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COVER
STORY: AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE
Anarchy Alert
Despite the US' choice of a potential head in Kabul,
restoring order will not be easy given the interests of the players involved
Declaring a war
against the US may have been an act of bravado, but the outcome for the
Taliban is a foregone conclusion. Equations are already being worked out
to erect a stable political structure in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The
US, in close consultation with its European allies, seems to have zeroed
in on Zahir Shah, the 86-year-old exiled Pashtoon monarch who was last
in Afghanistan in 1973, to head an interim government after the Mullah
Omar regime is toppled.
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KING IN WAITING: With US blessings, Shah (right) hopes to
return a ruler
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However, restoring order in a country with a
bloody history of internecine feuds is not easy, especially given the
self-interests of the players currently involved. Delhi, which has played
no meaningful role in Kabul since 1992, is looking for a UN-backed multi-ethnic
government ratified by the Loya Jirga (tribal chiefs' meet) and one that
includes representatives of the Northern Alliance (NA). India-besides
Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan-has had close ties with the NA
headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani and provided tacit support to the anti-Taliban
forces led by former Tajik commander Ahmed Shah Masood. On September 13,
before Masood's death was made public, this clutch of nations met at Dushanbe
to review its strategy to counter the Taliban. The meeting was also intended
to signal that Masood's successor General Mohammed Fahim Khan had the
full support of Russia, India and Iran to stall any move to split the
forces.
Iran, however, hasn't put all its eggs in the
NA basket. It also backs the Hizb-e-Wahadat led by Shia Hazara leader
Karim Khalili and has serious misgivings about the US' post-September
11 rediscovery of the NA for launching anti-Taliban operations. Moscow,
on the other hand, favours Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum who seems
poised to recapture the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Dostum, who fled to Turkey
after the Taliban attacked Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997, has rallied around
1,000 men at Dara-e-Suf in northern Afghanistan.
Expectedly, Pakistan-irked as it is by the traditional
links of Russia and India with the NA-wants a pro-Islamabad government
in Kabul. It is understood to have insisted the US ensure a "friendly"
regime in Kabul as quid pro quo for securing air bases and logistic support.
Its best hope lies in some key Taliban commanders ditching the present
regime and joining a Shah-led government where it will have a decisive
say. However, its unstated fear is that many Pashtoon commanders-who were
initially with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar-will just walk over to the NA.
The other fear is the Taliban backlash. The
core Taliban around Mullah Omar in Kandahar includes youth from the Afghan
refugee camps in Pakistan who have a strong ideological commitment to
Islam. Pakistan feels that after the Omar regime falls, this section may
move to avenge Islamabad's facilitating of the US attacks. Perhaps, by
trying to effect a change in Pakistan.
To avert this-which could have a bearing on
Pakistan's unity-Islamabad has clarified it will not participate or be
directly involved in any attacks against Afghanistan. However, if the
NA is seen to be getting the upper hand, Pakistan may instigate Pashtoon
tribals along the Durand Line to retaliate. Alternatively, it could move
its forces under the guise of protecting its lines of communication, while
effectively checking the forward sweep of the NA.
For India, a nightmarish situation could unfold
if a retreating Taliban moves towards Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir as it
would pressurise the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. These worries
have led to Delhi rooting for a broadbased neutral government with representatives
from Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtoon, Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara, Turkmen and other
minority groups. According to former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit, even
with a broadbased government in Kabul external military support will have
to be given to Shah to tackle the Taliban resistance.
Given these complexities, the US has chosen
to prioritise military operations against Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida
group while confining its relations with the NA to anti-terrorist operations.
It is yet to clarify its relations with the NA. Besides, the US' prolonged
stay in Afghanistan and its increased influence in Central Asian republics
could lead to friction with Moscow over hydrocarbon resources and the
lucrative trade routes in the region. It does not seem to be a hopeful
future, but for now that's all Afghanistan can wish for.
Shishir Gupta
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