the culprit even to the
Wild West style of justice. Even some members of the "shoot-first-ask-questions-later"
brigade in the present administration have acknowledged that a limited
strike, like the one launched by Bill Clinton in 1998 against Afghanistan
and Sudan, is likely to be ineffective.
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FIRE POWER: USS George Washington, currently off New York
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Similarly, an unlimited, all — out conventional
attack-a difficult proposition even for the world's only superpower —
might not exterminate the threat. Besides, such unilateral assaults are
unlikely to be popular with the international community. Therefore, while
it is still not clear which of the several options being examined by seething
military planners in Washington will finally come to fruition, one option
that has almost certainly been ruled out is a unilateral, one-time 1998-type
stand-off missile strikes.
Herein lies the dilemma for the world's lonely
sheriff as he ponders the first war of the 21st century: how to get rid
of this threat once and for all in the long term without appearing to
be inactive or, worse, weak in the short term. Writing in the Washington
Post, Air Force General (retd) Charles G. Boyd sums up this concern: "Not
to respond would be unthinkable: it would diminish and demean American
leadership and would surely invite further attacks." On the other
hand, the general notes, "To react excessively or inaccurately would
put us on the same moral footing as the cowards who perpetrated the September
11 attacks."
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ON THE HUNT: US President George
W. Bush (right) talks about smoking the terrorists out, but his
officials admit they are fighting a difficult battle with an enemy
that offers no clear targets
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By all accounts, the Bush Administration is following
a three-pronged approach to deal with this multi-faceted issue. First,
to collect irrefutable evidence of the complicity of the Al Qaida group
in last week's horrific events while maintaining a high level of alert,
with special emphasis on homeland defence. Second, to build a multilateral
political, economic and social coalition against the new enemy-the global
terrorist. Finally, the US would have to sustain and coordinate this unwieldy
coalition over an indefinite period against what Bush, in a rare eloquent
moment, called "a conflict without battlefields or beachheads".
The first, primarily unilateral strand, is proceeding
apace and the order to recall 35,000 reservists, particularly from the
National Air Guard, is the best indication yet of the importance being
given to the concept of homeland defence. However, it is the second aspect
of this three-part strategy that will pose the greatest challenge for
the Bush Administration.
The last time the US built a truly multilateral
"coalition of the willing" was against Saddam Hussain in 1991
when 36 countries including, interestingly, Afghanistan, combined forces
to throw the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. That coalition was relatively
easier to build for a number of reasons. First, the US was still engaged
in the multilateral arena and sought the endorsement, if not approval,
of the United Nations Security Council for its actions, which made the
coalition palatable to many. Even India broke with tradition and allowed
the US planes to refuel in Mumbai. Second, it was not difficult to prove
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, which also provided a clear military objective:
the liberation of Kuwait. Finally, given the superior firepower of the
coalition, there was little doubt that this would be a limited operation
and that it would be possible to keep casualties low. However, even then
the US could barely keep the coalition together for the month-and-a-half
long Operation Desert Storm.
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