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COVER STORY: PAKISTAN
Price Of A Deal
President Pervez Musharraf may have compromised
too much in his bid to see his country emerge as a frontline state for
US designs in the region
By Ishtiaq Ali Mehkri in Karachi
From a "coup
leader" to being regarded as a "statesman" at Capitol Hill,
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has indeed come a long way. And all
in less than three weeks. Under his leadership, Pakistan is on the verge
of crafting a new orientation not only in its foreign policy, but in its
entire socio-political outlook. As the United States finalises strategy
to bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age, Musharraf is making plans to
build a new republic based on the principles of anti-terrorism and liberalism
and to make Pakistan politically a frontline state for US designs in the
region.
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RIOT READY: Security at a pro-Taliban demonstration in Lahore
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But in much of Islamabad there is confusion about
how to go about in a war that Pakistan knows very little about. The only
thing that everyone seems to agree on is that the consequences of the
general's decisions could be catastrophic for a loosely knit nation like
Pakistan.
One thing, however, is certain: Musharraf's
decision to stand by the Americans has won Pakistan not only the status
of a US frontline ally in fighting terrorism, but also negated, perhaps
for all times to come, the threat of being declared a "terrorist
state". And there is more pouring in: packages of economic assistance,
vows from the White House to protect Pakistan at all costs and the lifting
of nuclear-related sanctions.
Pakistan's decision to go along with world opinion
in the fight against terrorism may have been pragmatic, but it has led
to the country experiencing the kind of political-cum-social backlash
that has rarely been witnessed before, especially in the northern and
tribal areas. The next few weeks or months will show whether the war next
door spills over into Pakistan itself.
At the moment, however, the general is in complete
control of the state and the political apparatus. Analysts here believe
that Musharraf could run into rough weather only if the Americans overstepped
their mandate in the region.
If sources in the Government and diplomatic
missions are to be believed, there is much more that Washington wants
Pakistan to do. Prime among them is to bring to an end the militant activity
in Kashmir. And that is where misgivings arise. Analysts believe it would
be too much to expect the Pakistan Army to give up something that has
for decades been the hidden agenda of the Islamic republic.
There is considerable debate on what Islamabad
has managed to bag as compensation for extending support to the US. The
Government seems reluctant to share the details and critics say what the
general has been offered is merely "peanuts"-precisely the term
General Zia-ul-Haq used back in 1979 when Washington offered Islamabad
$250 million for its support after Soviet forces marched into Kabul. On
record, there is the promised $3 billion loan from the US as well as $40
million that Japan has pledged. But Islamabad's hopes on other fronts
remain, well, hopes. There is little chance that the IMF is even seriously
considering the Government's much-touted $2.5 billion loan under the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility. Similarly, the Government was hopeful that
at least a part of Islamabad's staggering $36 billion external debt would
be condoned. Observers cite the deal that Egypt stuck with the US before
signing the Camp David accord with Israel through which it managed a waiver
of its entire outstanding debt. However, nothing of the sort is likely
to happen in the case of Pakistan. Sources say that the waiver of nuclear-related
sanctions has little to do with real progress until sanctions under Section
508 and other curbs under the Pressler, Symington and Brown amendments
are lifted by the US.
If Agra provided Musharraf with an opportunity
to consolidate himself at home, the World Trade Center-Pentagon strikes
have elevated not only his stature internationally but legitimised his
regime. It was what Afghanistan had done in 1979 for Zia-ul-Haq. Musharraf
has been quick to cash in on it. Yet the road ahead is tough. Extremists
in the establishment and outside and other jingoists who have hitherto
had their way on an agenda of hate and terror are not likely to lie low
for long.
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