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COVER STORY: US RETALIATION
Tough Task Ahead
Building a coalition
this time around would be relatively more complex. First, given the a
la carte multilateralism in the early days of the present Bush Administration,
potential coalition partners are not only going to be sceptical about
the sincerity of Washington but are also likely to expect their pound
of flesh in advance. For instance, while offering their cooperation, both
China and Pakistan sought US support on Taiwan and Kashmir respectively.
Second, it is more difficult to prove a direct connection between a terrorist
and the crime. Besides, as noted international scholar and vice-rector
of the United Nations University in Tokyo Ramesh Thakur points out, "Washington
... must not make a distinction between 'our' terrorist and 'theirs',
condoning or tolerating one lot while isolating and battling another."
Indeed, in this context, it would appear that some present and potential
allies of the US are also part of the anti-US terrorist network (see graphic).
Finally, given the nature of terrorist networks, a war against them is
unlikely to be limited either in space, time or body bags. The last aspect
may be of significant consideration, particularly to the militaries of
the developed world.
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EVER READY: The Taliban militia are not only committed faith
warriors, they also have the inhospitable Afghan terrain on their
side
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Despite these hurdles, the US can be expected
to cobble together a respectable military coalition which would include
some, if not all, NATO members: Israel; some moderate Arab states, also
victims of terrorism, such as Egypt; some new strategic partners, such
as India; some reluctant partners along the Afghan border, such as Pakistan;
and perhaps some unlikely partners like Iran, depending on the consensus
in Teheran and Washington. As in 1991, both Russia and China can be expected
to provide political support, particularly in ensuring that the appropriate
resolutions are passed in the UN Security Council, although military support
may not be forthcoming. However, it would be more challenging to build
a coalition that can also sustain a political and economic assault on
the terrorist networks over a long period of time.
While the 1991 coalition provides a useful model
for a military build-up, new approaches will have to be explored in terms
of tactics as none of the past wars provide an effective tactical model
to deal with the present situation. During the Iraq war, then General
Colin Powell famously said of Hussain's forces in Kuwait: "First,
we're going to cut it off, and then we are going to kill it." The
shadowy bin Laden-inspired network does not offer such a clear target.
As US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld candidly admitted on Fox News
Channel, "The terrorist organisations don't have armies, navies and
air forces that one can go battle against. They don't have capital cities
with high-value assets that they are reluctant to lose."
This poses a tactical challenge to the US military
and most of its allies, which until now were primarily geared to strike
other armies, navies, air forces and political, economic and civil infrastructure
using their own superior conventional military firepower. This explains
why the US was relatively successful in Iraq and Kosovo but floundered
badly in both Somalia and Rwanda. The latter experience is likely to be
revisited in Afghanistan.
Although some in the current US Administration
have threatened to "bomb Afghanistan back into the Stone Age",
the prolonged fight against the Russians followed by the yet unfinished
civil war has already ravaged the country and practically razed it to
the ground. Today, there are hardly any assets-military or civilian-worth
bombing. Besides, as Barnett Rubin, a leading American scholar on Afghanistan,
told the New York Times, "The Soviet Union bombed, mined and strafed
the terrain ... yet lost the war." He cautioned that sending troops
into the ragged, barren mountain terrain would "only move the disadvantages
of Vietnam to a new and harsher setting".
Even if the target list is expanded to include
countries that harbour terrorists or enable them to carry out their activities,
the tactical question will have to be revisited. For, there is no guarantee
that even a massive use of conventional force to destroy the political,
civil and military infrastructure alone will break the terrorist networks.
They could quite easily remain unaffected or move to another location.
Perhaps that is why American military planners are seriously examining
covert operations. According to military experts, as many as 35,000 special
forces-including Navy SEAL Team Six, US Army Delta Force and the Air Force
Special Operations RECON and insertion units-have already been recalled
on a war-footing. In addition, the 82nd Airborne Division, which specialises
in capturing airfields and rapid assault missions, is also being prepared
to be deployed abroad.
Clearly then, even as the Bush Administration
works towards building a coalition, it will also have to develop the tactics
that this coalition will have to employ to take on the terrorist networks.
According to one assessment, the tactical model that might be appropriate
in tackling the scourge of terrorism is the one being used by paramilitary
and special forces to dismantle the drug trafficking networks in Latin
America, West Africa and Europe. Another tactical model is the one that
India has been using, with mixed results, in combating the indigenous
terrorist groups. While the Bush administration is certainly willing to
explore these options, it will have to develop new and more innovative
tactics to meet this menacing assault on civilisation.
(The writer is an associate with the International
Peace Academy, New York.)
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