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COVER STORY: WAR
DIPLOMACY
Crucial Pashtoon Support
The Taliban struck
back with air raids, and a Russian TV channel reported that Dostum may
have died in the attack. This was promptly denied by the Dostum camp.
Meanwhile, the Taliban rallied its 50,000-odd troops and fortified its
defences. Its guns shot down two US unmanned spy planes and its fleet
of 20-odd ageing MIG and Sukhoi fighters, inherited from the Soviet invasion,
were put on full alert. Ominously, the Taliban also threatened to keep
its 20-odd Scud missiles ready. To show that people were still with them
the militia organised a huge anti-US demonstration in Kabul and torched
parts of the former US embassy on September 26. It also seized 14,000
tonnes of food the aid agencies had stocked as part of their famine relief
programme.
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ALLIES AT WORK: British
soldiers undertake manoeuvres in Oman; (below) Dostum is leading
the anti-Taliban charge
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Whatever the claims of the NA on the battlefield
it has its limitations. Without the backing of the US-led forces, it would
be difficult for the NA to overrun the Taliban. There are other problems
too that make it dicey for the US to depend solely on the alliance to
wage its war. The biggest hurdle is that the NA still has no Pashtoon
leader of consequence. The Pashtoons constitute 41 per cent of the total
16 million population of Afghanistan and control the country's power structures.
The alliance is dominated by Tajiks, who comprise 22 per cent of the population,
and Uzbeks led by Dostum, who account for another 6 per cent. The Hazaras,
who live in the heart of Afghanistan and have also joined the NA, constitute
another 5 per cent, with their leader Kharim Khalilli renewing attacks
against the Taliban with some backing from Iran.
The US desperation to get Pashtoon support made
it initiate moves to bring back the former king of Afghanistan, Mohammed
Zahir Shah, now living in exile in Rome. In the past week several overtures
have been made to the king to convene a Loya Jirga, or assembly of tribal
and regional leaders, to determine the fate of post-war Afghanistan. The
move was also aimed at shaking the loyalty of Pashtoon chiefs who are
currently aligned with the Taliban. The question no one is asking is:
does the old king command tribal loyalties 28 years after he was overthrown?
Even if a titular monarchy is put in place in
Kabul, will American interests be forever safe? Consider the Iranian precedent.
In the 1950s, the CIA helped overthrow Mohammed Mossadegh, a sort of Islamic
socialist who had elbowed out the Pahlavi dynasty in Teheran and was liberally
nationalising western-owned oil companies. Once Mossadegh was "taken
out" and the rule of the Pahlavis restored, America happily concluded
that the will of the "silent majority" had prevailed. Instead
a small ruling elite isolated itself from the Iranian masses and created
conditions for fervent radicalism and anti-US sentiment. A quarter century
later the beneficiary was Ayatollah Khomeini.
The NA suffers another drawback. Pakistan is
uncomfortable if a new Afghan regime is dominated by those who have no
allegiance to it-the Taliban is often described by its Afghan opponents
as Pakistanis. Part of the reason why it decided to help the US was possibly
a reassurance that Pakistan's interests too would be protected when a
new regime took charge. The demand stems from Pakistan having to bear
the brunt of instability and civil war in Afghanistan over the past two
decades.
The Taliban had been nurtured by Pakistan so
it could retain some control over Afghanistan. It also encouraged bin
Laden to actively support Kashmiri militancy by establishing training
camps. The US concern is that if Pakistan has too much say in the regime
that replaces the Taliban, there may be a resurgence in terrorism after
a respite.
The US seems to be moving with utmost caution,
with Secretary of State Colin Powell pointing to a "decisive and
sustained" offensive. While waiting for its warships to reach the
Gulf and readying the armies of its allies, America worked hard to muster
as much international support for the war against Afghanistan as it could.
It swiftly brought its NATO partners on board. But the tricky problem
was winning the support of Russia, China, Iran and the key Central Asian
republics bordering Afghanistan.
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