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INDO-US MILITARY ALLIANCE
Falling Back on India
Wary about the stability of its partners in West
Asia, the US proposes a military alliance with India for the long haul
against terror. The Government turns down but it may not be the last word.
by Prabhu Chawla
September
11 put the fear of Osama Bin Laden into America. Since then, President
George W. Bush is on the warpath. Blending cowboy language with a shrewdness
few expected from his administration, he is turning the placid world of
diplomacy upside down. What the Daisy Cutters are doing to the bleak countryside
of Taliban-held Afghanistan, his global coalition building is replicating
in geopolitics. If the fanatical enemy is crafty, audacious and nimble-footed,
the Bush Administration is replying in kind-with innovation, technology
and quick thinking. Without too much fanfare, Bush has broken the mould.
He has changed the way Washington sees itself.
America has reason to be one step ahead of the enemy. The Islamists want
to pit Islam against the rest and trigger a clash of civilisations. Its
theatre of war is Afghanistan but its targets are more ambitious-Saudi
Arabia, the Emirates and Pakistan. Success would leave America emasculated
and bereft of a foothold in the oil-rich region. For America this is no
time for squeamishness. If it concedes Pakistan's demand for a Ramzan
cease-fire, it may as well retire from the war. If it stops after the
Taliban is felled, it runs the risk of giving terror networks a respite.
If it goes after the real promoters of Al Qaida, it could lose allies.
The
Bush team has a black-and-white view of the world. On the evening of September
11, it asked General Pervez Musharraf one question: friend or foe? In
less than a week, Pakistan joined the global coalition. Now that same
Texan bluntness dominates its future vision. India began the Bush era
as an incidental blip on the
margins of the radar screen-an unfamiliar place that could possibly serve
as a counterweight to China. After September 11, it has re-emerged-at
the centre of a resurgent Pax Americana dream.
The
signals are unmistakable. Two days after US Secretary of State Colin Powell's
12-hour visit to India-when he extended Bush's invitation to Vajpayee-Ambassador
Robert Blackwill sounded out External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh about
Indo-US military cooperation. Earlier this month, Indian Ambassador to
the US Lalit Mansingh spoke of a "convergence of strategic interests"
between the two countries. During his Delhi stopover on November 5, US
Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was characteristically forthcoming.
At a joint press conference with Defence Minister George Fernandes, he
said his aim was "to
strengthen the military-to-military and defence ties between our two countries,
which I think are so important." The visitors' schedule of the US
Embassy in Delhi tells a story. Next month, a joint Indo-US Defence Policy
Group will meet, with US Undersecretary of State
for Defence Douglas J. Feith leading the Yankees. This may be preceded
by a visit from Admiral Dennis C. Blair, chief of the US Pacific Command.
Apart
from hinting that military cooperation could figure during the agenda
of the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-Bush talks in the White House, officials in
both countries are tight-lipped. They deny the very existence of any concrete
proposal.
Documents
with INDIA TODAY clearly indicate that military cooperation is a serious
understatement. What the Bush Administration has in mind is a full-fledged
alliance that is calculated to make India the US' foremost military ally
in Asia, with a relationship akin to that of the US and NATO members.
The American blueprint envisages a central role for India as a counterweight
to China on the one hand and the fragile
Islamic states of West Asia on the other. It would involve the establishment
of American bases on Indian soil and India's direct participation in future
operations. An attack on the US in the region would automatically invite
Indian retribution.
At
the core of the US proposals, submitted to India just prior to Rumsfeld's
visit, is a key role for the Indian Navy. The proposals suggested by Washington
include: Indian Navy tankers conducting replenishment operations for US
Navy (USN) ships in the Indian Ocean, southern Bay of Bengal and the Arabian
Sea.
Escort operations every eight to 10 days by Indian Navy ships (INS) for
USN supply ships through the Malacca Straits.
Refuelling
USN ships in India and sourcing high-grade aviation fuel for combat aircraft.
INS frigates or destroyers to intervene in support of USN in the Arabian
Sea in case of enemy action. Establishment of joint communications networks.
Ship repair facilities, port visits and supply of fresh foodstuff to USN
ships.
These proposals seem to be governed by two considerations.
First,
the availability of facilities in India would automatically cut down the
transit time for US military supplies to bases in east Asia, particularly
Japan. At present, USN tankers source oil from the Gulf and then proceed
to east Asia via the island base of Diego Garcia. An Indian facility could
cut down a journey by as much as 1,700 km. Second, by involving INS in
escort and protection work, the USN will have a permanent reserve for
prompt deployment to trouble spots. It will be able to divert its resources
from routine commitments. It won't be overstretched.
THE US proposals don't stop at merely identifying the Indian Navy as a
reliable escort service. Washington wants to broaden Delhi's involvement
in a formal alliance by seeking training and range facilities for its
entire military operations. It wants facilities for combined landings,
combined field training, combined live-fire training (land, air and sea).
These facilities would involve establishment of large US military bases.
An effective naval firing range, for example, involves clearing an area
of up to 500 km of sea from normal traffic.
Likewise,
field operations would mean that a large chunk of the Rajasthan desert
would become a combat training zone. The Indian response to the US proposals
has not been enthusiastic. When Jaswant Singh sought the views of the
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on October 19 on the principle of
extending military cooperation to the US, he met with resistance. Vajpayee,
Home Minister L.K. Advani and Fernandes spoke out against the idea. The
others in the meeting were Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra, Planning
Commission Deputy Chairman K.C. Pant, Cabinet Secretary T.R. Prasad, Home
Secretary Kamal Pande, the three chiefs of staff and the directors of
RAW and IB. Following this rejection, the US returned with explicit "discussion
points" that were a full elaboration of its wish list-minus the open-ended
issues of jurisdiction, command and control and rules of engagement that
can only be discussed once the principle is agreed to.
The CCS met again on November 3 to give Vajpayee a clear brief for his
discussions with Bush in Washington. Once again the political leadership
was unwilling to budge. Both Advani and Fernandes argued that accepting
the US proposals would be construed as a sign of Indian weakness. It would
also be a major departure from the existing national consensus against
getting directly involved in the military disputes of a superpower. Moreover,
there was also a feeling that Washington was treating India and Pakistan
at par and not being sufficiently attentive to India's concerns over cross-border
terrorism. India, it was made clear-and conveyed to both Powell and Rumsfeld-
would not accept unlimited military and economic assistance to Pakistan._
At
the same time the CCS did not throw out the entire gamut of US proposals.
It was willing to consider replenishment of fuel and food and even anchorage
for the USN. The idea was not to rebuff the US entirely. From India's
perspective, keeping the door slightly ajar for more negotiations makes
sense.
Despite
the ingrained anti-Americanism that infects much of the political discourse
in India, Vajpayee knows that there is a groundswell of public opinion
in favour of extending full support to the US war effort. The environment
seems right for breaking the hoary mould of non-alignment, despite India's
unwillingness to get out of a Pakistan-centric mindset. HOWEVER, yielding
to the compulsions of the moment also means giving in too easily. India,
it would seem, is keen to extract a price from the US, as President Pervez
Musharraf of Pakistan has done.
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