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INDO-US MILITARY ALLIANCE
The Great Debate
The
CCS met again on November 3 to give Vajpayee a clear brief for his discussions
with Bush in Washington. Once again the political leadership was unwilling
to budge. Both Advani and Fernandes argued that accepting the US proposals
would be construed as a sign of Indian weakness. It would also be a major
departure from the existing national consensus against getting directly
involved in the military disputes of a superpower.
Moreover,
there was also a feeling that Washington was treating India and Pakistan
at par and not being sufficiently attentive to India's concerns over cross-border
terrorism. India, it was made clear-and conveyed to both Powell and Rumsfeld-
would not accept unlimited military and economic assistance to Pakistan.
At
the same time the CCS did not throw out the entire gamut of US proposals.
It was willing to consider replenishment of fuel and food and even anchorage
for the USN. The idea was not to rebuff the US entirely. From India's
perspective, keeping the door slightly ajar for more negotiations makes
sense.
Despite
the ingrained anti-Americanism that infects much of the political discourse
in India, Vajpayee knows that there is a groundswell of public opinion
in favour of extending full support to the US war effort. The environment
seems right for breaking the hoary mould of non-alignment, despite India's
unwillingness to get out of a Pakistan-centric mindset. HOWEVER, yielding
to the compulsions of the moment also means giving in too easily. India,
it would seem, is keen to extract a price from the US, as President Pervez
Musharraf of Pakistan has done.
From Powell to Rumsfeld, India has spelt out
its own charter of demands. First, it wants the US to lift the ban on
military supplies and allow the import of supercomputer technology and
other hitech products. These bans remain in place despite the lifting
of the post-Pokhran sanctions. Second, India wants US support for its
bid to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Some things are unstated. The CCS advised the
prime minister to politely inform Bush at the White House meeting that
it would need something more than the lunch-cum-Rose Garden diplomacy
to persuade the Indian political class to join the US military mission.
In a complex political canvas, the US would have to deliver more in terms
of its support to India's position in Kashmir for a broad consensus to
emerge.
For any discussion on a military alliance to
progress seriously, Washington would have to stop equating India and Pakistan.
One would have to be treated as a strategic partner and the other, a duplicitous
ally of convenience. Not that the US is unaware of India's scepticism.
Even if the fear of being branded a "lackey of US imperialism"
doesn't haunt a ruling party that banks on the aspirations of Green Card-chasing
middle classes, there is a nationalist undercurrent that can be invoked
by forces as diverse as the RSS and the CPI(M). An Indo-US military relationship,
admitted Admiral Blair, isn't "as easy as turning on a switch".
It requires political groundwork and mental preparedness. Yet, military
observers concede that there is an inescapable logic to the US proposal.
In a post-Cold War age, the US is frankly embarrassed
by the conduct of some of its allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,
in nurturing the terror network in the first place. The Republican faithful
who put Bush in the White House seem fearful of an Islamic upsurge that
offends the tenets of the "American way".
In the hunt for new partners, India fits the
bill on a number of counts. It is well positioned geographically and is
a democracy with a professional army. It has a large diaspora in the US.
American Indians are noted for their education, enterprise and family
values-all of which appeal to the US heartland. It understands the American
idiom. Most important, India has an instinctive hatred for radical Islamists.
Indeed, it has been named-after the US, Britain and Israel-by bin Laden
as a target.
For India, the US proposals have a mixed appeal.
There is, of course, the fear of the devastating social consequences of
a large US troops presence. Images of South Vietnam and the Philippines
haunt the middle classes. Against this, however, are the large strategic
and colossal commercial spinoffs. Without question, Delhi is attracted
by the possibility that a formal Indo-US alliance would mean the final
burying of the Kashmir issue-to India's advantage. With access to the
most advanced technology, India could begin the process of competing with
China. Its regional power ambitions won't be thwarted and it would have
fulfilled its unsatiated desire -recognition from the US of A. At the
same time, a reduction in the defence budget would permit scarce resources
to be diverted to the social sector and for economic development. Finally,
there would be a significant multiplier effect of likely American defence
investments in India-the US defence budget for 2000 was $313.3 billion
(at Rs 15,00,000 crore, five times the size of India's entire Union Budget).
Would it compromise Indian sovereignty? That
depends on how any military arrangement is negotiated and whether or not
there are enough safeguards and opt-out clauses. However, an Indo-US military
alliance wouldn't have Subic Bay or Okinawa as the model. It would be
more akin to the US presence in democracies such as Britain and Germany-unobtrusive
and understated. For the moment, the alliance idea seems stillborn. Some
would say the Government upheld national honour. Others would interpret
it as another missed opportunity.
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